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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

11/20/08
Pakistan: Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq  —Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. (D-PA), Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
11/13/08
The View from Gaza  —Taghreed El-Khodary, New York Times journalist in Gaza and Harvard University Nieman Fellow (2005-2006). Interviewed by Middle East Bulletin.
11/04/08
Getting on the Right Track  —Dalia Rabin, chairperson, Rabin Center, and daughter of the late Yitzhak Rabin. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Keeping Focus on Long-Term Objectives

“[W]hile we do need to have a cooperative approach that involves many of our friends and allies in meeting with the Pakistanis, … as we work out with them a rough division of labor, the U.S., I believe, ought to be taking the lead in addressing the issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. And given the difficulty of doing so, I suspect that we will not have a great deal of difficulty in convincing them to allow us to take the lead there. But as we all know, there is a real tension between our short-term tactical aims in trying to capture or kill terrorists across the border and militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and our longer- term counterinsurgency pacification goals. We very much need to be focusing on the end state. What is it that we want this area to look like? ... In that context we need to have a common agenda with the Pakistani government and very much to include the military on counterinsurgency in that area. There needs to be, therefore, a focus on combining military efforts with economic, development and political development in those areas.”
—Robert L. Grenier, managing director and chairman for Global Security Consulting, Kroll, event, “Partnership for Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability in Pakistan and the Region,” Center for American Progress, November 17, 2008

Middle East Analysis

Waiting for Condoleezza

By Ben Caspit (Maariv), translated by Middle East Bulletin

It seems that the IDF operation in Gaza has realized its objectives. For an operation on a local scale no more can be expected. Givati provided the goods, Southern command won praise from decision makers, and the Palestinians paid dearly. According to the Major General Yoav Galant, it is possible to continue at this pace for weeks on end. Until they get the message. On the other hand, it is possible to exit at any moment. To quit while ahead.

According to Israeli statistics, around 80 terrorists were killed in the past few days, in addition to a few dozen civilians. The message is clear: Israel is taking its gloves off - right now at a low intensity. If there’s a need it will happen again, but on a greater scale.
On the other hand, Hamas has learned the effectiveness of the Grad [Katyusha] missile and tasted the possibility of paralyzing a big Israeli city. This taste is dangerous; it is easy to become addicted to it.

If something dramatic doesn’t happen in the coming day, or overnight, Condoleezza Rice’s visit tomorrow will mark the end of this current round of violence. The American secretary of state doesn’t care about the Gazans, but about her “baby,” the Annapolis process, which is currently trapped beneath the rubble. Rice will try to pry it free. She aspires, with all her might, to leave for herself a fancy diplomatic legacy in the months remaining to her. A diplomatic source who understands these matters suggested yesterday to Rice, in her absence, that she start looking for a different legacy. She won’t find such a legacy here.

Meanwhile, yesterday a new front opened against Ehud Barak. The minister of defense, who is managing the IDF’s operation in Gaza, found himself yesterday skirmishing with Minister Ami Ayalon. If things don’t work themselves out quickly it will become a political crisis within the Labor Party. Ayalon, who promised Barak that he wouldn’t run against him before the next elections in return for a promise that he would be a partner in all decision-making processes, feels betrayed. The forum of eight, which became the forum of nine when Ayalon joined the government, has been dismantled and no longer exists. The cabinet doesn’t meet. Ayalon’s letter to the prime minister, defense minister and foreign minister from a few weeks ago was, it turns out, only a preview. The movie itself will be screened in the coming days.

"We are in a complex situation,” says Ayalon. “In order to adapt to it we have to adopt for ourselves a decision-making process. And such a process does not exist. The bottom line from all the Winograd reports is that the State of Israel does not have a policy, nor does it have an orderly process for molding a policy. Nobody knows what we want, what we aspire to, and nobody is conducting an orderly process in order to find out. For victory is not measured in comparative casualty levels, or in occupation of territory. Victory is measured by the capability to create a better political reality out of it. And I ask: will what we are doing today in Gaza create such a reality?” Ayalon answers his own question: “I’m not sure…”

He doesn’t have a problem with a military operation in principle. On the contrary, he demands an immediate “targeted hit on specific houses. Every house from which a Qassam is launched, we’ll give the family that lives there a four hour notice to evacuate and we’ll erase it. International law recognizes such an action.” What Ayalon thinks is missing is a serious, in depth, and penetrating discussion on what we hope to achieve through what we’re doing and our goals. "So we’ve killed 100 Palestinians, and suppose we have weakened the military arm of Hamas. So what? For at the same time we have also strengthened dramatically the standing of Hamas in the territories, and we have weakened Abu Mazen and weakened the political axis of the moderate Arabs. In order to win, we need a political process. We have to achieve a cease-fire from a position of strength, which will be binding on all the organizations. We have to reach an agreement on the crossings with the cooperation of the international community, and we need a courageous and genuine political process in Judea and Samaria. There are 600 roadblocks there and not one of them is being removed, and in such a way there will never be a better economic situation there. We must think, talk and hold a discussion about all these things.”

Herein lies the problem. “I don’t identify a willingness on the part of the defense minister to have such a dialogue,” says Ayalon. What he doesn’t say, at least publicly, is that Olmert is a hostage of the defense minister and cannot force this type of conversation upon him. "The main thing,” says Ayalon “is that we say that Abu Mazen is weak. In my opinion, Olmert is no less weak if we cannot remove an outpost or move a roadblock. I am telling you that in the past week, the Palestinian Authority arrested 20 Hamas operatives in Judea and Samaria, one of whom died in Palestinian prison. So perhaps it is not perfect, but it is more than we are doing. And we are wasting energy on operations that do not have any real thinking behind them. A military operation that is not accompanied by a diplomatic initiative will strengthen Hamas, as the only element that is capable of fighting Israel, and will weaken Abu Mazen, to the point of putting him at risk of being toppled, as well as weakening the axis of moderate Arab states."

And what does Barak say? Barak doesn’t say much. He’s very busy in Gaza. For him, Ayalon is a nuisance. “What does he want all the time?” whine Barak’s people. “He has maximum access to the defense minister, they talk often, today there was a governmental discussion, there’s a cabinet meeting on Wednesday. What does the man want from us? All these conversations about discussions and discussions, at the end someone also needs to act. Every discussion like this requires preparation with the prime minister of a couple of hours, and before that there’s preparation with the defense minister of a couple of hours, and before that preparation with the chief of staff of another couple of hours, and before that with military intelligence and preparations at the command level and on and on. At the end of the day it takes two days of meetings to have a discussion of this sort instead of the chief of staff taking care of the situation on the ground. Does Ami have an alternative? Let him propose it and we will discuss. But with all due respect, it’s impossible to spend time only in meeting rooms. He talks about the recommendations of Winograd? There’s also the trauma of Winograd. A trauma that forces everyone to constantly chalk up meetings in preparation for the next commission of investigation.” This is just the beginning of the fight. The prime minister is trying to maneuver between Barak and Ayalon, the general and the admiral, without getting entangled. He’s after all only a corporal. He would prefer Ayalon explode at Barak than at him. But Ayalon knows that in the end, the responsibility is on the shoulders of only one Ehud. Olmert. Somebody close to him nicknamed him “prime minister without portfolio.” At this rate, it seems that Olmert is not lacking in portfolios, Ayalon is not the most significant of them.

Condoleezza Rice, armored with an armada of American generals who have been hanging around here for many months keeping accounts will arrive in Jerusalem tomorrow. Let’s seem him get out of that.