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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

Setting the Record Straight

Eye Still on the Ball

“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010
  • Middle East Analysis

    Upcoming Events

    The Road Forward on Middle East Peace

    Event: October 1, 2009 - 12:00pm-1:00pm

    Introduction:
    Winnie Stachelberg, Senior Vice President for External Affairs, Center for American Progress

    Featured speaker:
    Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL)

    Moderated by:
    Moran Banai, U.S. Editor of Middle East Bulletin

    WATCH HERE

    Choosing the Annapolis Road

    By Mara Rudman and Brian Katulis, advisers to Middle East Progress, original commentary for the Middle East Bulletin

    The ink on the joint Israeli-Palestinian understanding is dry, the delegates have gone home, and the streets of Annapolis are no longer crowded with diplomatic security details. After Annapolis, everyone is asking: what next?

    Even before the sessions began, skepticism was on full display in media editorials and commentary from pundits on the left and the right. Extremists on the fringes – Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians alike – took to their streets to protest a meeting aimed at jumpstarting the peace process. With such cynicism and downright opposition, the safe bet was on Annapolis achieving nothing. It was as if the meeting was doomed to collapse under the weight of pointed intellectual arguments from sharp analysts for whom critique is stock in trade, and equally vociferous opposition from radicals who have used violence to kill brave leaders working for peace and terrorize the silent majorities who pragmatically support a two-state solution.

    As the dust settles from this week’s flurry of meetings, it is worth taking a deep breath, standing back, and looking at the big picture. Three tasks are essential at this early stage.

    1. Take stock. First, we should assess what happened. With only one month to go in 2007, it is amazing to see where things stand compared to where they were just a year ago. Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, have been meeting regularly for months, developing a genuine ability to communicate beyond the stiff pleasantries of diplomatic protocols. This developing relationship is laying the foundation for a new albeit narrow opening for progress. The joint statement read aloud by President Bush laid out specific commitments and set a goal for reaching a peace treaty “resolving all outstanding issues” by the end of 2008. Although much work remains ahead, this statement presents an opportunity for those supporting a sustainable and enduring Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    Annapolis helped achieve some important gains beyond the Israeli-Palestinian track. Despite naysayers sniping, getting such an inclusive group from this troubled region together was no small task. After years of seeking to isolate Syria, the United States shifted its approach by inviting it to join the party.

    Israel’s growing recognition of the import of the Arab Initiative is notable, too. Prime Minister Olmert spoke of it as “born in Riyadh, affirmed in Beirut and recently reaffirmed by you in Riyadh,” and said he “value[d] this initiative, acknowledge[d] its importance and highly appreciate[d] its contribution.” He went on to note that “[t]he Arab world represented here by many countries is a vital component in creating a new reality in the Middle East.”

    Getting countries like Saudi Arabia – which faces a domestic constituency that includes some of the most conservative and extremist opponents to the peace process – was not simple. Though inclusiveness and broader participation is largely symbolic, symbolism matters too, particularly at an early stage of trying to restart a process.

    2. Acknowledge the Challenges. A real opening was achieved this past week – and the next step is to embrace the challenges that lie ahead and acknowledge that the tasks are difficult. Pragmatic acknowledgement of the scorecard of issues to be addressed is a key step in planning for moving forward in the process. It is also important for holding all sides accountable to the commitments that they have made.

    The tasks are considerable for both Israelis and Palestinians on the security front. Palestinians face a major challenge in achieving political consolidation that can serve as a foundation for stability and prosperity. They will need a great deal of outside help to reestablish law and order, disband independent militias, and stop rockets from being fired into Israeli territory by terrorists. Gaza presents particular challenges after the violent coup conducted by Hamas in June. The international community must dedicate more efforts to addressing the humanitarian implications facing the 1.5 million Gazans as a result of this lack of security and a largely stifled economy. Israeli and Palestinian authorities must work together to reduce the barriers that impede Palestinians’ ability to travel and have access to trade and goods. Israel must also freeze settlement activity, remove illegal settlement outposts, and make preparations for relocating settlers as borders are determined in final status negotiations. Finally, both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders must prepare their publics for some difficult compromises on the toughest issues – including refugees, Jersualem, final borders, and the status of settlements.

    3. Make a Plan to Meet the Challenges. The Annapolis joint understanding sets out a goal of getting all of this done by 2008. That’s a pretty tall order, but timelines and goals like this have a way of focusing attention and motivating parties to get things done. In addition to the joint declaration, this past week’s meetings produced a new effort for monitoring the security situation and developing a more sustainable security framework. The appointment of widely respected and politically skilled General Jim Jones, with a broad mandate to deal with security issues bilaterally and regionally, is a good sign that the United States is committed to achieving progress on this key front. A number of follow-up meetings are planned, including an international donors conference on December 17, a potential follow-up meeting in Russia, and more sessions of the Middle East Quartet, which should find a way to engage as well the Arab Follow Up Committee, the involvement and support of which proved valuable at Annapolis.

    In the wake of Annapolis, a more complete set of ingredients are available for achieving Middle East progress; there are no shortage of tools and mechanisms for getting things done. What is needed is brave leadership that assembles these different elements in an inclusive and integrated process that forges pragmatically ahead in a difficult landscape.

    After Annapolis, those interested in reviving the Middle East peace process face a fundamental choice: either roll up your sleeves and dedicate your efforts to help leaders move the process forward, or continue offering up Monday morning quarterback analyses that do little to advance the cause.

    After seven difficult years in the Middle East, cynicism and naysaying is understandable, but going overboard with skepticism leaves us nowhere. The alternative to the Annapolis formula? A center that literally does not hold: a growing security vacuum, pragmatists with nothing to show for their willingness to negotiate, extremists on both sides prevailing. This alternative damages U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian and regional interests and makes life no better for the people impacted by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We choose the Annapolis route, bumpy as it may be.