How to Move Forward on Syria

by Theodore H. Kattouf, former U.S. ambassador to Syria and the United Arab Emirates; president and CEO, AMIDEAST. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

How do you see the current state of affairs in Syria?

My sense is that Syria has some domestic concerns. First, and perhaps foremost, is that Syria is no longer a net exporter of oil and therefore it has lost its number one foreign exchange earner. In addition to that, like many countries right now, it suffers from inflation—and life for the ordinary Syrian has never been that easy to begin with.

In addition, of late, the security situation hasn’t been what we’ve come to expect of Syria—that is, we expect that it can control dissent, or at least violence, within its borders. We’ve had, in the space of a few months, the assassination of the senior Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh; the mysterious shooting on the beach of General Suleiman, who is reputed to have been involved both in the re-supply of Hezbollah and perhaps in whatever facility nuclear or otherwise that Israel bombed last fall; and finally, and most recently, there was the bombing near a Syrian intelligence headquarters that reportedly killed 17 people. This does not mean by any stretch of the imagination that the Syrian regime is on thin ice, or that it is very vulnerable, but only that it is dealing with some domestic problems that it has not had to deal with for some time.

What is your view on current U.S. policy toward Syria?

It’s a bit hard for me to understand current U.S. policy toward Syria. The Syrians and the Israelis are in peace talks, through the Turks. It’s my understanding that both sides have let the U.S. know they would welcome the U.S. playing a significant role. And yet, for the first time in my memory, the U.S. has shown no apparent interest in getting involved. Indeed there were reports a couple of years ago that when the Israeli prime minister let it be known that he wanted to explore peace talks with the Syrians, senior administration officials discouraged him from doing so. Clearly, both Israel and Syria have gone ahead on their own, with the initiative of the Turks, and it makes us look a little bit marginalized, at a time when our own efforts between the Palestinians and Israelis do not appear to be making any significant headway.

And how would you read Secretary Rice’s recent meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Wallid Muallem at the United Nations General Assembly?

Well, in terms of a new administration, I think it’s a good move. It’s a good step on the part of the secretary, because it will make it easier for the next administration to conduct a more serious dialogue with Syria. Our relations with Syria were on a downswing even before 9/11. You can probably date it to the collapse of the Clinton efforts to broker an Israeli-Syrian peace, when the president met with the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in the spring of 2000 in Geneva and Assad refused Clinton’s offer because it did not get Syria down to the Sea of Galilee.

And then, of course, 9/11 came along and Syria, as a state sponsor of terror, was in a very bad light with the administration. First of all, Syria was no longer part of any peace process, which if successful could have helped to resolve many of the contentious issues between the United States and Syria. And secondly, Syria was identified in the public mind with terrorism, or at least support for terrorism. The Syrians did help in a serious, effective way before the U.S.-Iraq war, by cooperating against al Qaeda cells. But once the Iraq War started, relations did rapidly deteriorate and they’ve never recovered.

The U.S. tends to only want to talk to the Syrians when there’s something we want from them. Meanwhile, the Syrians want a broad, comprehensive dialogue with the United States. And they even admit that they cannot really conclude a peace with Israel unless the United States is also involved, because, obviously, they would like a different sort of relationship with the United States. They’ve given hints that if they could conclude a peace with Israel under U.S. auspices and have a different kind of relationship with the U.S. and the West, they would be willing to take measures that would clearly cause a breach in their relationship with Iran, something that Israel of course wants very, very much right now. But, as I said, the United States, for ideological reasons apparently, is not willing to engage in a serious comprehensive manner with Syria.

Syria, of course, is hardly without sin. There’s been a lot of negative Syrian behavior—acting out, if you will. And in response to not getting what they want—a dialogue with the U.S. — they have been strong supporters of Hezbollah, of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and maintained a very close relationship with Iran.

You’ve written about a Grand Bargain between the United States and Syria. What issues would be involved in such a bargain?

Well, there are quite a few issues. First, I’d like to reassure Lebanon’s many supporters that I don’t think, and I don’t know anybody else who does think, that Lebanon should somehow be considered a prize for Syria in any Grand Bargain. To me, that should be off the table.

But, there are things that Syria would like. They would like to have their honor restored by regaining all the territory lost in the June 1967 war. They would like to be off the state sponsors of terrorism list, which results in a number of sanctions, and of course, there have been additional sanctions put on since their inclusion on that list in 1979. They would like to have a climate in which the U.S. would back World Bank loans and aid from Europe, Saudi Arabia, Japan and others to Syria. They would like help with their economy in terms of reform and attracting foreign direct investment.

And I think in return, the Syrians would be willing to quit allowing the supply to Hezbollah of Iranian arms through their territory—as a result of a treaty with Israel, they would have no choice in any case. They would have to insist that Hamas and Islamic Jihad either become normal political parties with no militia wings or expel them altogether from Syria and ensure that they were not aiding them in any way. They would need to support peace in terms of a two-state solution between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. And they would have to have normal relations with Israel. There’s plenty to talk about but right now Syria is feeling vulnerable and its only reliable ally is Iran. And they are not going to alienate the Iranians until all the t’s have been crossed and i’s dotted in some sort of a Grand Bargain that I referred to.

So how do you get both sides to such a Grand Bargain?

First you have to begin talking to one another, that’s most basic. And you have to be willing to talk about everything. I think we should have enough self confidence that just because we talk about issues with the Syrians that it is not an indication that we’re willing to concede on basic principles, be it Israeli security, or infiltration across the border with Iraq, although that’s clearly improved quite a bit in recent months. We need to be willing to talk about the issues Syria is interested in talking about as well as the ones we wish to talk about. And I think if we did so, we’d find ourselves with a lot of support from a number of the actors in the region who don’t want Syria to be in Iran’s orbit. And the Europeans would also be quite supportive.

Let me give you an example. We did send an assistant secretary of state in 2007 to Damascus, but only to talk about the processing of Iraqis who had worked as translators and the like for the U.S.. We wanted to send a consular officer there to interview them and others to verify their bona fides. But meanwhile, Syria has a million and a half refugees from Iraq and we really have not been that interested in addressing that issue in a serious way, even though it’s a huge humanitarian burden for Syria. If Syria had closed its borders with Iraq to those refugees, I don’t know what kind of a humanitarian disaster we would have had.

We invited them last November, upon the urging of other Arabs, to come to Annapolis to open Palestinian-Israeli talks and they did come. And then there was one meeting after that, between Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Muallem, I believe in Egypt, on the margins of a conference about Iraqi security. But each side claimed the ball was in the other side’s court and nothing further came of it. And now we’ve had this ten minute meeting up in New York at the UN. But as you can see, it all seems very sporadic, lacking vision, lacking purpose, lacking seriousness.

What about the Syrian side? Are there problems there?

There are absolutely problems on the Syrian side. The regime in Syria has never understood U.S. politics very well. I think they’ve shown some learning of late, but they’ve always been very clumsy and heavy-handed about who they would talk to and who they would allow in. They’re very suspicious. They often misread the tealeaves. So, there’s plenty of blame to go around. And Syria has played, as I’ve said, the spoiler role, which hardly endears you to people you want to have a dialogue with.

So if the United States were interested in a Grand Bargain, how would you work with the Syrians?

Well, I think the Syrians have given enough signals that we should test them. Because, it’s Bashar al-Assad who, for a number of years, has let it be known that he wanted to resume peace talks with Israel. Occasionally he would talk about starting where his father and then Israeli Prime Minister Barak, through President Clinton, had left off. But, nevertheless, there’ve been plenty of signals that Syria has come to understand that the lack of a peace process was costing it dearly in its foreign relations.

Now you can argue that the Syrians just want the process for that reason and nothing more. But I believe that Bashar al-Assad would become a very popular president in Syria were he able to do something that his father was never able to do, restore Syrian sovereignty over all the land occupied in the June 1967 war. And clearly a lot of people in the Israeli military, intelligence and political establishment think the same thing or they wouldn’t be talking to Syria right now through Turkey. They want to explore the possibility of weaning Syria away from Iran and ending its unhelpful policies in that part of the world.

Israel and Syria can’t do this without the United States—virtually both of them say exactly that. A U.S. role is needed and desired and I think when the next administration comes in, if Prime Minister-designate Livni is able to form a government similar to the one that’s currently acting in a caretaker role, that the door would be open for the next U.S. president, whether it be McCain or Obama, to chart a different course.

You were one of the last ambassadors to Syria before …

Margaret Scobey followed me, but she was recalled back to Washington never to return after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

What’s your perspective on the U.S. appointing a new ambassador? What kind of opportunities would that provide? What kinds of risks are associated with it?

I go along with those who say that talking to our adversaries is not some sort of a favor to them. I think we should be represented at the ambassadorial level. We can all have our suspicions about what the Syrians did or didn’t do in Lebanon relative to some of the awful acts that have been committed there. But those issues are being investigated. There’s a separate track and process for them. Meanwhile, however, I think we should be willing to receive their ambassador here in Washington on a regular and normal basis at the State Department and elsewhere in the government. I hope that the time is at hand when a new administration comes in to send a new ambassador to Syria. This is not the first time we’ve had very bad relations with Syria but we’ve found ways in the past to overcome it and I see no reason why we couldn’t do it soon after the new administration takes office.

Would there need to be some kind of diplomatic fig leaf so that it doesn’t appear as a concession?

No, because a new administration isn’t bound by the conventions of the previous one. Plus we already have the fig leaf because a number of former secretaries of state, I think, at one time or another have stated that we ought to be talking at a high level to the Syrians. That includes former Secretary Powell who said exactly that—and he had been part of the administration in the first term.

You spoke about ensuring Lebanon’s sovereignty as part of the Grand Bargain. How would that be accomplished?

It’s not going to be easy. I don’t believe that Syria, if there were a Grand Bargain, would allow the whole thing to break down over Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon are neighbors and not everything Syria says about their relationship is wrong. The Syrian and Lebanese people share a tremendous number of similarities, there are a lot of familial relations and the border has always been poorly patrolled and demarcated and people have easily slipped back and forth in better days.

In the context of a peace treaty with Israel, Syria would have no reason to support armed elements of Hezbollah. One would expect that the Israelis would insist that the Syrians have nothing to do with Hezbollah, unless it becomes a normal, political party within the Lebanese context. Any sovereign state worthy of the name should have only one legitimate government and only one legitimate force, i.e. the sanctioned armed forces and the police and the like. You cannot have a state within a state and expect other governments to view you as a normal state.

Syria and Lebanon do have agreements that govern their relationship. Both states need the other. And I think that it would be good and normal for Syria and Lebanon to have, if the Syrians like the words “distinguished relations,” then distinguished relations. But Lebanon is a member of the Arab League, like Syria. It deserves respect for its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. And I’d like to think that Syria would go along with that.

What do you foresee in the coming months while President Bush is still in office and how can the transition be handled effectively?

Sometimes the outgoing administration will consult with the incoming administration about coordinating on certain issues, and I don’t see that it’s beyond imagining that if the incoming administration indicated that it would like the United States to start preparing the way for a higher U.S.-Syrian dialogue and some U.S. participation in Syrian-Israeli talks, that the current administration couldn’t smooth the way for that.

I’ll give you one example: When the Reagan administration was leaving office, Secretary of State George Shultz, even though he had had some rather sharp things to say about the PLO, nevertheless determined that the PLO had fulfilled the necessary legal requirements for the United States to enter into a dialogue with it, making it easier for the incoming Bush administration to try some new policy initiatives in that regard.