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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

12/11/08
Toward Resolution  —President of Israel Shimon Peres. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
11/25/08
U.S. Engagement with Iran: A How to Guide  — Karim Sadjadpour, associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
11/20/08
Pakistan: Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq  —Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. (D-PA), Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

A Shared Interest

"With his enthusiastic embrace of the so-called Saudi peace plan, Olmert is committing Israel to accepting the Arab narrative of the Arab-Israeli conflict. … With Olmert now giving his stamp of approval to the Saudi plan, he is denying the country its moral right to defend itself both militarily and diplomatically."
—Caroline Glick, deputy managing editor, The Jerusalem Post; senior fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs, Center for Security Policy, "Tzipi and the Drug Lords," The Jerusalem Post, November 27, 2008 versus
  • “Israel rejected the Initiative in the past without examining it in depth. According to the common wisdom, the more Arab partners involved, the more they’ll be pushing us and be in favor of the Palestinians. I think that in the present situation in the Arab and Muslim world, where we see strengthening of extremism that bothers moderate Arab states no less than it bothers us, the Arab states have an interest that such an agreement comes to fruition. And for that to happen, if there is a need to push the Palestinians or assist them, I think this is exactly the time to do that.”
    —Maj. Gen (ret.) Danny Rothschild, president, Council for Peace and Security, interview, Israeli radio, Reshet Bet, November 2, 2008 (translated by Middle East Bulletin)

    • Middle East Analysis

    • Putting the Arab Peace Initiative Into Action —Ghaith al-Omari, director of advocacy, American Task Force on Palestine; former foreign policy adviser to Palestinian President Abbas. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
    • Peace Plan Needs PR Backing —Roula Khalaf (Financial Times)
    • A Comprehensive Agenda —Ezzedine Choukri-Fishere, former adviser to the Egyptian foreign minister, & Omar Dajani, former legal adviser to the Palestinian negotiating team (Al-Ahram Weekly)

    The Day after Annapolis

    Interview with Gadi Baltiansky, former press secretary to Prime Minister Ehud Barak & director general of the Geneva Initiative

    Q: What positive outcomes did you see from this meeting? What were the positive things that surprised you the most from this session? What is the importance of those positive outcomes looking forward?

    A: The meeting in Annapolis marked a meaningful shift in Israeli policy of the last seven years. Until now, Israel conditioned re-launching negotiations with the Palestinians, and specifically negotiations on the final status agreement, upon implementing the first stage of the Road Map. According to the new policy, it is possible to conduct negotiations in parallel with the implementation process rather than wait for its completion.

    The second positive development is that the upcoming negotiations will no longer aim for an interim or temporary agreement but discuss all the core issues – most significant of which are the borders, Jerusalem and the refugees – paving a possible way to reach a final status agreement.

    A third development is that, even if no strict time frame was set up, there is an interest in reaching an agreement by the end of 2008.

    Additionally, we shouldn’t downplay the importance of the massive participation of the Arab countries in the summit yesterday and the caliber/seniority of their representatives.

    Q: On what issues do you think there could have been better results? What issues are the most challenging and thorniest to tackle?

    A: The meeting itself was a bit disappointing; the joint statement could have been much more substantial and the speeches could have presented more detailed objectives. President Mahmoud Abbas was the only one who referred to the final status issues in his speech. The reason is not insufficient preparation ahead of the meeting but political unwillingness on Israel’s side – backed by the United States – to formulate such a statement. Yet, it is important to note that the results of Annapolis will be tested not based on what happened at the summit but on what the Annapolis process will entail. If yesterday’s summit fails to begin a process, it will be remembered as a failure or soon forgotten altogether.

    Q: Looking to the coming months: What are the most realistic intermediate results that the international community should work towards on the Israeli-Palestinian front? What are the key building blocks to making sure momentum moves forward on the Israeli-Palestinian track?

    A:     In the upcoming months there are three tracks in which we can envisage progress. The first is strengthening Abu Mazen’s power in the Palestinian territories by building the institutions of a future Palestinian state.This will need to be done while minimizing the divide between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For this purpose, Israel needs to remove checkpoints and roadblocks, release prisoners, and halt construction in the settlements. Such acts would demonstrate to both the Palestinians and the opposition in Israel that Olmert is ready to make the transition from words to actions.

    The second track is demonstrating progress in the negotiations over at least one of the less sensitive core issues, i.e., security arrangements, borders or water.

    The third track is increasing international involvement in the process, one expression of which is presence of the international community – led by the United States - not only in what happens on the ground but also around the negotiation table. Additionally, once Israel proves its commitment to the process, it would be possible to demand that the Arab states demonstrate even symbolically their future consent to normalization with Israel. Minor diplomatic steps would help both the Israeli leadership in explaining better why painful compromises must be made, and Abu Mazen in showing his public that the Arab world supports the process.

    Q: What tools does Olmert have to advance the process?

    A:     The main question in my opinion is whether Olmert really means to obtain an agreement within a year or whether it is a brilliant political maneuver that will guarantee his survival as well as improve his image and popularity.

    I don’t know the answer and am not sure such an answer exists. Olmert wants both the process and his coalition; therefore he might advance the process without reaching a point which jeopardizes his position.

    It is important to note that Olmert distinguishes between reaching an agreement and implementing it. He might be willing to reach an agreement toward the end of 2008 if he is confident that a real agreement exists on which he can capitalize in the elections. However, there is no way he will start with implementation before the next elections. An agreement is achievable in months but implementation is expected to take years. For the record, the implementation of Israel’s peace agreement with Egypt lasted three years, and back then there were very few settlers.

    Possibly, Olmert’s platform in the next elections will be based on an agreement with the Palestinians. I also do not waive the possibility that if, from some reason, the Palestinian process collapses, Olmert will seek progress on the Syrian front.

    Q: What is the core debate inside Israel and where does the public stand?

    A: Most of the public in Israel supports a peace agreement according to the known parameters (Clinton, Taba, Geneva Initiative) but does not believe that it will happen in the next few years. The failure of Camp David in 2000 followed by seven years of violence, terrorism and lack of negotiations has had a strong impact on Israeli society, which has become more and more skeptical over time. Parts of the Israeli leadership believe naively that it is possible to reach an agreement with a very broad consensus. This, however, will never happen because of the price Israel would be required to pay. About a third of the public will oppose a peace agreement vocally. The question is whether the majority has the power to impose its will on the minority and if the elected leader has the courage to confront the minority – the minority will always be louder than the majority.

    In order for the silent majority to wake up and speak up, the leadership needs to present something meaningful, something more than statements. The public today only hears words but does not witness an actual change. Moreover, currently, representatives of this public, ministers from Kadima and Labor, are only adding to the skepticism instead of recruiting their constituents for a historic move.

    Q: What tools does Abbas have to advance the process?

    A:     On the one hand, Abbas needs a dialogue with Hamas to bolster his legitimacy and national support for his way, while on the other hand, he should make sure this dialogue does not stall the process with Israel or stop international support. First and foremost, he needs to do the utmost to ensure that no terror attacks emanate from cities such as Nablus where his forces are in charge of security. In addition, he needs to step up reform of the Fatah movement and keep an eye on anyone who is affiliated with Fatah. Finally, Abbas, like Olmert, should prepare his public for painful compromises. Already he uses far less slogans than he used to and this tendency of presenting the facts more realistically should continue.

    Paradoxically, leaders on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides traditionally try to appease their opponents in the hopes of reducing the latter’s objection. However, the target audience is the silent majority which should be convinced so that it, in turn, can overcome the minority’s pressure.

    Q: What is required of the international community in general and the United States in particular to help solve the conflict?

    A: The international community should be actively involved in all aspects of negotiations. More specifically, the last relevant Security Council Resolutions were 242 and 338, issued over 30 years ago. The international community headed by the United States can have an impact by turning important principles into a new Security Council Resolution which will serve as the new basis for negotiations.

    Within the international community, U.S. support of an agreement is crucial. Without such support, neither reaching nor implementing such an agreement can be accomplished. The U.S. role can be split into two parts – first, helping the sides reach an agreement by providing the required guarantees to both sides as well as the kosher stamp on the actual documents. In the second phase, the United States should monitor both the implementation of the Road Map as well as of the negotiations themselves. Additionally, the United States can commit to being part of the solution, for example in issues such as security, refuges and economic arrangements.

    Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an important U.S. interest. If the United States chooses to stay out of the conflict, it doesn’t mean that the conflict would stay out of the United States; this is especially true given the linkages that the Arab and Muslim world makes between Israel and the United States.

    During the first six,seven years of its term, this administration was not actively engaged in the process and security has only deteriorated. Now, the administration would like to do what it should have done in seven years only in one year. Better late than never. However, clearly the United States would have to double, if not quadruple, its efforts to compensate for the lost years. And by efforts I’m not referring to speeches.