Reviving U.S.-Turkey Relations

Turkish leaders still see a largely European future for their country, but its interests remain intimately tied to its southern neighbors. Turkey’s renewed activism in the Middle East became urgent after the turmoil caused by the 2003 Iraq War. Ankara is seeking to protect its interests by influencing rather than reacting to regional developments. The opening has also been prompted by economic opportunities in Middle Eastern markets. Middle Eastern countries have been generally receptive to Turkey’s overtures and seek greater cooperation with Turkey to advance a number of their own interests. Turkey is seen as an attractive partner on a range of issues and often a welcome alternative to the United States or Iran.

As the United States rethinks its own approach to the Middle East, it needs to make space for an increasingly activist Turkish diplomacy in the region. The United States could benefit from Turkey’s soft influence and efforts to stabilize the Middle East. How Ankara and Washington shape Turkey’s resurgence in the region will likely affect the development of a broad range of common interests including Iraq’s stability, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, and Arab-Israeli peace efforts.

While Turkey’s regional strategy and its “zero problems” approach to its neighbors may sometimes lead to policy differences with Washington ... [i]t is in the interest of the United States and Turkey to define areas where Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East can best serve common goals. With stronger bilateral consultation and coordination, Ankara’s diplomatic activism can be an asset and enhance regional stability. Access the full report>>

During his electoral campaign, President elect Obama highlighted the need to focus greater attention on Afghanistan. ... Turkey is in a unique position as regards its actual and potential contributions to this problem. Turkey’s relations with Afghanistan date back to the 1930s when Atatürk’s Turkey provided assistance to Afghan leaders in their initial state building efforts. Following the U.S. intervention in 2002, Turkey contributed to the security effort by twice assuming the leadership of the ISAF force. Currently, Turkey has seven hundred troops in and around Kabul.

But perhaps more important than the military dimension is Turkey’s ongoing commitment to the state building campaign. Turkey assumed in 2006 the management and operation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the district of Wardak, west of Kabul. ... In addition, the Turkish PRT was instrumental in the establishment of over a dozen schools; ... a police education and training center, and a model police station. Furthermore, Turkey recently pledged 200 million USD for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. ... A final element enhancing Turkey’s potential in this region is Turkey’s ability to bridge the Afghanistan-Pakistan divide. ...

The initial political rift between Turkey and the United States on Iraq stemmed from the inability of the United States, prior to the military intervention, to explain and sufficiently convince the Turks about its exit strategy from the country and the region. The same mistake should not be repeated with Afghanistan. In other words, the scope of Turkey’s contributions to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan will depend on the ability of the United States, as the leading actor in the region, to define, articulate and reach a consensus with its partners about the end game in Afghanistan. The new administration should therefore concretely determine its objectives and set out its strategies in order to position itself best to request and receive all the support its allies—and in particular Turkey—could potentially provide for addressing the Afghan problem. Access the full article>>

Israel’s three-week offensive in Gaza in January 2009 threatened to wreck the unique relationship between Turkey and Israel. ... The harsh Turkish reaction to the offensive was taken as a major indication of a Turkish volte face at both the official and popular level. ... Huge anti-Israel demonstrations flooded the streets of Turkey’s major cities and towns; demonstrators burned Israeli flags and waved anti-Israel and anti-Semitic slogans. One of the placards read: “Jews and Armenians cannot enter, but dogs can.” ...

In fact, Turkey’s stance on Gaza should be understood as part of the AKP government’s proactive foreign policy: as a diversionist ploy at home and a challenge to rivals at home and abroad. Evidently, there was genuine sympathy for the Palestinians among the Turkish people. But the government was also apparently attempting to manipulate this sympathy in order to mobilize support for the AKP in the ... local elections in March by deflecting attention from the domestic PKK problem, challenging the military—the architect of relations with Israel—and enhancing Turkey’s role among Arab and Muslim countries. Yet for all these rhetorical and emotional reactions, the Turkish government did not initiate any “punitive” move against Israel. It did not recall its ambassador from Israel. ... Moreover, at the very time that Erdoğan was lashing out at Israel the two states reportedly signed a new bilateral arms deal. ...

In Israel, wisely enough, the official reaction to the Turkish attacks was low-key. ... In fact, Israel could not afford the luxury of antagonizing such an important partner in a largely hostile region. Jerusalem was willing to bury its resentment in the understanding that if it managed to contain the crisis in Gaza it would be able to weather the Turkish storm as well.

Past experience has shown that the two countries’ bilateral interests are stronger than sentiments. ... [T]he historic bonds of amity between the two people and the two states are likely once again to prove strong enough to overcome the crisis, even though it might take much longer this time. Access the full article>>

Mark Parris, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey; visiting fellow, The Brookings Institution, speech, International Investors Association (YASED) conference in Istanbul, February 11, 2009:

“The Obama administration comes into office with recent, clear reminders that Turkey is awfully useful if Washington wants to get help to Georgia, or to support or withdraw forces from Iraq, or to develop alternative supply routes for Afghanistan. It’s awfully useful if you want to coax Russia onto a more constructive path, or to build a coherent strategy toward Iran or Syria. It’s a unique nexus in terms of energy security strategy, or combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime. There may be places in the world as important to the U.S. on one or a few issues we really care about. I can’t think of a place as important on so wide and overlapping a range of interests ... Turkey may not be today at the top of Barack Obama and his senior foreign policy team’s initial “to do” list. But life and geography will get it on their screen in due course. When it does, they will find, as have their predecessors, that it is always easier to work with Turkey than around Turkey.”

Justice and Development Party (AKP)
Profile: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül established AKP in 2001 on the basis of bringing economic and democratic reform to Turkey, including membership in the European Union. A moderately conservative party, AKP won significant victories in both the November 2002 and the July 2007 parliamentary elections. Its leaders reject the term Islamic, preferring to present themselves pro- democracy and supportive of religious secularism.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 38.8%
2004: 41.6%
Municipalities won: 45
Notes: AKP received most of its votes from central Anatolia region and lost support to the main Kurdish movement, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the southeastern and northern provinces. AKP failed to oust DTP from Diyarbakir, the regional capital of the mainly Kurdish southeast.

Republican People’s Party (CHP)
Profile: CHP, headed by Deniz Baykal, was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and is the oldest political organization in Turkey. The secularist CHP became the main opposition to the AKP in 2002. In 2007, CHP formed an alliance with the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and retained its position as the primary opposition party.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 23.1%
2004: 18.2%
Municipalities won: 13
Notes: CHP won in Turkey’s northwestern and western provinces and took control of Antalya from AKP in the municipal elections. Votes for CHP in the mayoral contest in Istanbul reached a record percentage although AKP held on to the position.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
Profile: The nationalist MHP has, under the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli, positioned itself as a moderate, right-wing party, emphasizing Turkish nationalism and identity.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 16.1%
2004: 10.4%
Municipalities won: 10
Notes: MHP challenged the AKP in Anatolia and won provinces in the Aegean, Mediterranean and Thrace regions. It gained 2 percent in this election cycle, from 14 percent in 2007, stealing votes from the AKP. The regional election authority in the southern central district of Adana, where the incumbent candidate for mayor switched from AKP to MHP before the election, approved a recount of votes.

Democratic Society Party (DTP)
Profile: The pro-Kurdish DTP came into existence when it merged with the Democratic People’s Party and the Democratic Society Movement in 2005. Ahmet Türk currently leads the party.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 5.7%
2004: 5.1% (as part of SHP)
Municipalities won: 8
Notes: DTP strengthened its control over southeastern Turkey. It defeated AKP in Diyarbakir, the largest city of the Kurdish southeast, and took over leadership from AKP of Van, Siirt and Iğdır.

Felicity Party (SP)
Profile: The Felicity Party, or Saadet Partisi, is a successor to the banned Islamist Virtue Party. Erdoğan and others left SP in 2001 to form the AKP. SP was under the new leadership of Numan Kurtulmuş in these elections after years of being led by Recai Kutan with behind the scenes influence of Necmettin Erbakan, the first Islamist to become prime minister of Turkey.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 5.2%
2004: 4%
Municipalities won: 0
Notes: SP, which received only 2.3% of the vote in the 2007 parliamentary elections, is seen as an alternative to the AKP for some conservative voters.

Democratic Party (DP)
Profile: The DP is a successor to the center-right True Path Party (DYP), which was a continuation of the outlawed Justice Party. DP was led by Süleyman Soylu in the elections.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 3.7%
2004: 9.9% (as DYP)
Municipalities won: 1
Notes: The DP tried to win using mayors who joined the party after being elected as AKP. The party won one of thirty mayoral seats in Izmir; CHP won the remaining seats.

Democratic Left Party (DSP)
Profile: Led by Bülent Ecevit from 1987 to 2006, DSP reached the height of its influence in 1999 when it won 22 percent of the popular vote and a majority in parliament. Due to tensions within the party, DSP collapsed in 2002, and joined a coalition with the leading opposition party, CHP, in 2007. DSP ran in these elections under Zeki Sezer.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 2.8%
2004: 2.1%
Municipalities won: 2
Notes: DSP focused on three provinces: Eskişehir, Ordu and Bartın. DSP’s candidate, Yılmaz Büyükerşen, won the mayoral race in Eskisehir with 51.4 percent of the vote and the party took control of the northeastern province of Ordu.

Great Union Party (BBP)
Profile: A far-right, ultra-nationalist small opposition political party. BBP's leader Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu died in a plane crash March 25.
Provincial Assembly Votes
2009: 2.2%
2004: 1.2%
Municipalities won: 1
Notes: BBP won by a landslide in Yazıcıoğlu’s birthplace, Sivas.

Full 2009 provincial assembly and municipal election results party can be found here.