Managing the Transition in Iraq

Since 2003, the United States, al Qaeda, and Iran have implemented programs to influence Iraqi politics and society. Of the three, Iran has the most at stake in Iraq and is the most integrated in Iraqi society. Iran’s goals for Iraq directly impact its fundamental and enduring strategic interests: preventing chaos on its border, limiting U.S. power projection capability in the region, ensuring Iraq does not threaten its political or cultural integrity, and building a platform for projecting influence across the Middle East. Although many aspects of these objectives clash with U.S. interests, Iran shares important ends with the United States, primarily: preventing widespread chaos in Iraq that could spark a regional conflict and the return of dictatorial Arab nationalist rule. ...

U.S. policy focuses on Iranian lethal aid to Iraqi militias at the expense of countering Iran’s primary mode of power projection in Iraq: support of Iranian-affiliated Iraqi political parties. ... The U.S. needs a comprehensive strategy for countering Iranian influence in Iraq that includes rolling back the influence of Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians. Access the full article>>

The United States is actively transferring ownership of Iraq's troubled Diyala Province, using a tough-love approach to force Iraq to take on greater control ahead of any deal that would put limits on the U.S. military next year. From handing over irrigation projects to cutting funding in favor of a more cumbersome Iraqi payment system, the strategy amounts to the de facto first steps of withdrawal. ...

"The training wheels are off," says Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, the U.S. Army commander for northern Iraq. For many months, he has restricted quick-fix discretionary spending by commanders in favor of Iraqi projects often channeled by the Americans, but put together and funded by Iraqis. "They can't keep relying on the coalition forces to prop them up," says General Hertling. "We've got to see the strength and the weaknesses of the government come to the forefront." ...

But the provincial government has problems, and insecurity has prevented Diyala Province from spending all its $140 million budget for three years in a row. Access the full article>>

Despite some progress, Iraq’s legislative agenda, promoted by the United States in order to capitalize on recent security gains, is bogged down. The main culprit is a dispute over territories claimed by the Kurds as historically belonging to Kurdistan—territories that contain as much as 13 percent of Iraq’s proven oil reserves. This conflict reflects a deep schism between Arabs and Kurds that began with the creation of modern Iraq after World War I. ... In its ethnically-driven intensity, ability to drag in regional players such as Turkey and Iran and potentially devastating impact on efforts to rebuild a fragmented state, matches and arguably exceeds the Sunni-Shiite divide that spawned the 2005-2007 sectarian war. ...

Rather than items that can be individually and sequentially addressed, Iraq’s principal conflicts—concerning oil, disputed territories, federalism and constitutional revisions— have become thoroughly interwoven. ... How to move forward? If there is a way out, it lies in a comprehensive approach that takes into account the principal stakeholders’ core requirements. A sober assessment of these requirements suggests a possible package deal revolving around a fundamental “oil-for- soil” trade-off. ... Such a deal would codify the significant gains the Kurds have made since they achieved limited autonomy in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and especially after April 2003, while simultaneously respecting an Arab-Iraqi—as well as neighboring states’—red line regarding Kirkuk.

This package entails painful concessions from all sides, which they are unlikely to make without strong international involvement. The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has been providing technical support on a range of issues and, since late 2007, has devoted the bulk of its efforts to the question of disputed internal boundaries. It will need stronger backing from the United States and its allies, which have an abiding interest in Iraq’s stabilization yet have played a passive bystander role that has confused Iraqi stakeholders and encouraged them to press maximalist demands. The United States should make it a priority to steer Iraq’s political actors toward a grand bargain they are unlikely to reach on their own and to secure its outcome through political, financial and diplomatic support. Access the full report>>

Joseph A. Christoff, director of International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, October 28, 2008:

"Iraq does not have the kind of expertise it needs in good procurement, budgeting, and contracting issues. Secondly, there's been brain-drain in the technocrats that were once part of the Iraqi government, that are now, many of them, refugees in neighboring countries. And finally, I think some would contend that because the United States has spent $48 billion to contribute to Iraq's reconstruction and stabilization, there has been less of an incentive on the part of the Iraqi government to spend its own capital money to try to rebuild its infrastructure."

On November 16, the 40-member Iraqi cabinet approved a proposed security agreement with the United States. The pact, passed by a 27-1 margin, sets the legal framework for the status of more than 150,000 U.S. troops stationed in roughly 400 bases throughout the country. The proposed agreement is meant to take the place of the current UN mandate permitting multinational forces in Iraq, which expires at the end of the year. The pact is still pending approval of the Iraqi parliament, which remains divided over the agreement. The presidency council, consisting of President Jalal Talabani and his two deputies, must also approve the proposed deal.

Security Agreement Details
The agreement reportedly contains 31 articles including certain key provisions:
• Establishes June 30, 2009 as the date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from all cities and towns; sets December 31, 2011 as the date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq
• Prevents the United States from using Iraq as a base for attacks on neighboring countries
• Allows for joint Iraqi-U.S. panels to try U.S. soldiers and defense contractors if they commit serious crimes while off duty and off base
• Allows the Iraqi government to try nearly 16,400 detainees currently being held by the United States in Iraqi courts
• Requires U.S. forces to seek permission from the Iraqi government to search homes
• Provides Iraqis with the right to examine incoming shipments, including those with weapons, destined for U.S. recipients

Progression of Negotiations
In November 2007, the United States and Iraq agreed to a Declaration of Principles that set general principles for the countries’ political, cultural, economic and security relations. This arrangement took the form of a security agreement and a more general strategic framework agreement covering issues not included in the proposed security agreement. The Iraqi government stated it would no longer request an extension of the UN mandate legalizing the presence of multinational troops in Iraq past December 2008. The sides had expected to reach an agreement by July, but negotiations slowed due to concerns regarding details of the pact. U.S. and Iraqi negotiators reportedly reached an understanding after the United States agreed to certain Iraqi amendments laid out in late October.

Key U.S. policy shifts in response to Iraqi demands, including a promise to set a concrete date for troop withdrawals and providing Iraq with a degree of authority in criminal cases involving U.S. forces, led Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to support the agreement, paving the way for its passage through the cabinet. In addition, various Iraqi Shiite politicians said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most influential Iraqi Shiite cleric, reportedly offered support for the agreement under certain conditions, and this influenced the cabinet’s decision.

Next Steps
The Council of Representatives (COR), Iraq’s parliament, must still approve legislation that includes both the security agreement and the strategic framework agreement. Although Article 58 of the Iraqi Constitution says that international treaties and agreements require ratification by a two-thirds majority of the COR, it is still unclear whether the pact will need to be passed by a simple or two-thirds majority. The accord faced criticism from Sadrists, led by the Shia cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and some Sunni politicians during its first reading in the COR on November 17. Opponents sought to gather support to demand Maliki and other cabinet officials answer questions about the accord in parliament. Sadrists contended the ratification process was unconstitutional and threatened to bring the matter before the court, while also planning to submit a bill requiring a two-thirds majority for parliamentary approval.

If it passes the COR, the security agreement will need to be ratified by Iraq’s presidency council, consisting of President Talabani, a Kurd, and the two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni, and Adil Abdul Mahdi, a Shiite. The parliament’s deputy speaker indicated he expected the COR to vote on the security agreement by November 24, a day before a scheduled 15-day recess.

U.S. Concerns
Congress has expressed concerns that the Bush administration has not consulted with it throughout the negotiations on the proposed security pact. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced a bill in August, since referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, prohibiting the Bush administration from entering into binding security deals without receiving prior approval from Congress. Several members of Congress, including Congressman Ike Skelton, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, have expressed concern about possible provisions that would allow the prosecution of U.S. forces in Iraqi courts.