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Wednesday, May 07, 2008
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Egypt’s Key Role in Middle East ProgressTODAY'S FEATURE
Examining Egypt’s Leadership in the Regionby Francis J. Ricciardone, recently returned U.S. ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008). Interview with Middle East Bulletin, Part 1.Egypt’s big, historic, pivotal, vital contribution was in making peace with Israel at the time of Sadat, Carter and Begin. It was a pioneer. Egypt, then the leading Arab nationalist state that had led the Arab world into war with Israel many times, led the way to peace. It showed that it could be done. … Egypt continues to stay engaged with the Israelis, the Palestinians (in all their factions, including those with whom neither Israel nor we will deal), the other Arab states, and of course us. No one but Egypt—not even the United States—can serve within our current policy and legal constraints, as the communications conduit among these parties who are in various states of war. The Egyptians continue to urge and to sustain engagement not only between the two main parties to the conflict, but also by the other Arab states and the United States. Access the full interview>> |
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Middle East AnalysisWalking the Path to Reform With Egyptby Francis J. Ricciardone, recently returned U.S. ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008). Interview with Middle East Bulletin, Part 2.Egypt is a pivotal state in many ways. It is one of those dozen or so states in the world whose success or failure and choice of direction will influence choices by other people in their region. If Egypt can move toward a more liberal economy, more respect for international standards of human rights, toward international concepts of democracy, then it is indeed likely to influence other states, other peoples, to believe that they can accomplish the same. So, it’s a bellwether country. Beyond this, as a simple geographic proposition, Egypt is strategically important as long as we wish to project military, economic and political influence around the world. So in the past few years, when we’ve tried to promote democracy and human rights as an integral part of our global strategy, I think we’ve correctly focused on Egypt as a pioneer state that really ought to succeed. Perhaps it’s for that reason, since we’ve seen progress that is not as fast as we and many Egyptians would have liked, and some outright reversals, that there’s been a high frustration level on both sides. As we have insisted, the Egyptian Government has said, yes, we need more democracy, we want more human rights, but we want it on our terms, in our way, in our time and on our conditions, and we will grow it from within. We’ll appreciate your advice and your assistance, but we don’t appreciate your cutting of our aid, or lecturing us, or trying to punish us into doing what you would like us to do on your schedule, in your way. So that’s been the frustration in the relationship of late. It doesn’t mean that the relationship is in jeopardy, but that tension has certainly been there. … You walk that line by walking it with them, and showing some empathy. You begin by having a conversation with them at the leadership level and at the mass level, as well as with the English-speaking liberal elite, about their aspirations: Who are they? What do they want to become? Where do they want to go? What do the young people of Egypt want? And how do they all propose to get there? Access the full interview>> What Does a Failed Strike Mean?by Elizabeth R. Nugent, Cairo- based U.S. Fulbright Fellow (Egypt Daily News)On May 4, 2008, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak celebrated his 80th birthday. In a country such as Egypt—where 45 percent of the population survives on less than $2 per day, people die while waiting in bread lines and inflation of prices runs even more rampant than in the rest of the world—one might wonder what President Mubarak had to celebrate. But it seems that Mubarak got his birthday wish. The streets of Cairo were bustling as usual despite calls from opposition parties and independent activists to stay at home to strike against rising prices and the corruption in the current regime. The May 4 strike was planned in the aftermath of the April 6 strike, during which many Cairenes actually did observe in solidarity with the workers of a state-owned textile factory in Mahalla. These workers were continuing a year-long protest about their own wages while addressing the current economic issues plaguing Egypt: rising prices, depressed salaries and a growing gap between the wealthy and the poor. …Both strikes were not as widespread as predicted and considered a disappointment by many. … However, neither strike could be dubbed a complete failure because of the important new developments that have occurred within the last month in Cairo. One of the most important lessons from these strikes is that the government took the strikes—or at least the threat of the strikes—seriously. The police presence in the city, particularly in downtown Cairo, was impressive. … Mubarak also responded to some of the demands of the strike. He recently ordered the army to help increase bread production and announced a 30 percent pay increase for public sector employees. … The strikes and their seeming failures prove two important points. The first is that there is a distinction between internet movements and actual movements. … Egypt has a vibrant and critical blogging scene, yet this has failed to translate into cohesive opposition support and failed to help the strikes succeed. The second point is perhaps the most important. …Until the majority of Egyptians are economically stable enough to take a day off to protest, major change cannot and will not occur. Access the full article>> Egypt’s Local Elections Farce: Causes and Consequencesby Amr Hamzawy, senior associate, and Mohammed Herzallah, junior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy OutlookEgypt is trapped in an unenviable position, characterized by growing social unrest and political polarization. Choices made by the Egyptian regime will most likely determine whether the current social convulsions will be followed by more instability or, if matters are handled prudently, sustainable recovery. In all likelihood the option of moderating the perilous effects of economic strain by orchestrating a new wave of political reforms is one that the regime will hesitate to embrace at this stage. The concern that such openings might make worse the odds of a trouble-free presidential succession seems to surpass any other considerations. The result of this conservative outlook has been a regrettable return to old authoritarian habits on the part of the regime. … Regrettably, the panic that presently characterizes the Egyptian regime’s handling of the country’s troubles is likely to persist until the presidential succession issue is finally settled. To be sure, the task of persuading the regime to support political reforms when it is trapped in this frame of mind is immeasurably difficult … The capacity of organized opposition forces to reach out to the public and take part in resolving collective grievances in a peaceful, constructive manner continues to contract. Liberal and leftist forces continue to hemorrhage credibility and cohesion. In addition, the regime’s anti-Muslim Brotherhood policies are causing the group to reconsider its consistent commitment to the political participation option. This state of strategic imbalance could have critical repercussions in terms of the Brotherhood’s ability to sustain a sense of disciplined moderation within its ranks. Such an outcome would have severe long-term repercussions for the country as a whole. The current resurgence of protest activism constitutes the one promising development in Egyptian political life. But progress on the street needs to be complemented by real political progress in the performance of organized opposition forces in the political process. Notwithstanding the fact that this progress is largely predicated on the regime’s willingness to welcome the opposition’s input, it is also dependent on the quality of this opposition. Only through active, disciplined, credible, and committed participation in the political process can organized political forces in Egypt effectively advance the reform agenda and push for sensible and comprehensive policies that can address the socio-economic exigencies at hand. Access the full article>> |
Heard on the StreetWorking Toward Regional StabilityEgyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit, interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, April 18, 2008: "We have a region in turmoil around us. We have the Palestinian-Israeli dispute that is not yet resolved—trying to do something there. We have a country like Lebanon, paralyzed by internal difficulties. We have a country like Iraq in difficulty— the least to say. We have a Palestinian national movement that has been cracked between two forces. And we have the situation in relation to Iran with all the difficulties that are emanating from the Iranian nuclear file and the ramifications of that nuclear file in relation to the West … So that is a region where we live in and we are responsible—trying all the time to stabilize that region, to ensure that no war erupts, to ensure that the Palestinian- Israeli dispute that has been tormenting all of us for the last 60 years comes to an end in a just manner for the Palestinian people. And there, Egypt puts lots of its own resources and its own diplomatic activity trying to ensure that both sides—Israelis and Palestinians—would reach that point where they can implement … two states living side by side and peace and security for both." Background BasicsEgypt’s Important Political PlayersHosni Mubarak, president: A former air force officer and vice president, he took office in 1981 after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Mubarak is Egypt’s longest-serving president and ran unopposed in his four previous terms. In 2005, he was reelected in the country’s first multi-candidate race, a vote reportedly controlled by his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Concerns about his age and health, denied by the government, have raised questions about a possible successor to Mubarak. In March 2008, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Dustur Ibrahim Eissa was sentenced to six months in jail for allegedly spreading such rumors. Ahmed Nazif, prime minister: Nazif, the former minister of communications and technology, was a surprise choice for Prime Minister in 2004, because he did not have an economic or political background. As prime minister, Nazif included members from the private sector in his cabinet for the first time in Egypt’s history, and instituted reforms that many analysts say contributed to steady economic growth in Egypt. Some critics blame Nazif for initiating economic policies that have not helped Egypt’s lower socio-economic class, especially in light of the recent dramatic rise in food costs. Ahmad Aboul Gheit, foreign minister: In his current position since 2004, Aboul Gheit was the former ambassador to the United Nations. He has been active in promoting an Egyptian- sponsored ceasefire in Gaza. Aboul Gheit recently met with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at a meeting of donors to the Palestinian Authority in London, where he invited her to visit Cairo. Relations between Aboul Gheit and Livni became strained in January 2008 when he criticized her for a video Israel sent to the United States demonstrating Egyptian involvement in arms and militant smuggling into Gaza. Omar Suleiman, chief of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: Suleiman has long played a part in Palestinian politics. In 2003, he facilitated negotiations that helped form a new Palestinian government as part of the road map peace process. Suleiman was also involved in the training of Palestinian security forces in the lead up to Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. When fighting broke out between Fatah and Hamas in 2007, Suleiman presided over meetings between the two sides. More recently, he has played a central role in promoting an Egyptian-led ceasefire between militant groups in Gaza and Israel. Suleiman is expected to meet with Israeli officials after Israel’s Independence Day, to discuss the ceasefire that was previously accepted by the militant groups. Suleiman is also mentioned as a possible successor to Mubarak because of his connections to the military, and his similar outlook towards Israel and the United States as President Mubarak’s. He is not a member of the NDP, however, and would have to resign from his post and spend one year as a party official to become eligible for the presidency. Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces and minister of defense: Despite the military’s powerful role in Egypt’s system, the military has recently remained quiet about a possible successor to President Mubarak. This silence is viewed by some as an indication that the military is willing to accept a civilian president, provided this does not create instability in the country. There are also specific concerns about Tantawi’s age and health status. Since 1981, Mubarak has taken efforts to separate the military from politics by granting it economic privileges and giving greater power to the internal security forces that have authority within Egypt. Dr. Ahmad Fathi Sorour, speaker of People’s Assembly, lower parliamentary house: According to the constitution if President Mubarak were to die in office, Sorour, the country’s most senior elected official, would take over for 60 days until the new elections were held. In March 2008, Sorour visited the United States, where he met with administration officials and members of Congress. Sorour discussed the political situation in Egypt, the imprisonment of opposition leader Ayman Nour and the government’s role in promoting an Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. Dr. Safwat Sherif, speaker of the Shura Council, upper parliamentary house, and secretary general of the NDP: Sherif became speaker in 2004 after serving as Minister of Information for 22 years, a position in which he held considerable power. The switch, ordered by President Mubarak, left Sherif in a position of arguably less political power. Commentators saw the influence of Gamal Mubarak in the move, and NDP officials indicated that the move helped him to gain prestige within the NDP. Gamal Mubarak, assistant secretary general of the NDP: Since the last party convention in 2002, the son of President Mubarak and former investment banker has risen to the second most powerful rank in the NDP and heads the party’s policymaking committee. In this position, he helped isolate the Muslim Brotherhood from the government by supporting initiatives to expand NDP powers and block opposition challenges, including banning religious political groups. There has been a lively debate over the possibility of Gamal Mubarak succeeding his father as president. In 2007, the government changed its laws, creating the 50-member Supreme Committee that will choose a presidential candidate from within its ranks. The NDP subsequently elected Gamal Mubarak to the committee, drawing criticism that this served to subtly transition him into a possible successor role to his father. Gamal denied that the change of the laws made it easier for him to become president. Amr Moussa, secretary general of the Arab League: Moussa was widely supported within Egypt in his former role as foreign minister from 1991-2001, largely because of his sharp criticisms of Israel, which included condemning Israel for its actions on the peace process and its unwillingness to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Speculation exists that Moussa’s large domestic following may have played a role in his departure from the Egyptian government, because Mubarak saw him as somewhat of a rival. Moussa has changed the traditional attitudes of the Arab League since his appointment in 2001. He was seen as playing an influential role in the League supporting the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative and its recognition of Israel’s right to exist, a change from its former policies. Moussa has also taken on risks by citing sectarian and religious tendencies, and not just the presence of U.S. troops, as the roots of violence in Iraq. In the ongoing Lebanese political crisis, Moussa has been leading Arab League efforts to mediate a solution. Moussa is critical of U.S. policies in the Middle East, condemning what he sees as the unwillingness of the United States to exert leverage over Israel to stop expanding settlements and the U.S. policy approach to Iran. |
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Middle East Progress appreciates the support and cooperation of Americans for Peace Now, Geneva Initiative, Israel Policy Forum, and New Israel Fund. |
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