Mubarak, Netanyahu, Obama, Abbas and Abdullah at White House (AP)
"There is a feeling that the present Palestinian government under Salam Fayyad has done a lot in terms of governance, in terms of running a clean operation, in terms of fighting corruption that occurred in the past … And so, there is some puzzlement as to why these have not been supported as they should be, in an environment where the Palestinians are clearly doing what needs to be done to build a state and fight corruption along the way."From your experience what role do you think Arab leaders should be playing in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict?
There needs to be an Arab safety net, through the Arab Peace Initiative, that would, on one hand, assure the Palestinians that in their negotiations with Israel they will get support from the whole Arab world. Arab leaders should also be able to offer security guarantees, which would lead to the inclusion of Hamas and Hezbollah in any eventual settlement. Because, this is no longer a separate Palestinian-Israeli affair; there are regional elements that have to be addressed if we are to arrive at a permanent solution. Arab participation also will encourage the Israelis to make what to them would be painful compromises on their part, knowing that in return they will get peace not just with parts of the Palestinians but with the whole Arab world.
Can you talk a little bit more about how you see the comprehensive nature of the conflict at this point?
I see that we need a regional settlement. When I talk about a regional settlement I mean a settlement on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative, which has promised Israel that in return for Israel’s withdrawal from Arab land on the basis of the 1967 borders, it will have not just collective peace with every Arab country, but also security guarantees for all states in the region, including Israel. This has not been looked at in depth, because what I believe this implies is the inclusion of Hamas and Hezbollah, their becoming purely political parties, moving away from violence and moving away from armed conflict. In addition, the Arab Peace Initiative also offers an agreed solution to the refugee problem, thereby making clear that the Arab world is not talking about four or five million Palestinians going back to Israel. In addition, the Arab Peace Initiative talks about an end to the conflict and no further claims. All of these are elements that the Palestinians alone cannot offer Israel without an Arab cover. And as I said, I don’t think the Israelis would be interested in making painful compromises from their point of view on such issues as East Jerusalem or the borders of the Palestinian state without knowing that in return they’re going to get peace and security from the whole region.
The Arab Peace Initiative is mentioned by President Obama, it’s mentioned by Secretary Clinton, why do you think it hasn’t actually made any visible progress?
For a number of reasons. When it was first adopted, I don’t think that the Bush Administration gave it the support that it deserved—neither the Bush administration nor Israel, for that matter. Because of its reference to 194 the Israelis looked at it as nonstarter and the Bush Administration gave it only lukewarm support. Although, even when it talked about 194, it talked about it in the context of an agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem.
The Obama Administration has certainly warmed up considerably more than the Bush Administration to the initiative. At the same time, I think that the Arab world did not market the initiative the way it should have. And while it adopted that initiative in 2002, it did not really follow up on it with a major promotional campaign to explain what it really means to the Israeli public and to the international community as well.
What do you think about efforts that were made in the past year and a half, to seek to operationalize the Arab Peace Initiative to use it as a confidence-building measure?
I actually look at it not just as a confidence-building measure but as part of an end-game settlement. I am not convinced any longer that an incremental approach is going to lead to a solution in a timely manner, and time is something that we don’t have. Right now there are many who would tell you that a two-state solution is already on its deathbed and that we don’t have much time to implement a settlement. Also, there are now regional elements that a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli track will not be able to solve on its own. The negotiations have to be complemented by a parallel approach to get an understanding from key Arab states on supporting the Palestinians, both on the agreement they will reach with Israel and in terms of financial support. We need to make sure that we create a context, an environment, in which negotiations on the bilateral track can be conducted successfully.
Why do you think that, aside from President Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah, Arab governments, or Arab leaders, have not become very engaged in this process either over the last year and a half or now that there is a bilateral negotiation taking place?
Most other Arab states, with the exception of Syria, really do not have a territorial issue with Israel and therefore were not engaged in the past with any negotiating process with the Israelis—the Syrians have come very close to arriving at an agreement. And so, while there is no need for a negotiating process between every Arab state and Israel as there are no territorial issues involved, what the Arab Peace Initiative did is signal to Israel that in return for successful negotiations on the Palestinian and Syrian and Lebanese tracks, the Arab world was prepared to offer Israel peace and security even if the other Arab states did not have a territorial issue with Israel.
With regards to the state building or financial component of a comprehensive peace, there seemed to be veiled hints from the administration that they would like more engagement from the Arab world on that component as well.
Yes, and, in fact, they are probably not that veiled considering President Obama’s address to the United Nations. There is a feeling that the present Palestinian government under Salam Fayyad has done a lot in terms of governance, in terms of running a clean operation, in terms of fighting corruption that occurred in the past, and that its present project of building a state—in reality if not in name—even under difficult conditions of occupation, needs to be properly acknowledged and supported. And so, there is some puzzlement as to why these have not been supported as they should be, in an environment where the Palestinians are clearly doing what needs to be done to build a state and fight corruption along the way.
What do you think are the main concerns of the Arab leaders who the United States would like engaged on this issue?
The Arab leaders have been calling for the United States not just to be engaged, but to put a package on the table that would probably be a combination of the Clinton Parameters and the Arab Peace Initiative. There is a feeling that left alone to the negotiations process the two parties are not going to arrive at a successful conclusion in time for a two-state solution to be implemented. And so Arabs have been pushing the United States for some time to abandon the incremental approach and offer a package. This package would not be an imposed one, as some people try to depict, because it really is the outcome of almost seventeen years of negotiations between the parties in which the parameters for a final settlement have become known to all.
What role do you think Iran’s increasing power in the region and its nuclear program play in this equation?
Iran is not an Arab country and therefore has not been a signatory to the Arab Peace Initiative. But this is why I believe a regional settlement should be arrived at, because in the context of a regional settlement, Iran’s support of radical groups will be cut off—particularly if you involve Syria in such a regional settlement, where Syria gets back the Golan Heights up to the June 4, 1967 borders.
But Iran’s rhetoric against Israel really has less to do with an ideological stance against the Jewish state and more to do with Iran’s wish to be recognized as a regional power, which has to be addressed probably somewhat separately from the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are numerous examples in the past where Israel actually supported Iran, even militarily. For example, in the Iraq-Iran war in the nineteen eighties, when Iran worked with Israel on the Iran-Contra affair. So, it’s not clear that Iran’s rhetoric against Israel really stems from a wish to wipe out the Jewish state as much as to draw attention to Iran as a regional power.
As the former foreign minister of Jordan, can you tell us about the special role that Jordan and Egypt play in trying to move forward comprehensive peace?
Jordan and Egypt, and I would add Saudi Arabia also, have done a lot in the last decade in addition to Jordan’s and Egypt’s peace treaties with Israel, which opened diplomatic channels that were not possible before and helped push the peace process forward. All of the initiatives that tried to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the last decade have really come from these countries. The Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, a Saudi initiative with strong support from Jordan and Egypt, managed to get the whole Arab world to commit to peace and security with Israel in the case of a regional settlement. The Road Map is another initiative that was, again, I would argue, initiated by Arab states—worked at very closely with the European Union—to attempt to translate the vision of a Palestinian state into a series of steps that would end the occupation in three years and establish a Palestinian state. There have been a number of such activities where Egypt and Jordan supported the process very strongly and supported Palestinian efforts to try to end the occupation through diplomatic means.
What is your sense of possibility in the coming months?
I think the bilateral track on its own has little chance of arriving at a successful conclusion, simply because each side does not have what the other side wants. What I explained before is that there are now regional elements that cannot be addressed through a Palestinian-Israeli track alone; the question of Hamas, the question of Hezbollah, the question of the relationship with Iran, the question of Syria’s role, cannot all be addressed through just a separate peace agreement. Even if they successfully arrive at an agreement, there is no way for that agreement to stick without the support of the whole Palestinian population and therefore without the inclusion of Hamas. There are elements such as what you do about the refugee issue, what you do about East Jerusalem, where I believe the compromises will have to be met through a regional settlement. Neither the Israelis, nor the Palestinians would be able to make such compromises if the reward is only a separate Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
Do you imagine reviving the multilateral groups?
No. I don’t mean that we need to have multilateral negotiations taking place. I think the negotiations can still be on the Palestinian-Israeli front—I would add to that a Syrian-Israeli track. But I think that some understanding of the end game has to be arrived at with the Arab states. So that any agreement on the Palestinian-Israeli front would gain the support of Arab states and would not blame the Palestinians for any compromises made.
