Secretary of Defense Gates and Prime Minister Erdogan (AP)
"I think the Obama administration … clearly wants a very positive relationship with Turkey, no question. … They value Turkey and we have great common interests. There are a number of difficult issues coming down the pike, which need careful handling. Despite the unpopularity of the U.S. in Turkey they also value highly the American relationship."How has Turkey changed since you were the U.S. ambassador there twenty years ago?
It has changed radically in all sorts of ways. It has become a much more dynamic country, certainly economically, particularly over much of the past decade. It has become much more open. Subjects are discussed which were forbidden in the past—often people were tried for simply saying certain ‘dangerous’ things. Much of that has ended but not all of it. It has also become much more democratic in the sense that more and more people have been brought into the system, more democratic practices have been introduced, and in general a more democratic public ethic is developing. Turkey still has a long way to go—some of it is still third world, and it has serious political and social problems as with public education and the status of women. But, by and large, the country is more progressive and far more advanced than it was when I was there twenty years ago.
Last week the Turkish government arrested some very high-level current and former members of the military. What is your assessment of the status of civil-military relations in Turkey and what are the implications of this status?
Relations between the government and governing party and the military are rather parlous. Over the last number of years, the AK Party has attempted, quite properly, to reduce the role of the Turkish military in political life and, by and large, they have come a long way. It is not finished and there remain significant tensions between the government and the military The country has also become extremely polarized over the years between Turkish secularists and AKP supporters. But the fear of a coup, which has been pervasive for half a century—there have been four, including one that was not a formal coup, but effectively a coup—seems increasingly remote, though not impossible. The political situation today is unstable and uncertain and surprising things can happen, but it’s moving in the direction of the Turkish military becoming essentially a military institution, not a political one, but the end has not yet come.
And how does that tie into the secular-religious dynamic?
There is a strong feeling among many, in the military, but not only the military—many academics, businessmen and others—that the AK Party is increasingly trying to make religion a much more visible part of state and society and their supporters are infiltrating many of Turkey’s main institutions including the police. Some actually think AKP would like to see a religious, or sharia, state. Until the present Turkish government, whose duration is uncertain, finds a way of producing a state and a government, which makes a large part of the Turkish public less concerned about Islamic intrusion into social and political life, there’s going to remain a considerable amount of political uncertainty and turmoil.
One should also not expect that the AK Party will continue to have a permanent majority in parliament. The AKP’s popularity has gone down, in part because of its management of the economy and the general world recession with its impact on Turkey. The government also has, in many ways, become increasingly authoritarian as perceived by many people in Turkey. I would not preclude that in the next election you would see the AK Party no longer with a majority and not able to form a government except with other parties. I don’t say that will happen, I just say political life changes. A lot depends on how the government is perceived to be doing and I think the economic issue is still a big one. Maybe in a year, if Turkey recovers, like America is expected to recover, the question of employment will be diminished or forgotten, and the AK Party will resume its former popularity. But it’s hard to say. Other factors are, of course, important. Right now the opposition is considered to be very weak and have poor leadership, and therefore not likely to become the dominant party in Turkey. That’s the general perception. In democratic politics I don’t preclude political surprises. Right now the AK Party is still the most popular party, but its numbers have gone down. Polling is not too accurate in Turkey, but the trend at this time seems clear.
Turning to foreign policy—we can get into the specific countries later—but, overall, what do you think is driving Turkey’s foreign policy? How is it different than in the past?
Much change has occurred, a result of changes in Turkey and in the world, particularly in the area surrounding Turkey. The Soviet Union is, of course, no more, and the whole focus of Turkish international relations on NATO and on protecting itself from the Soviet Union has gone. Turkey perceives its interests and its focus quite differently than it perceived it in the Cold War. And that is natural.
The advent of the AK Party, with its strong Islamic roots, has also had a significant impact on foreign policy, particularly on trying to improve its relations with all its neighbors, most of whom are Arab or Islamic, and extending its role and involvement in many areas from Central Asia to Iraq to Afghanistan. Turkey has become a more important international player on numerous issues from energy to peace in South Asia. The AKP’s emphasis on the Middle East was actually tried twenty some years ago by then President Ozal—he did a lot of the same things that Mr. Erdogan is doing—but it had no cogent focus or philosophy and the Iraq war ended it.
Right now, led by the prime minister and Foreign Minister Davutoglu, significant efforts been made to improve relations with Iraq, Syria and Iran, and all Turkey’s neighbors in the Caucasus, including Armenia. The Turks are significantly involved in Central Asia, including their economies, and active in support of NATO in Afghanistan. Turkey is certainly a big factor in Iraq and important to maintaining Iraqi political stability and ultimately to the extrication of American forces from Iraq.
Picking up on that, what is Turkey doing in Iraq and what might we expect as U.S. troops are withdrawn?
Turkey’s involvement in Iraq has radically changed since I was around, particularly in the last two years and certainly since the first Gulf War. Turkey has had two interest in Iraq this past decade. The first was reduce the capabilities of the PKK, and eliminate their safe haven in northern Iraq; they haven’t done that. It became a big issue between Turkey and the United States two years ago. Turkey felt that the United States was not paying attention to Turkey’s security interests in northern Iraq. Over the past couple years, however, while the PKK still exists, there’s more sense of comity and cooperation between the United States and Turkey on this issue. The Kurds in Iraq continually express concern for Turkey’s interest, but have done little to reduce the PKK, as far as I know.
Most importantly, the Turks have changed their attitude towards northern Iraq. They had, since the beginning of the first Gulf War, feared the growth of an autonomous, and later after the second Gulf War an independent, Kurdish state in Iraq. They had nothing to do with Iraqi Kurdistan after the end of the second Gulf War. But as the Americans began to talk about their departure from Iraq and carry it out, the Turks have changed their policy and tried to develop a close relationship with Kurds in northern Iraq. They thought that they could play a bigger and more helpful role in keeping Iraq together by having a good relationship.
Turkey still has serious concerns in Iraq and the biggest one is Kirkuk. The Turks are very skeptical about seeing Kirkuk become part of the Kurdish region for a variety of reasons, notably its oil and its concern for Iraq unity if sectarian violence took over. That problem still has to be worked out and it is a very contentious issue. But, the Turks and Americans have a common interest in keeping Iraq together. I believe the United States is working closely with them.
Turkey has taken a different approach toward Iran than the United States and most of its NATO allies, including offering to act as a mediator between Iran and the United States. How do you read Turkey’s Iran policy and what do you think might happen with Turkey currently on the UN Security Council?
That’s been a big change in Turkey on thinking about Iran. There have always been historical rivalries and a distrust of Iran in Turkey. When I was there twenty years ago it was profound. There was a general expression of the view ‘don’t believe anything any Iranian official ever tells you.’ Iran is also a Shiite state.
The AKP, however, with its policy of zero problems with its neighbors is working hard to improve relations with Iran; they also see Iran as very much a source of trade and finance. Parenthetically, one of the big aspects of Turkish policy toward the Middle East that doesn’t get enough attention is the economic dimension. Mr. Erdogan himself has been very active in trying to promote trade and investment, and that’s no small part of their general efforts.
In the case of Iran they have taken a somewhat different position than the United States. They are very skeptical of sanctions and are dedicated to continued negotiations. Decisions will have to be made fairly soon, the most important of which will be on the question of sanctions on Iran. That will come up in the Security Council, where Turkey is presently a member. Turkey has shown its lack of interest in sanctions, and its desire for more negotiations between the major powers and Iran and it is actively trying to promote continued negotiations. How Turkey will react to sanctions will depend upon the actual measures and their perception of what is happening, but, by and large, they have expressed their lack of enthusiasm for sanctions. Depending upon the measure, I suspect they would abstain in the voting. Clearly this is of great concern to the United States. Even if China abstained, the United States would still need nine members to pass any sanctions resolution. Brazil is also apparently opposed to sanctions, so Turkey’s vote can be very important. This can become a difficult issue between the United States and Turkey.
One of the countries it seems like Turkey is having problems with in the region is Israel. From the Turkish perspective you hear that ever since the Gaza conflict there’s been this tension and from the Israeli perspective, Turkey is turning towards the east …
I think Turkey is much more interested than it has ever been in its Arab and other neighbors, but that doesn’t strike me as something they shouldn’t do. Why not? They have important political interests there. Why shouldn’t they seek to improve their relations? And that’s part of the change in international circumstances, but it is also welcomed politically in Turkey.
In regard to Israel, Turkey has been the most positive of Islamic countries toward Israel. They were first to recognize. But Israel has never been very popular in Turkey. Turks, certainly not just Erdogan, do not like what has happened over the last number of years in Gaza and in the lack of progress on a Middle East settlement, for which they most blame the Israelis. Relations over the years of AKP rule have not been close and worsened over the last couple of years.
Let me backtrack a moment. The nineties were the heyday of Turkish-Israeli relations, with military, intelligence, economic and all sorts of cooperation. While that was popular in the Turkish government and military it was not so popular in the Turkish public. Mr. Erdogan got very angry at the Israelis over Gaza and we saw the famous episode with Mr. Peres at Davos. Mr. Erdogan continues his rages from time to time, which mostly increase his political popularity in Turkey. But, by and large, I think Turkey wants to still have a cordial relationship with Israel and maintain a good level of economic and diplomatic relations. And I think the Israelis, realizing that the situation is different than ten years ago, also want to have a decent relationship with Turkey and avert further blowups. So, I would expect probably some difficulties from time to time, but also a continued effort on the part of both counties to maintain good economic and political relations. For Israel, Turkey has been important in the sense that Turkey gave it an outlet to Islamic countries and reduced its fear of encirclement. It is important to Israel to continue a decent relationship with Turkey and I think both countries will work towards that. But I do not preclude flare-ups depending upon what happens in the whole Middle East equation.
And how does Syria play into this considering the change in relations with Turkey?
The present Turkish government has focused hard on changing the atmosphere in their relations with Syria. Remember, Turkey threatened war on Syria in the nineties, over the presence of PKK leader Ocalan in Damascus. Syria got rid of Ocalan and that permitted relations to improve. No question that the AKP government has brought about significant improvement in trade, investment and, very interestingly, freedom of travel, with no more visas for Syrians to travel to Turkey. Also, the Turks tried hard to mediate between Israel and Syria. That has gone nowhere and I’m skeptical it will. Nevertheless the Turkish government has continued to state its interest in trying to promote a settlement between Israel and Syria. I don’t mean to sound complacent, but to me this is part of the changing nature of the situation. Turkey has much broader interests now without having to worry about whether the Russians are coming down through the Bosphorus. We have of course said little about Turkey and the EU or the Cyprus issue. Perhaps another time.
What should be expected in the wake of the House Foreign Affairs Committee vote on the Armenia genocide resolution bill?
Right now it’s pretty tense. The American government finally came down in favor of putting off the Congressional resolution but contributed to the problem with Turkey by not acting sooner. Turkey recalled its ambassador, an expression of anger toward the passage of the resolution in the House committee. The Turkish public remains aroused and the government has threatened further retaliation, because of the passage of the resolution within the House committee. But it was 23-22, which was very surprising, and all the signs indicate it will not go to the floor. What Turkey will now do I don’t know. They’re still expressing great anger, and one of their problems is that any retaliatory measures will also impact on them, say for some action to complicate American activities in Iraq. I suspect we will see some cooling off period.
Why do you think the progress has stalled between Turkey and Armenia?
My view differs from many Turks and the Turkish government. The Turkish government made an impressive effort, to be applauded, to try to establish a new relationship with Armenia including opening the border and moving to establish relations. They simply didn’t take into adequate account the attitude of the Azeris, who also have significant domestic political influence in Turkey and insisted nothing be done by Ankara without the Armenians making some movement on Nagorno-Karabakh and certain adjacent districts clearly belonging to Azerbaijan. They didn’t get it. They hoped that the Americans or the Russians would somehow produce something, but that did not happen. So, when the Azeris complained bitterly, the Turks pulled back, and they sort of even started to blame the Armenians for it by referring to an Armenian Supreme Court decision referencing the genocide provision of the Armenian constitution.
Hopefully, the effort between the two countries will be resumed, but that will likely take some time. Turks are saying that the Congressional genocide resolution has made that harder. But the real question is can the Turks move forward without doing something for the Azeris? They say that is essential to get the Turkish parliament to approve the agreements that have been worked out with Armenia. Right now that looks to be a very long-term prospect.
What would you advise the Obama administration with regards to U.S. policy toward Turkey?
I think the Obama administration, like all American administrations I’ve seen, even in this new age of international politics, clearly wants a very positive relationship with Turkey, no question. It is an increasingly important international player with extensive involvements. They value Turkey and we have great common interests. There are a number of difficult issues coming down the pike, which need careful handling. Despite the unpopularity of the United States in Turkey, they also value highly the American relationship.
I think also there is another important concern, that is, if this government, the AK Party, a religiously derived party, can overcome the country’s polarization and establish a much more democratic Turkey as they profess, and create a much more stable, dynamic nation, that will be a great achievement. And it could potentially have great, if intangible, influence in the Muslim world. Hopefully it would also positively impact on Turkey’s efforts to get into the EU, however remote they might now seem. What’s happening internally in Turkey—moving toward greater democracy and hopefully it’s success in turning itself into a modern, dynamic democratic state, which has been run by a party—with religious roots and a strong religious constituency—I think can be of extraordinary political importance.
Turkey is an increasingly important, dynamic country. We have lots of interests there, including many political and national interests, but there is also a broader interest in seeing Turkey become a successful stable democracy.
