President Karzai at the London conference (AP)
The international conference on Afghanistan opened earlier today in London. Foreign ministers from some 60 countries and representatives from international organizations gathered to coordinate international aid to political, governance and development efforts in Afghanistan.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai called on Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah to play a role in peace talks and mentioned his government’s new plan for reconciliation with the Taliban. Ahead of the conference, the United Nations on Tuesday removed five former high-ranking Taliban members from its terrorist sanction list. On the same day, the IMF and the World Bank announced their support for a debt relief program of $1.6 billion for Afghanistan following the country’s completion of a few key steps.
Below are some pieces you may have missed analyzing the conference and the situation in Afghanistan more broadly.
The Urgency of the Moment
by Caroline Wadhams, senior policy analyst, Center for American Progress
The Obama administration has not equilibrated the civilian and military components in Afghanistan, but it has begun advancing a stronger civilian agenda than existed under the Bush administration. Its recently released Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization strategy offers an important blueprint and launching point for leaders at the London conference to consider. Yet Obama’s document lacks detail for crucial strategic pieces, including creating a regional strategy, improving governance that addresses warlords and weak leadership, and reintegrating insurgents.
Leaders at the London conference must fill in, or at least begin to amplify these elements, ensuring that the civilian approach is as at least as coordinated and comprehensive as the military one. They must create consensus on a number of central elements, including addressing Pakistan’s strategic calculations, improving governance and leadership in Afghanistan, and reintegrating and reconciling with insurgents, all while dealing with capacity and political constraints. Access the full article>>
Afghanistan, Allies to Launch New Effort to Return Taliban to Society
by Alex Rodriguez and Julian E. Barnes (Los Angeles Times)
The Afghan government, U.S. officials and NATO are preparing a new effort to bring mid-and low-level Taliban fighters back into society. In doing so, they face the task of convincing militants that the jobs and amnesty they promise this time will materialize.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has long pressed efforts to peel Taliban fighters away from the insurgency. Thousands of Taliban militants laid down their Kalashnikov assault rifles and signed up for the old program, which lasted 4 1/2 years and cost $3 million. But many fighters didn’t get the money and land they were promised and rejoined the insurgency. Others took the cash and returned to the Taliban.
“That program was ridiculous,” said Mohammad Arsalan Rahmani, a former Taliban deputy minister and now a senator in Afghanistan’s parliament. “Taliban fighters who surrendered have been arrested. … Everything depends on the U.S. government. If there’s no sincerity, it won’t work.” Access the full article>>
Unanswered Questions on Afghanistan and Pakistan Policy
by Brian Katulis, senior fellow, Center for American Progress
The Obama administration last week released its latest strategy paper for Afghanistan and Pakistan, a document that provides more details on what it is planning for the two countries. This paper is the most concrete explication of what applying the Obama administration’s “smart power” national security approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan will look like—the full use of all national security tools at America’s disposal. But it leaves three key questions unanswered:
1. What is the end state that the United States seeks in Afghanistan and Pakistan? 2. What is U.S. policy on dealing with both countries’ internal power struggles? 3. What role do countries in the region such as India and Iran play? …
Rolled out in advance of this week’s conference on Afghanistan in London, the overall strategy is comprehensive, with each individual policy initiative described fairly clearly and linked together as an integrated package. … Despite all of the hard work that has gone into this document, the latest strategy falls short in three important ways, and the Obama administration should look closely at these three questions as it continues to develop its strategy. Access the full article>>
A Deal with the Taliban?
by Ahmed Rashid (The New York Review of Books)
In a major policy shift, senior Pakistani military and intelligence officials say they have offered to help broker talks between Taliban leaders, the Americans, and Karzai. … This is an important change in the official position of Pakistan. For the past nine years—despite the well-known connections between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban—Pakistan has denied that it has influence over the Taliban leaders, and openly playing host to them was considered out of the question. Pakistan will have to make serious efforts to gain the confidence of the U.S. and the Afghans if it is to sponsor negotiations with the Taliban; but their differences could be worked out through arrangements made between the various intelligence agencies and governments involved. Senior U.S. officials say that Pakistan is showing itself to be "more flexible" on Afghan policy than before.
How will the Taliban leaders respond? Many of them are fed up with years of ISI manipulation and strategizing on their behalf and would prefer to keep the ISI out of such talks. … But the ISI has power and influence over the Taliban. Not only are the Taliban able to resupply their fighters from Pakistan, and seek medical treatment and other facilities, but the families of most Taliban leaders live in Pakistan where they own homes and run businesses and shops. Taliban leaders travel to Saudi Arabia on Pakistani passports. All this makes them vulnerable to ISI pressure. Access the full article>>
Taliban Overhaul Image to Win Allies
by Alissa J. Rubin (The New York Times)
The Taliban have embarked on a sophisticated information war, using modern media tools as well as some old-fashioned ones, to soften their image and win favor with local Afghans as they try to counter the Americans’ new campaign to win Afghan hearts and minds.
The Taliban’s spiritual leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, issued a lengthy directive late last spring outlining a new code of conduct for the Taliban. The dictates include bans on suicide bombings against civilians, burning down schools, or cutting off ears, lips and tongues. The code, which has been spottily enforced, does not necessarily mean a gentler insurgency. …
Now, as the Taliban deepen their presence in more of Afghanistan, they are in greater need of popular support and are recasting themselves increasingly as a local liberation movement, independent of Al Qaeda, capitalizing on the mounting frustration of Afghans with their own government and the presence of foreign troops. The effect has been to make them a more potent insurgency, some NATO officials said. Access the full article>>
Bombs and Baksheesh
by The Economist
Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are often intended as macabre theatre. And so it was on January 18th when teams of Afghan fighters and suicide-bombers slipped though concentric rings of checkpoints and brought mayhem to the centre of Kabul. They struck as President Hamid Karzai was swearing in members of his cabinet. Nearby, to the sound of explosions and gunfire in the streets, foreign guests were huddled in the Serena hotel, the target of two previous attacks. Smoke billowed out of a shopping centre. The Taliban kept up an online commentary on the progress of its “martyrdom-seekers”.
It was in some ways the most audacious attack on the capital since the American-led intervention in 2001—an act of armed propaganda to demonstrate that neither Mr. Karzai nor his foreign supporters could protect the center of Kabul. It was certainly not the launch that Mr. Karzai wanted for his new government, just ten days ahead of a big conference on Afghanistan in London. … Yet on closer examination the attack offers some glimmers of hope. Afghan intelligence appears to have been tipped off about the impending attack, and security forces were on heightened alert. In contrast with past attacks, when insurgents were able to enter the Serena hotel, government buildings and a UN housing compound, this time the attackers were repulsed from ministries and other big targets. Access the full article>>
