King Abdullah and President Assad meet in Damascus (AP)
"I would encourage the administration to continue doing much of what it’s been doing, which is engaging the Syrians not just for the sake of engagement but rather looking to Syria to help us with actions that are not so difficult for it to do."The Deputy Foreign Minister of Syria, Faisal Mekdad, visited Washington D.C. as part of a series of progressively higher level diplomatic contacts, but at the same time in May the administration continued the sanctions regime against Syria. What is your assessment of the administration’s actions towards Syria?
I applaud the administration’s efforts to engage constructively with Syria, after a long period of estrangement. Even though Syria had its current ambassador here during much of the Bush administration, he had little official access except when it suited the former administration’s purposes. And the Syrians, in apparent retaliation, isolated our embassy in Damascus. So we’ve had no ambassador in Damascus since mid-February 2005, following the Hariri assassination. The Syrians have had an ambassador, but the U.S. government largely chose not to deal with him. Now we are seeing, as you say, progressively higher-level contacts, and my belief is that the U.S. will nominate an ambassador to Syria in the coming month or so. As for sanctions, many of them are congressionally mandated and cannot be removed until Syria changes aspects of its behavior, especially its support for non-governmental groups that have elements engaging in terrorism.
And how do you think U.S. actions are perceived in Syria?
Well the Syrian regime welcomes the new spirit of this administration to engage with adversaries. They also appreciate that the new administration doesn’t lecture them with long to-do lists, but actually listens to their concerns. They will welcome warmly the return of a U.S. ambassador to Syria and will give embassy staff members far better access to officials and the people than they currently are allowed. That said, it’s very important that both countries continue to be realistic in their expectations for this dialogue. The Syrian regime benefits from being able to influence events in Lebanon, the Palestinian-Israeli arena and Iraq, even if it’s in a negative way. They have made the point that you need to deal with us or we can create problems for whatever objectives you’re trying to achieve. By their terms, this role of spoiler has been successful. We just witnessed the visit of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to Damascus this past week, his first as monarch. This visit occurred despite Syria’s continued close relations with Iran. The spirit of the visit seemed very positive, after a period of some estrangement. And yet, Syria, I am quite sure, has no intention at this time of pulling away from Iran or abandoning its support for Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These Syrian policies, however distasteful to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, have helped the regime ride out a very turbulent period.
What do you think led to King Abdullah’s visit?
As I said, Syria has shown that it can play an unhelpful role if it wishes, but a more constructive role if it wants, and that it is determined at this point not to abandon long-standing relationships to which the United States and Saudi Arabia object. Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have had to recognize that it’s better to deal with Syria than not, if they want to make at least some progress toward their aims. But the fact remains that everyone needs to be realistic, because the regime still insists on recovering every last inch of Syrian-held territory occupied in the Six-Day War, and it wants a new relationship with the United States whereby it would be removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list, and similar such sanctions’ legislation. The United States, for its part, cannot enter into a new, far more constructive relationship with Syria until the Syrians definitively end their support for such groups. To my mind, the key to a better U.S.-Syrian relationship, is a successful U.S.-brokered Israeli-Syrian negotiation. An Israeli-Syrian peace treaty would by definition require Syria to quit supplying military materiel to Hezbollah and to stop offering succor to Palestinian rejectionist groups. Moreover, a Syria at full peace with Israel would have no rational reason to do so. Then, and only then, could the U.S. remove all sanctions against Syria and encourage others to help develop its economy.
Why do you think, then, that since the formation of the new Israeli government we’ve seen no interest in the resumption of Israeli-Syrian informal negotiations?
As we know, Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel has a very, very right-wing government, perhaps the most right-wing government in Israel’s history, despite the presence of the relatively small Labor faction led by Ehud Barak in this coalition. He is in intense discussions with the administration, with Senator George Mitchell in the lead, about settlements, as well as building within East Jerusalem. With such a complex internal political situation conflicting with Israel’s most important bi-lateral relationship, it would be very hard for Netanyahu, at this point, to give Syria what it wants to enter into negotiations: A guarantee that if all other issues can be satisfactorily resolved, Israel will withdraw to the armistice line that existed on June 4, 1967. Netanyahu rejects this Syrian requirement as a precondition, even though several previous Israeli prime ministers, beginning with Rabin, did just that.
So where would Syria fit into the overall administration’s agenda in the Middle East. If that’s the situation right now, how do they move forward on it?
Syria, itself, is not the preoccupation of this administration. Hopefully, the Syrian regime understands this. Obviously Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan-Pakistan are the most vital national security issues and an Israeli-Palestinian peace is the centerpiece of any end to the decades-long struggle between the Arabs and the Israelis. But, as I said earlier, when ignored Syria inevitably finds ways to remind everyone that it has the means to cause us problems on a number of issues that we care about.. The new administration understands this reality, although it rightly does not want to give the Syrians an inflated sense of their importance.
How do you asses the current relationship between Syria and Lebanon?
Well, it’s a very unequal relationship. I think it’s important to note that Lebanon is a very divided country and there are pro-Western factions that also tend to be pro-Saudi; then there are pro-Iranian, pro-Syrian factions and a lot of Lebanese who fall in between. Lebanon is essentially a consensual democracy, more consensual than democratic. Even if your coalition wins a majority in Parliament you cannot form a government unless you satisfy major elements within the opposition. That’s just the way it is. Syria, to a lesser extent than Iran, has influence, with Hezbollah, which commands a huge following among Lebanon’s Shia, but there are also smaller groups that look for guidance to Damascus, among small factions within the Christian, Sunni and Druze communities. So Syria does have undoubted influence, but I would not jump to the conclusion that the failure to form a government in Lebanon thus far is because of Syrian interference. Lebanon should not be a prize for anyone. An Israeli/Syrian/Lebanese peace would allow Syria and Lebanon to redefine their relationship in a much more benign atmosphere free of coercion.
The two countries did exchange ambassadors for the first time recently.
Yes, they’ve exchanged ambassadors for the first time in their history. The regime in Damascus used to say, ‘Well, our relations are so close and we’re such brotherly countries that such formalities are unnecessary.’ So for the Syrians to have sent their ambassador to Beirut and received a Lebanese ambassador in Damascus is not a small thing. If it were, then you would have to ask why it wasn’t done sooner. And it does constitute recognition that Syria does not have long-term designs on Lebanon’s sovereignty. But having said that, and I have heard this from Syrians close to the regime, that so long as Syria and Israel are in a state of war—and they are currently in a state of war despite the Golan disengagement agreement—Syria is determined to prevent any other power from being able to use Lebanon as a springboard to get at Syria. If that means that Syria has to play rough to try to prove that it will protect its perceived vital interests where Lebanon is concerned, they say so be it.
In terms of the internal situation in Syria, we talked to you about this about a year ago, how would you asses the change there over the past year? Has there been a change?
I don’t think there has been much of a change internally. Let’s recall that this regime has literally been in power for almost forty years. That is amazing when you think about it. There is no well-organized internal opposition to this regime and there does not appear at the moment to be any prospect of one. Meanwhile, President Bashar al-Assad has been in power now for over nine years. I think it is fair to say that he has consolidated his power. By that I mean he has moved out almost all of his father’s old guard and put in place younger men in key positions in the armed forces, as well as the security, and intelligence services. They are unquestionably loyal to him. And so he is in a much stronger position than he might have been even five years ago and certainly a far better position than he was eight or nine years ago.
What is your read on Syrian weapons development that keeps leaking out a bit at a time?
Presumably, one has to be in the intelligence community or write for Jane’s to know a lot about this issue. But I would say this: Syria long ago realized that it could not achieve strategic parity with Israel. Even in its best days, when it had access to advanced weapons from the USSR on generous terms, it could not do that. Therefore, Syria, like several other states that are locked in struggles with far more powerful adversaries, has found ways to try to counter-balance Israel’s overwhelming conventional and unconventional military strength through asymmetric means.
What do I mean by that? Well, the very relationships we spoke of earlier. Hezbollah, an ally in Lebanon, showed what asymmetric warfare could do in the summer of 2006 when a guerilla force essentially fought Israel to a standstill in southern Lebanon. Although Gaza’s people suffered terribly in December and January, Hamas, with which Syria has a friendly relationship, nevertheless survived to fight another day, and just by surviving feels that it has accomplished a lot. Meanwhile, Syria is believed to have a very large and varied inventory of ground-to-ground missiles that could hit almost all major Israeli population centers. And some people speculate that that is one of the reasons that in the summer of 2006, Israel, which was already suffering under the hail of rockets on northern population centers, chose not to attack Syria even though it was well known that Syria was resupplying Hezbollah.
You said earlier that you think Syria has no intention of separating itself from Iran. What can an American administration realistically hope for in terms of future Syrian-Iranian relations?
Let me qualify that by saying that what I really said was that there was no intention of separating itself from Iran at this time or at any point soon. The last time we spoke, I used the term ‘Grand Bargain’ to describe what would be necessary if there were to be any hope of separating Syria from Iran and Syria from Hezbollah and the Palestinian rejectionist organizations. A Grand Bargain, as I defined it, meant a U.S.-brokered peace deal with Israel in which Syria gets back all of the occupied Golan. Of course, Israel would have its own legitimate needs and expectations and Syria would have to satisfy. But even that would be insufficient to convince Syria to distance itself from Iran. For that to happen Syria would also want to know that the U.S. was willing to have quite normal and mutually respectful relations with Syria. Hence, all sanctions on Syria would be lifted and the United States would not stand in the way or discourage Japan, Europe or wealthy Arab states from investing in or aiding Syria’s economy.
With this Grand Bargain on offer, it is quite possible that Syria would opt for peace with Israel and a new relationship with the United States at the expense of what has been a thirty-year alliance with Iran.
How would you advise the Obama administration to move forward with its policy toward Syria?
Right now there doesn’t seem to be any immediate prospect for Syrian-Israeli reengagement on peace negotiations, for reasons that have already been stated. But, I would encourage the administration to continue doing much of what it’s been doing, which is engaging the Syrians not just for the sake of engagement but rather looking to Syria to help us with actions that are not so difficult for it to do. What do I mean by that? Before the entry of U.S. forces into Iraq, Syria offered effective cooperation against Al Qaeda and like-minded groups. There’s no reason that we could not revive such cooperation. It is believed that Syria has greatly reduced the networks that allowed jihadists to infiltrate into Iraq, but it can and should do more. If the United States approaches Syria in the right way, particularly now that the Syrians know that the United States does not pose a threat to it from Iraq and that U.S. forces are going to be withdrawn by the end of 2011, than we might get a much more positive response from Syria on that issue.
I suspect that the Syrian-Saudi talks may have encompassed the formation of a new broad-based government in Lebanon. If that comes to pass, the U.S. could endorse what has been done and let it be known that it appreciates the efforts of the Syrians and the Saudis to help the Lebanese move this along.
The words I would advise the administration keep in mind when dealing with Syria are mutual respect, patience and sequencing. The two previous administrations at times erred in giving the Syrian regime too much attention or largely shunning it. I think this administration get’s it and is looking for a middle way. The Syrians don’t give something for nothing. We have to be willing to think a bit outside the box and outside the sanctions regime about how we can reciprocate Syrian gestures in ways that do not violate strictures that Congress has laid down in law. I think there are some things that either will not cost us much or may even be to our benefit. Syria wants to make application to the World Trade Organization, why should we block that? It will take years for Syria to satisfy the organization’s requirements. The administration has allowed Syria access to some spare parts for the Boeing aircraft. Good, who would want to see a civilian aircraft go down and innocent life lost because the United States was not allowing the needed spare parts into the country? The EU has an economic association agreement with Syria. Leaving aside whether or not Syria wants to sign it, at one point the U.S. urged friends within the EU not to go ahead with this agreement. We could now say that we’re fine with it. Syria has taken in well over a million Iraqi refugees. It needs more resources to support them, and we have a moral obligation to help.
There are many intermediate steps that both countries could take toward one another short of us requiring the Syrians to end all relations with Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the Syrians expecting the United States to take it off the terrorist list when it has not ended its support for the groups that we consider terrorist.
Ultimately, the United States cannot get what it wants from Syria without persuading the Netanyahu-led government in Israel to engage seriously with Syria in peace negotiations. That doesn’t have to come immediately but if engagement is going to be successful, eventually it has to come.
