By Assaf David, Jordan expert, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
Yesterday was the 15th anniversary of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. Can you outline the principles of the agreement?
The peace agreement, in general, touched upon both bilateral and multilateral affairs. On the bilateral side, it established civic cooperation between Israel and Jordan on all fronts: water, environment, tourism, agriculture, science, transportation and more. It was the official termination of the state of war between the two countries and included mutual recognition as well as a security commitment to ensure that neither country would not allow the entrance of forces to its territory that could endanger the other.
The agreement included two interesting clauses. First, on the bilateral level, article 9(2) in which ‘Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.’ This article is rather tricky because the wording is very vague. The Jerusalem Institute tried a few years ago to come up with potential solutions to the Holy Basin, and world experts in international law such as Professor Ruth Lapidot also said that is was problematic from a legal point of view—what exactly is a ‘high priority’? What obligation, if any, does it bear for Israel?
To make things even more complicated, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres had already guaranteed his Norwegian counterpart that the rights of the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem will be preserved. Peres thought back then that Rabin’s consent to ‘high priority’ for Jordan violated the MOU with the PLO that stipulated that there shall be no change in the status quo in Jerusalem until this issue was discussed in the negotiations on the final status agreement.
What was the purpose of this article?
This is a matter of personal interpretation. King Hussein demanded recognition of the Hashemite status in Jerusalem. In my opinion, Yitzhak Rabin agreed to include it as a gesture to the king, but I suspect that both leaders understood that it was not legally binding.
What is then Jordan’s position vis-a-vis a permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that is bound to include the issue of Jerusalem?
On several occasions, especially in the first year of King Abdullah’s rule, Jordan hinted that it had already given up on its special status in Jerusalem by stating that it was ready to hand the management of the holy places over to the Palestinians. Even if Jordan occasionally exploits its ‘special role’ in Jerusalem to bash Israel, it can be viewed more as a card Jordan will hesitate to use unilaterally. The bottom line is that Jordan does not want to get into trouble, neither with the Palestinians nor with the wider Arab and Muslim world, over Jerusalem. Any role for Jordan in the holy places will have to be discussed and agreed upon with the Palestinians and with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.
Going back to the peace treaty, what is the other interesting article you were referring to?
The second interesting clause is the one dealing with the Palestinian refugees in Jordan. This is the multilateral aspect of the agreement, because this issue was too complicated to be solved on the bilateral level. From a Jordanian nationalist perspective, this article, which does not even cite UN Resolution 194, is problematic as it does not commit Israel to anything. The Jordanian opposition argues that by signing a peace treaty with Israel which de facto marks the end of claims between the countries, Jordan practically accepted the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees on its lands. Jordan’s difficult position stems from it being the only country hosting a large population of refugees that has signed a peace agreement with Israel. If Jordan now cannot demand anything from Israel, the opposition argues, who will negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan in a way that best serves Jordan’s interests?
How would you describe the relations between Israel and Jordan since 1994?
Generally, there were two periods of marked deterioration in relations that are worth mentioning. First, relations soured when Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister in 1996. The reason was not Netanyahu’s appointment but rather a chain of events that took place in a short period and which put the continuation of the peace treaty at risk. First, Netanyahu ordered the opening of the Western Wall tunnel in Jerusalem which sparked harsh violence and resulted in dozens of Palestinians killed and wounded.
Second, the office of Prime Minister Netanyahu, which in the beginning supported the position of the Israeli representative to the joint higher committee, tasked with implementing the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, had gradually lost interest in it. The committee, which included an Israeli and a Jordanian representative, was formed to oversee the realization of the agreement and to make sure it did not fall into the long arms of governmental bureaucracy. Once this position lost power in the PM’s office, the importance of implementing the agreement was pushed to the back burner. Diplomatically, it might have signaled a loss of Israeli interest in cementing the civic aspects of that agreement.
Finally, shortly thereafter came the attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal by Israeli Mossad agents in Jordan. That was a severe blow to the agreement and it took several months for the relations to improve. The King even threatened to revoke the agreement if Meshal died and Netanyahu therefore not only released Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin but also exposed the antidote of the poison used on Meshal, a secretive Israeli weapon, so that Jordan can rescue him. Meshal was still a Jordanian citizen at the time. He has remained deeply grateful for King Hussein ever since.
In the following years, relations improved slowly until Camp David 2000 when the Jordanians feared that Israel might sacrifice Jordanian interests in favor of Palestinians’ interests; namely, that if Israel and the Palestinian Authority sign an agreement which would allow the return of some refugees, they would be refugees from Lebanon and not Jordan. The second Intifada, which followed the failed Camp David talks, created outrage in Jordan, not only among the Palestinians but among everyone as in the rest of the Arab world. It is safe to say that since then relations have not gone back to their public pre-Intifada levels because the issue is still quite sensitive and domestic pressure on the government has not abated. Of course, the security barrier, the Second Lebanon War and Cast Lead operation in Gaza complicated the bilateral relations even more.
Relations now are tense. It seems to me that Jordan now responds to things to which it used to remain silent in previous years. For example, Jordan now says that Israel is working to change the status quo in Jerusalem. While that might be correct, the extent to which this is happening has not changed dramatically recently. Even Arab countries are not clear as to why Jordan is bringing this up now. Jordan failed twice recently to convene the Arab Committee on Jerusalem Affairs, headed by Morocco and with the participation of Egypt and Saudi-Arabia. Neither country understands what stands behind Jordan’s sudden rising concern for the fate of the al Aqsa mosque.
I think that what triggered the recent turmoil around Jerusalem was a Jordanian mission that came to Jerusalem to do some mapping work at the Mughrabi Ramp. They were stopped by Israeli police apparently due to lack of preliminary coordination and paperwork. This minor incident a few weeks ago might have started this whirlpool of accusations, rumors and media reports to the extent that a day has not gone by in Jordan in the last two weeks without a convention, workshop or conference on Jerusalem and Israel’s attempts to change the identity of the city taking place. Unfortunately, the headlines in Jordan’s government newspapers criticize the ‘Zionist search for invented history on the Temple Mount.’ This can hardly set a positive tone towards greater cooperation between Israel and Jordan on the issue of the holy sites.
In terms of civic cooperation between the two countries, it still exists but only marginally, well below the pre-intifada levels. Israeli tourists still visit Jordan but Jordanians are having a hard time getting visas to Israel, a problem which Israel must solve if it really seeks more people-to-people activity to strengthen the formal peace.
Jordan officially is a strong proponent of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Can you clarify what you mean when you say that Jordan was anxious at the prospect of an agreement in 2000?
There is a dissonance in Jordan—every time Israelis and Palestinians seem to get close to an agreement, even a draft, two contradicting approaches emerge among Jordanian elite. On the one hand, Israeli-Palestinian peace is a Jordanian strategic interest. The way Jordan sees it, the alternative to peace is further deterioration which could lead to Israel’s completion of the security barrier and the pushing of the West Bank into the arms of Jordan, similar to what happened in Gaza. On the other hand, the decision makers still cannot seem to convey to the trans-Jordanian elite that one of the implications of an Israeli-Palestinian peace is the settlement of Palestinian refugees permanently in Jordan. Recently, in the waning days of Ehud Olmert’s tenure when an agreement seemed somewhat near, rumors spread that Jordan was getting ready for ‘the day after’ in terms of accepting more Palestinians in its civil and security apparatus. Soon enough implicit threats on the Palace emerged that if the final status agreement were to bear this meaning, the state would risk losing the support of the Trans-Jordanian population.
Jordanians understand that Israel would never let most refugees return, and they are not counting on the Palestinian Authority to encourage the refugees to leave Jordan and move to the territories. In a way this is reminiscent of Israel’s paralysis when it comes to making difficult decisions on borders, Jerusalem and the refugees—Jordan knows what it ought to be doing but is paralyzed due to internal political dynamics.
King Abdullah is interested in an Israeli-Palestinian peace. He would sign a Clinton Parameters-based agreement tomorrow if it was up to him. It is possible that he is not handling his opposition now because an agreement does not seem imminent, something along the lines of ‘we’ll cross the bridge when we get there.’ But it shows the pressures he faces internally and what he will have to face when the moment of truth comes.
In light of King Abdullah’s consistent calls for comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, how do you interpret his recent public criticism of President Obama’s efforts to jumpstart the peace process?
Jordan, like the rest of the Arab world, pinned unrealistic hopes on Obama. They had thought that the Messiah would present a timetable and a framework for an agreement within six months, and that, of course, has not happened. I think Jordan has no expectations of the Israelis or the Palestinians. Who do they have expectations of? The United States. It is the only power that can make the two sides reach an agreement and that has not happened yet.
What is the Jordanian government then willing to do to help the United States move the peace process forward?
Nothing more than it has already done, I am afraid. When the U.S. administration reached out to the Arab world for steps of normalization with Israel, Jordan agreed to broker between Israel and the Gulf states but in itself didn’t come forward. The very mention of the word ‘normalization’ in Jordan these days seems like a curse. As I said, it goes back to the grim prospects of peace. It might change when the wheels are set back in motion.
How is the Jordanian government feeling about the upcoming U.S. withdrawal from Iraq?
Jordan knows the United States is attentive to its security needs and is therefore calm about the withdrawal. Potentially, the transfer of U.S. troops through Jordan can even boost Jordan’s economy for a short period.
What role does Jordan play in the recent friction between Iraq and Syria?
Jordan’s Prime Minister Nader Dahabi went to Iraq mainly to discuss bilateral issues, but while there he inquired as to whether they would be interested in Jordanian mediation with Syria. Not only was he rejected by Iraq, which instead announced that it would apply to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Syria found the way he phrased the issue offensive and subsequently postponed meetings of the Supreme Committee of the Jordanian and Syrian governments.
Shortly thereafter, King Adbullah and Queen Rania went on a surprise visit to Syria, where a warm meeting took place between them and Bashar Assad and his wife. Upon his return, Abdullah stated that Jordan does not intervene in the political affairs of Syria. Jordanian commentators still thought that Syria was patronizing Jordan and argued that while the Kingdom asks for Syrian sympathy to its unique situation and interests, Syria asks that Jordan recognizes it as its ‘big sister’ and move closer to its political path. These claims gained further support when Syria again postponed a visit by Nader Dahabi. This state of affairs changed only a week ago with Dhahabi’s visit to Syria along with a large government delegation.
For more on Jordan’s internal affairs as well as regional position, please see our previous interview with Assaf David “Jordan’s Internal and External Challenges.”
