Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (AP)
With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggesting that the United States may speed up the exit of some of its troops, attention is focusing on the status of Iraqi political reconciliation. Iraqi political parties are currently looking toward the January 2010 national elections and considering potential coalitions. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has established himself as the center of gravity within these discussions, but it remains unknown whether he will try to revive the fractured United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) by aligning himself with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), or whether he will decide to form a new, cross-sectarian coalition based on Iraqi nationalism.
Current coalition negotiations must be seen in the context of the January 2009 provincial election results. In the January polls, Maliki and ISCI offered competing lists. The Maliki-sponsored list, ‘Rule of Law,’ did exceptionally well in Baghdad, winning 28 out of 57 seats. It also won seven of eight Shia-majority southern provinces at the expense of ISCI, including an outright majority in oil-rich Basra. As a consequence, Maliki is entering into the present negotiations from a position of strength.
Furthermore, Maliki succeeded in the 2009 provincial elections by running on a platform that emphasized nationalism rather than sectarian identity. The fact that Maliki continues to campaign on a nationalist image indicates that he intends to run on a similar platform for the 2010 national elections, choosing to emphasize trans-sectarian principles like strong central governance, the rule of law and a unified Iraqi state.
Such a platform may prevent a Maliki-ISCI rapprochement, as ISCI is generally perceived to be overtly sectarian, supportive of federalism, and close to the Iranians. One factor to take into account is the desire on the part of the Iranian leadership to see the UIA reconstituted, since the dissolution of an alliance between the three largest Shia parties would certainly represent a setback for Iranian influence in Iraqi politics.
Including ISCI in a future coalition also may stymie Maliki’s efforts to reach out to certain Sunni nationalist groups. Maliki has already opened talks—though tentatively—with Saleh al-Mutlaq’s National Dialogue Party and with certain Awakening Council groups led by Sheikh Abu Risha. These Sunni groups may be less likely to ally with Maliki if ISCI is a part of the coalition.
Because Maliki’s own personal authority has increased concomitantly with the strengthening of the Iraqi state, there are strong personal incentives for Maliki to turn the page on the era of sectarian politics and to continue centralizing power. As negotiations proceed and coalitions take form, will Maliki relent on his desire to pursue a cross-sectarian coalition due to pressure from Tehran? Or will he decide to eschew a sectarian political dynamic for one based on Iraqi nationalism, like he did in the recent provincial elections? The answer will be indicative of the extent of Iranian influence in Iraqi politics as well as of Maliki’s own personal ambitions.
