A female protester holds up a poster of Iranian presidential candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi in Azadi Square (AP)
"A lot of people say that what has happened will lead to a greater push for democracy. I think that the main result is the end of consensus among the clerics."What do you think was the impetus for people taking to the streets? Do the protestors have a coherent goal in mind and, if so, what do you think that is? Are people pushing for reform, revolution, regime change, or something else?
The original impetus was to protest what were seen as fraudulent elections. But as people have gone out in the streets and as the government has responded, I think it’s become about the dictatorial nature of the current rulers. In the first days you weren’t seeing people chanting ‘death to Khamenei;’ that’s a different level. They are not interested in seeing a completely different system, but they do want to see more democracy.
They are also protesting against the basij and the Revolutionary Guard, who you see now cracking down on the protestors. Under Ahmadinejad the role of these groups has grown. It’s not just about what you’re seeing in Iraq. Rather, it has affected the day-to-day lives of Iranians. It’s about the man and woman walking down the street together, which is technically illegal in Iran, who get arrested.
And they are protesting because they don’t want Iran to be a pariah state. They don’t necessarily know the details of the nuclear program, but they do see that Iran is being ostracized by the rest of the world under Ahmadinejad in a way that wasn’t the case under Khatami. And they want that to change.
Who are the protestors? Are they just North Tehranis as some people think?
Americans sometimes ascribe their own ideas onto others, and in this case Iranian-Americans are doing that in particular. These are not people who want to overturn the regime and have a revolution. There’s some idea that this is the young people, who are more secular, and they want a different system.
Overall, this is a slightly more educated, more well-informed crowd that is protesting. We’re seeing young people out on the streets who see what other young people around the world have and they want it, too. But they don’t want to change the regime; they just want more freedom and more opportunities. It’s true that on the other hand, the followers of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei are mainly more pious and live in the country-side, but that’s a generalization, too. Some of them live in cities. Moreover, there have also been high-level clerics who have protested the results on their websites. Ayatollah Montazeri, who was intended to be the Supreme Leader but had a falling out with Khomenei, has spoken out against the results. So the distinctions are somewhat blurred.
It seems like there’s a fissure among the clerics. Is that the case and what could be the impact of such a rift?
There has been a rift among the clerics since the time of Khamenei’s ascension to Supreme Leader. There are Ayatollahs who are more credentialed in Islamic theology than Khamenei was when he was chosen and who opposed his becoming the leader and we are seeing many of them now protesting the situation. Khamenei has assumed a lot of power, in his position as well as for his allies, like the Council of Guardians, which we are hearing a lot about now. He has intervened in politics. He not only assumes the mantle of divine authority, but he even claimed that the elections were divinely ordained.
So, there was always a rift, but the fact that important clerics are coming out to say that the election was rigged is very significant. It means they are publicly criticizing Khamenei and the structure that he has created.
A lot of people say that what has happened will lead to a greater push for democracy. I think that the main result is the end of consensus among the clerics. After all, in Shia Islam, before 1979, it was believed that clerics should not lead the state, but rather should act as advisers to the state. But now the clerics run the state. In the future, Khamenei will not be able to assert consensus of the clerics in regards to his actions, and that will make it much harder for him to rule.
What about Rafsanjani?
Rafsanjani is a very sly politician. He wants to be Supreme Leader, or to be the most powerful person in Iran. But here he has become Khamenei’s biggest challenger. It’s true that he has in the past been the voice for free and fair elections. When Khatami was elected in 1997, it was Rafsanjani who said that the results had to be honored because there was too much energy out there for Khatami and not accepting the results would lead to something along the lines of what we are seeing now. And he was right. But ultimately, he’s really interested in his own power. And we’ll have to see what he does now.
Now that violent crackdowns have begun, do you anticipate a decline in the level of civil disobedience? Are rallies, protests and marches still being planned?
We’re already seeing less people out on the streets. The people of Iran are not crazy or suicidal and they see the danger associated with protesting, so many of them are staying home. I think we can expect to continue to see sporadic protests. The state is really trying to figure out how to reassert its authority.
What is your opinion of the approach the Obama administration has been taking to the events in Iran thus far? What effect if any, will this have on U.S.-Iran relations?
Until Tuesday, I think the president managed to walk the tight rope on this very well. With Tuesday’s speech, however, I think that he took sides—he spoke out against the violence, praised the protestors—and I think that that will make any future relations more difficult.
Obama came in with a clean slate. Until June 12, I think the regime was seriously considering his offer to negotiate. My sources tell me that within Khamenei’s circle, there were discussions about how to engage. The regime wants to negotiate. But there has to be a way for them to come to the table that allows them to save face and to feel that they are respected and equals. But yesterday Obama went back to the old way of things—talking about Iran as an authoritarian regime.
So, I think that this will make it much trickier to negotiate now.
