Western Wall & Dome of the Rock (AP)
"Any agreement on Jerusalem would have to be part of a final status agreement. I can’t see the parties agreeing on boundaries, or refugees, or other issues, without Jerusalem being part of that package."Why is the issue of Jerusalem so central to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict?
The city is overwhelmingly important in Judaism and in Islam, as well as Christianity, of course. Jews the world over, and Israelis, Muslims and Christians, Arabs and others, feel a particular attachment to it. In this case, both Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Muslims, want to control the holy sites physically; that’s a difference from Christian attitudes today. The city is such a part of their self image, of their narrative, of their belief system, that its possession is critical to both.
How have previous attempts at resolving the final status issues—the Clinton parameters, Taba, Geneva Accord—dealt with Jerusalem?
The fault that we found with many of these initiatives—the Clinton parameters, which otherwise are very good, Taba, which otherwise is good, and the Geneva Accord—is that they dealt with the problem of the Old City by trying to find a formula for division, and for assigning sovereignty over various bits to one party or the other. The core problem with that is that the main holy sites in Jerusalem, the Haram al-Sharif and the Temple Mount, are one and the same edifice. The Western Wall and the Barak are part of that edifice. There’s no satisfactory or sustainable way of separating what’s Jewish from what’s Muslim. There has to be a formula, we think, where an arrangement can be put in place that guarantees to each that their holy sites, their belief systems, will be protected and safeguarded. That’s why we’ve taken the Old City as a case apart, and said, we think, because of the systemic lack of trust between the two parties and the need for a solution that’s sustainable, there should be a special administration for Jerusalem.
So the special administrator is a way to bypass the challenge of sovereignty?
Yes, in a way. The reason being is that we don’t think that either side will be able to relinquish their claims to sovereignty. Therefore the idea of division is bound to come to an impasse. We tried to remove sovereignty from day-to-day governance. In other words, let’s not fight to find a formula, which is very unlikely to be found, that would satisfy both sides in terms of sovereignty. Let them both retain their claims to sovereignty; they don’t have to change their position. But let them in the interim period, before they reach an agreement if they can, agree to an administration that they could together put in place and which would be responsible to them together. That’s why we’ve chosen the model of a special regime, which would be run by a chief administrator, who would be appointed by the parties, and who would run the Old City under a mandate that the parties—Israelis and Palestinians—would design.
In your approach, what would be the main responsibilities of the administrator?
Anything that’s really politically or religiously contentious. Not that the administrator would deal with the administration, as such, of a particular holy place—that of course should stay with the denomination concerned. But what we feel is needed, is an administration that can be seen as fair-minded, to run the Old City—of which the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount complex is an integral part—in a way which both sides will consider fair to their own national, religious and cultural interests.
And you said that this would be potentially a temporary measure until the two sides reached agreement. Would this be part of a final status agreement, or would this come before a final status agreement?
Any agreement on Jerusalem would have to be part of a final status agreement. I can’t see the parties agreeing on boundaries, or refugees, or other issues, without Jerusalem being part of that package. This arrangement of the chief administrator and a special regime may be in place for some considerable period of years, because it’s uncertain that the parties would be able to agree on sovereignty in any near time. The chief administrator would be responsible for security, for entrance and exit into the Old City, for heritage, for archaeological excavations, anything that has to do with the political and security sensitivities of the two parties. It would act as a kind of protector of the interests of both, and its goal would be to administer these sites and this particular bit of turf, with dignity for all, and equity for all. I don’t think Israelis would feel confidence with a Palestinian administration, and obviously Palestinians do not feel comfortable with an Israeli administration. This is an attempt to find a middle way that meets the religious and emotional needs of both sides, without being seen by one as a political threat to the other.
How did you develop this approach?
We took as a basis what we thought was the non-functionality, or the lack of viability, envisaged in Geneva and in the Clinton accords—that somehow you could carve the Old City up, so that one brick or one stone would be Israeli and another Palestinian. I served in Israel for a long time, and my colleagues have served throughout the Middle East. We felt that whatever arrangements were envisaged had to be sustainable and able to withstand challenges. In other words, if there’s a terrorist incident, is there an ability for one side or the other to act on their own, or can they act together to restore normalcy in the Old City. We didn’t think there was enough confidence, enough ability to work together, or enough trust—there’s systemic distrust in the region—to enable the parties to work together to deal with this. So we thought, on a day-to-day basis, a week-to-week basis, a month-to-month basis, to take it out of the hands of the parties, put it in the hands of a chief administrator who would be in charge but at the same time accountable to both parties together. And those parties would be free to act—to change the mandate, to eliminate the special regimes—but they would have to act together, that’s the key. They would have to have a sufficient degree of common interest to want to change what would then be the status quo, namely the special regime.
Is this similar in some ways to how the Israelis and Egyptians solved the problem of their border, and security?
No, it’s dissimilar. I think in the case of Egypt and Israel you have a separating out—what’s Egyptian is Egyptian and what’s Israel is Israeli. And I think one could have that with Palestine and Israel, on the border, even in the Jerusalem conurbation, two capitals: one Yerushalayim, the other al-Quds. The one place you can’t break it out is in the Old City because of the overlapping of the most fundamental elements of strong belief systems on both sides. We thought this approach should be inclusionary rather than exclusionary if it’s to work.
Is there a role for outside actors—the Arab countries, the United States—in reaching such an agreement?
There’s definitely such a role. While the primary onus would be on the two parties, what we envision is a governance board which would be run by Israelis and Palestinians, and as I’ve said to whom the chief administrator would be accountable. But those two parties may want to ask countries like the United States, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps others, to sit with them on that board, so that there is a voice from outside parties—a necessary voice which will make easier, more simple and more legitimate in terms of the broader international community, the management of the Old City of Jerusalem.
Do you foresee in the near future the ability to move forward on such an approach? What are your next steps?
When we started this, it was in the midst of the second intifada, the al-Aqsa intifada. Many critics said to us then, ‘why are you dealing with this question of the status of Jerusalem? There’s rioting in the streets, there’s terrorism, there are reprisals, etcetera, etcetera. Jerusalem is a long way off…’ And our response was, yes, it may be a long way off, but the problem is that no one has really dealt with solutions to Jerusalem in such depth before. It sounds amazing, but it is true. The parties, by their own admission, were ill-prepared at Camp David to deal with this issue. In other words, there hadn’t been studies done, there hadn’t been the conceptualization that we’ve tried to give provide.
We have perhaps over 30 studies that we have commissioned on different aspects of security, holy sites, the economy and the social problems in the Old City. As a result of that, and of discussions with many Israelis and Palestinians as well as Americans and Europeans, we’ve come up with these ideas. We have published four seminal documents so far on Jerusalem and this initiative and we are currently working on a draft mandate for the administrator that the two sides might consider putting into a peace treaty: what that individuals duties, responsibilities and level of accountability would be.
This is all new. You can read hundreds of books on Jerusalem, but you won’t find anything, very surprisingly, that deals with the future of that city in depth in a way that would ensure the support of both Palestinians and Israelis, both Muslims and Jews, for an agreement that could be viable. What one tends to hear is ‘it’s all ours, we’ll run it fairly, etcetera, etcetera.’ Well, those views are exclusionary. They aren’t very likely to be accepted in any peace negotiations. We’ve tried to find a way through that that would guarantee both the kind of access, rights and respect that they want and at the same time serve as a kind of active intermediary—with real authority to ensure stability, normalcy, dignity and rights.
Is there anything else that you think is important to mention?
The security factor is a very important one. On the one hand, Israelis are very worried about terrorism, and threat of violence. On the other hand, Palestinians are worried perhaps about the same kind of thing in terms of the fair mindedness of policing and what have you. They are also worried about respect and dignity and equity in the Old City, and that is a form of security as well. So, this is a very two-sided thing. It’s very complex. What we envisage is a police force that would be part of the Old City administration. In the first instance the police officers would be drawn from countries whom the Israelis and Palestinians together agreed on, and recruited by the chief of police of the special regime on an individual basis. In other words, we wouldn’t go to country x or y and say give us ten of your best. Rather, they would go and say we’d like to do interviews for this—to get the best quality people. And they would be assisted, in our view, by community liaison officers who would be Israelis or Palestinians—because obviously in terms of family disputes and many other things, people from abroad would not be able to effectively act as intermediaries.
The other thing that I think it’s important that I say is this plan of ours—this concept—is not something we’re saying answers all questions, or must be accepted. What we are trying to do is introduce into negotiators’ minds a different conceptual option that they may want to look at if and when there are ever renewed negotiations on the future of Jerusalem. It would be for the parties themselves to decide whether this is viable or not. It’s just something we think people should think about in detail as an alternative to various options that haven’t proved widely acceptable to date.
For more on the status of Jerusalem and the future of the Old City:
The Status of Jerusalem
A discussion with Amb. Michael Bell and Marshall Breger, moderated by Amb. Daniel C. Kurtzer
Discussion presented by Middle East Progress
June 3, 2009
The Missing Peaces: How to Govern Jerusalem and Strike an Israeli-Syrian Deal
Michael D. Bell and Daniel C. Kurtzer; Prem G. Kumar
Foreign Affairs, March/Apr 2009
