May 7, 2009

President Obama and Pakistani President Zardari (AP)

"What is missing from the equation is a comprehensive U.S.-Pakistan strategic framework agreement that outlines two-way commitments between the countries on enhancing cooperation in all spheres—defense, intelligence, nuclear policy, the economy, energy, law enforcement and even educational and cultural cooperation."

This week’s round of trilateral talks between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Washington offers an important opportunity for the Obama administration to address the weakest link in its “Af-Pak” strategy—the deteriorating situation in Pakistan. Just back from my most recent visit to Pakistan last week, I don’t share the rather alarmist and pessimistic views dominating U.S. news coverage and political debates on Pakistan.

Yes, the situation is very serious and not improving, and some grave risks to U.S. security lurk in Pakistan. But most of Pakistan, a country of 170 million people, has not fallen into anarchy. The Taliban are a fringe minority isolated in small pockets of the country, and Pakistanis in recent weeks have turned against extremist Islamists. It is a country with millions of ordinary middle class citizens working in universities, banks and law offices who strive for the same things we want—stability and prosperity. With the right approach, a strategic framework agreement, the United States can more effectively address Pakistan’s multiple security, political and economic challenges. It has no other option but to work to develop stronger partnerships in Pakistan.

I highlight the word partnerships, in its plural form, because the United States must move quickly to develop a broader set of relationships across the full spectrum of Pakistan’s government, vibrant civil society and business communities. One of the biggest mistakes the United States has made throughout the past sixty years in Pakistan was investing in one faction or institution to the detriment of a broader-based approach. At times, we’ve partnered with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. Most recently, in the closing years of the Bush administration, we centered our policy on President Pervez Musharraf, who was ultimately a weak foundation.

Legislation in Congress, such as the Kerry-Lugar bill, introduced this Monday and supported by the Obama administration, takes a step in the right direction by proposing tripling non-military aid to Pakistan and imposing greater accountability on security assistance. Another piece of legislation proposes creating reconstruction opportunity zones in the troubled northwest part of the country. A new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last week adds another important element to a new policy.

Yet, on their own these new legislative initiatives and the proposed counterinsurgency fund, along with the trilateral talks this week, are not enough to form the broad-based partnerships needed to effectively address the problems in Pakistan. These initiatives by themselves could fall into the same old transactional trap that has plagued U.S.-Pakistan relations, one that I heard a lot about on my trip, with the United States saying “do more,” and Pakistan saying “give more.”

What is missing from the equation is a comprehensive U.S.-Pakistan strategic framework agreement that outlines two-way commitments between the countries on enhancing cooperation in all spheres—defense, intelligence, nuclear policy, the economy, energy, law enforcement and even educational and cultural cooperation. The United States has signed similar agreements recently with other important countries, including Iraq, and it should aim to enhance bilateral ties with Pakistan by working out a comprehensive framework for deepening cooperation between our two countries.

Without such a comprehensive agreement, the United States and Pakistan will find it difficult to break what has been a destructive cycle of mutual distrust, one that has played out prominently in the media over the past two weeks. A strategic framework agreement can serve as a more solid foundation for setting common goals in the medium and longer term. Without a longer-term set of goals, U.S. policy in Pakistan will remain stuck in a reactive mode lacking a clear vision, responding to recent negative trends with no clear line on the horizon. A strategic framework agreement can clearly outline commitments and expectations on both sides in trying to build a stronger partnership.

Such a strategic framework agreement also can open the door for broader-based cooperation between the two countries on official and non-official levels and ensure that various approaches are integrated. One good example: Pakistani academics I saw during my visit praised recent increases in Fulbright scholarships to bring more Pakistanis to the United States, but they wanted to see an expansion of efforts to bring U.S. scholars to Pakistan. Instead of dealing with each of these policy initiatives piecemeal, a strategic framework agreement can outline the basis for a long-standing partnership between the two countries in an integrated fashion, one with a view to the long-term relationship needed to make the United States more secure.

The United States cannot afford to fail in Pakistan, and fortunately it has millions of potential partners, in government as well as in the well-educated middle class and a vocal civil society and press. Last month’s armed takeover by the Taliban in certain parts of the country was not only a wakeup call for the Obama administration—it was a wakeup call for millions of Pakistanis. The United States faces several threats in Pakistan, but it also has an historic opportunity to put the bilateral relationship on more solid footing.



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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

Setting the Record Straight

Eye Still on the Ball

“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010
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