
Meeting with Iranian presidential candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi (AP)
"I think that Israel should make its views clear to those who are conducting the dialogue with Iran, primarily the United States. I think Israel cannot interfere, should not interfere and should not wish to interfere in the dialogue as long as its interests are recognized and protected."What in your view are the major challenges the international community faces in tackling the Iranian threat? Are there opportunities? If yes, what are they?
I believe that the major challenges which the world is facing with the Iranian threat are the following: first, the great difficulty of getting the Iranians to agree to a solution which will prevent them from achieving an option to produce a nuclear device. Second, trying to get the Iranians to agree to putting the lid on their enrichment program after they have repeatedly declared that it is their sovereign right to enrich uranium like any other country in the world. It is an issue of Iranian pride and the problem is how to address the Iranian national pride. And the third challenge is how to reach a solution with which other countries in the region can live comfortably. The other countries in the region being the Sunni Arab moderate states and Israel.
These are the three challenges which the current Iranian abilities are posing to the international community as a whole and to the United States in particular.
What about the challenge of what we call Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah and Hamas?
The Iranian proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, are issues which have to be addressed. But I don’t think we need to address them in conjunction with the nuclear challenge. The nuclear challenge is a world in itself. I think that most probably it would be erroneous to include Hezbollah and Hamas in the equation because it will give the Iranians a voice in the Arab-Israeli conflict, not only an adversary role as it has now but a role in crafting the ultimate solution so to speak to Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian problems. I think that as a result of making this linkage, Iran would become a partner and a voice that should be addressed concerning a dispute which is not their dispute. It will be a great mistake both from Israel’s point of view and from the point of view of the Arab Sunni world. And therefore I think that the Hamas and Hezbollah files, so to speak, should not be included in this current effort to obtain an Iranian halt to their programs.
Do you see any opportunities? If yes, what are they?
Yes, I do. I believe that the United States has enormous clout in the world and in the region in particular. And although the Iranians have become very, very arrogant and brazen in the language they have adopted in speaking to the United States, I think they know very well that they are not an equal partner to the United States in determining the future and destiny of the world. They are not a world power like the United States, and the fact that they are seeking equality with the United States is part of their propaganda, but it is not part of their realpolitik. I think they are looking for a role in the region; if it’s east of Iran, then in the areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, if it’s westward, it could include also maybe Iraq.
With that said, I do not think they should be allowed a role anywhere westward of Iraq because I believe that it will not be possible to reach a regional understanding without Israel being on board. I would say that the four regional powers who are active in the region are Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Israel, and you cannot create a regional architecture without Israel being on board. If the Iranians want to extend their aspirations westward this cannot be done without Iran recognizing Israel’s legitimacy and recognizing Israel’s role as a major player in the region.
What role should Israel have as part of the international effort to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons?
I think that Israel should make its views clear to those who are conducting the dialogue with Iran, primarily the United States. I think Israel cannot interfere, should not interfere and should not wish to interfere in the dialogue as long as its interests are recognized and protected. I think that Israel should not be in the forefront of negotiating and conducting a dialogue with Iran at this stage, now that the United States has entered the picture.
How do you assess the current Israeli government’s real view of Iran. Is it any different from what is being reflected in the media?
I think that on the Iranian issue there is very close proximity between what is said in the media and the view of the government of Israel. The true position of Israel on this issue is that it does not believe that it can coexist with an Iranian nuclear military threat, which is not just a potential threat, but a given threat. In other words, when the president of the United States says that an Iranian nuclear military capability is unacceptable, in Israeli eyes it means that it is unacceptable and that it will not be acceptable under any circumstances. And I think this is the position of Israel and that, in this respect, Israel supports the position of President Obama and wishes him success in handling the negotiations with the Iranians. Of course, there is a possibility, which the United States is aware of, not a probability but a possibility, a strong possibility, that such negotiations will not yield a positive outcome, that the negotiation in the end will fail to reach the goal the United States and the world at large has set itself.
If you were briefing Prime Minister Netanyahu ahead of his first meeting with President Obama, what would you advise him with regards to the Iranian issue?
I’d advise him to state very clearly that the Iranian threat has become of such significance and of such importance that in terms of the sequencing of events in the Middle East, it should be given priority. I would suggest to him that he should say to the president of the United States that the Iranian threat is of such paramount importance that should the president of the United States succeed in his present efforts, succeed in such a way that the Iranian threat will be removed, then the president of the United States will obtain such clout as to enable him to follow his views of settling the dispute of the Israeli-Arab history and that as a result of removal of the threat I believe that there will be a clear, a massive support in Israeli public opinion for taking the necessary steps to reach an understanding with the Palestinians earlier than previously envisaged.
How do you read the internal Iranian political map now, a month ahead of the elections?
I think it is very unclear and very uncertain. I don’t think we have sufficient information to give an answer to this question. But as you probably know, the conservative group has put forward another candidate and he’s been extremely critical of the current president, Ahmadinejad. He has been focusing on his economic performance, which is true. Ahmadinejad was originally elected not in order to quarrel and incite the anti-Israeli rhetoric around the world but his number one task was to try to improve the economy. He promised to provide people with jobs and curtail inflation and improve the loss to the ordinary man. All this has not happened—on the contrary. This led to extremely high level of dissatisfaction among ordinary Iranians with the state of the economy. I think that this is also affecting the leadership. And I believe that many Iranians realize that Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric has not served Iran well. So it’s possible, it’s very possible, that all this will come together and result in a change in the leadership.
But we shouldn’t be sanguine about that and believe that once Ahmadinejad is removed, if he is removed, the policy of Iran on the nuclear issue will change. It has to be remembered that the policy of Iran on the nuclear issue is a national policy and all elements of Iranian leadership are involved with it. It is not only the policy of Ahmadinejad, it’s not only the policy of the other candidates, it’s not even the policy of the spiritual leader Khamenei. It is in fact an across-the-board policy. There is no section of society, no party in Iran, which advocates freezing the nuclear program. One has to be clear about that. So we should be careful not to rejoice at the chance that Ahmadinejad might be removed from power and think that this will solve the problem.
So the international community should not take the elections into consideration moving forward on Iran?
One should take the elections into consideration because obviously once there is a replacement for Ahmadinejad, maybe the rhetoric will be different, maybe the atmosphere could improve. The election in itself is not a sign that everything is going to go well. But maybe it will be possible to conduct the negotiations in a more civil manner, in a better atmosphere, and that in itself is important.
If the nuclear issue is such a cross-the-board policy, what are the chances of succeeding in halting the Iranian nuclear program through dialogue?
I don’t know. I think the United States is approaching this in a very prudent manner, and obviously the United States is going to be very careful about raising hopes. I think that one has to take into account that at the end of the day, Iran will have to make a decision as to whether it wants to continue to play a pariah role in international affairs. We need to take into account that if negotiations fail, all other options would come closer to implementation, and you know that all other options are on the table, as the saying goes. These include more punitive sanctions in the economic field and a variety of other efforts which might be made to impress upon Iran that the price it is paying for its refusal to negotiate in good faith is a price which maybe Iran would prefer not to pay.
How do the Arab states perceive Iran’s nuclear program and growing regional influence?
The moderate Arab States are extremely concerned about this. They are very concerned about what this might mean for their countries. These include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and certainly the Gulf states, from Oman in the south to Qatar in the north. And I believe they are very, very concerned with the Iranian threat regardless of what they might say openly and certainly they would like the threat to be removed.
What role might Iran play in the war in Afghanistan?
The situation in Afghanistan is extremely tenuous and I believe that the United States will certainly welcome a situation in which the Iranians cooperate in pacifying Afghanistan. The Iranians have assets in Afghanistan. They have allies there, they have groups and tribal groups with whom they’ve had very close relations in the past. I think that they would very much like Afghanistan to be a pacified state and they fear the spillover from Afghanistan coming into Iran. They believe the Taliban to be a great threat and therefore there is considerable room for cooperation and for mutual support between the United States and Iran on the Afghan issue.
What might be the impact of an Israeli-Syrian peace process on Syria’s links with Iran and its support for Hezbollah and Hamas?
I don’t know. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that yesterday morning the prime minister of Israel stated very categorically that he does not believe that Israel should evacuate the Golan Heights. So I don’t think this is an imminent question that has to be addressed.

