Prime Minister Netanyahu & President Obama (AP)
"The meeting, I believe, was exactly what was anticipated and predicted: a shared concern over Iran's nuclear ambitions and differences of timetables and approaches on the Palestinian issue. Yet these differences can and presumably will be bridged once a process is launched."Prime Minister Netanyahu seems to have prepared himself extensively for the meeting with President Obama. What in your view are the most important points Netanyahu hoped to bring up?
This is their first meeting which is most definitely a huge opportunity and should be perceived as such rather than something of an obstacle that you just need to get over. We are talking ahead of the meeting but I think that Netanyahu will try to do the following: He will try and explain to Obama that the peace format that we have known since Oslo in 1993 has exhausted its lifespan and usefulness and you need to think out of the box. I think Netanyahu believes that this new president is amenable to thinking outside the box. Netanyahu and Obama, for that matter, are both going to highlight the regional approach. Now, there is a difference here, because Netanyahu will most probably emphasize the regional approach in order to decrease the centrality of the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli track, while Obama is going to endorse the regional approach based on progress on bilateral negotiations with the Palestinians. But in terms of how I expect Netanyahu to make his presentation, he is going to create something that we can describe as a reverse linkage.
In the last two, three weeks in Israel, you have heard people around Netanyahu say that there is no linkage between dealing with Iran and the Palestinian track. Yet essentially what Netanyahu is going to do is create the exact reverse linkage. He is going to say that you can’t have any progress on the Palestinian issue unless and until the Iranian issue is dealt with resolutely. Meaning that as long as Iran poses a threat and is on its way to becoming nuclear, a Palestinian state, especially with Hamas controlling Gaza, would be nothing more than a forward outpost of Iranian expansionism, extremism and terrorism. So, as far as Netanyahu is concerned, I have no doubt that he is going to emphasis the Iranian issue and he is going to lend credence to this argument by saying that this is a real threat shared not only by Israel and the United States, but also by most of the so-called moderate Arab states: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, most of the Gulf states, even Turkey. And that an Iranian nuclear capability would turn the Middle East upside down in a way that would be undoubtedly and irreversibly detrimental to American interests.
I can only assume that Obama will agree with that logic, but argue that in order to forge an effective coalition you need to make real progress on the ground on the Palestinian issue. On the issue of the two states, if Netanyahu will say a Palestinian state is not viable at this point and what you need instead is a bottom-up nation-building process, then Obama will nod and smile and say, Mr. Prime Minister, I agree 100 percent and part of bottom-up is freezing the expansion of settlements, freezing building in settlements, removing roadblocks and dismantling what you, according to Israeli law, call illegal outposts. So, I think these are the two issues that will govern the discussion.
What is absolutely vital is that the discussions flow amicably. If there is any tension, than any analysis of this issue becomes subject to a lack of chemistry. So the creation of some chemistry is vital because this is only the first meeting and the hype that has been generated is media hype. Yes, it’s the first meeting and yes, the first impression is important, but that said, it is just the first meeting and there are going to be plenty of others. And I wouldn’t rule out that the second meeting will be sooner than expected because the outcome of the agenda may require that the two meet again in say, two or three months, a timeframe in which you will have special presidential envoy George Mitchell come here, the Israeli foreign minister going to Washington to meet with Hillary Clinton, and before you know it, there is going to be a second meeting and the second meeting is much more of a work session than the first introductory meeting. That’s the agenda more or less.
What in your opinion are Netanyahu’s plans on the Arab-Israeli front?
There are three circles here. There is the Israeli-Palestinian circle, there is the Israeli-Syrian track and then there is an outer envelope of the regional approach. Now in the regional approach, there are two manifestations, one is the Arab League Initiative of 2002 that is obviously going to be modified and repackaged. But there is another manifestation, a very recent one, and that is King Abdullah of Jordan’s plan—what he calls the 57-state plan, which to many Israelis including President Peres and Defense Minister Barak, a) seems to be a very appealing, and b) a framework that should be acceptable to Israel as long as it is a framework for deliberations and negotiations, rather than a take it or leave it attitude.
I think Netanyahu is going to say that the two-state solution is a wonderful bumper sticker, it appeals to many people’s logic, but realistically and practically on the ground it is just not viable at this point. Which is why he is going to argue that we need to invest in a nation-building system—not in a patronizing way that we will build their state for them, but nation-building in the sense that Israel will be able to assist economically, administratively and any other way. And he’ll call on the world to be engaged in that, and build the institutions. Because clearly, what you see in the Palestinian Authority ever since Oslo is a dysfunctional political system that cannot guarantee security in terms of stemming terrorism. If that leads to the creation of a stable and functional Palestinian Authority, than I think that Netanyahu himself at some point will not rule out a two-state solution. Just declaring it right now seems to him to be catering to formulas that have not worked.
What is the issue then with saying ‘two-state solution’ to describe the desired horizon?
I think this has to do with domestic political issues.
Let’s get back to the other two circles you started to describe.
On Syria, I think something is maybe growing in the midst here that we can’t foresee right now. The strategic advantage in Netanyahu’s eyes of the negotiation process with the Syrians is clear. I think that he understands the price that Israel will have to pay. Supposedly, it’s only a real estate dispute: give the Golan Heights back and you will get peace, not an American-Canadian type of peace, but an Egypt-Israeli peace. Cold peace is better than a hot war. But it’s more than that. Not the fact that they are hosting terrorist organizations, which in itself negative, but let’s assume that is something they can deal with in a relatively short period of time, but the nature of the issue with Syria is its alliance with Iran. Now, obviously Israel is realistic enough to know that you can’t demand as a precondition that Syria sever its ties with Iran just as an exchange to entering negotiations. By the same token, you need to understand fully what you are getting in return or whatever territorial compromises you are going to make on the Golan.
I think that on the Syrian track, Netanyahu is much more skeptical of their intentions and interests and thinks that it is not exactly around the corner. And if anything, Netanyahu awaits further American indication of how they see the Syrians.
Netanyahu has previously expressed interest in peace with Syria, but last week said he would not withdraw from the Golan Heights. Has his thinking on the issue changed and, if so, how?
When Netanyahu says, ‘I will not withdraw from the Golan Heights,’ I take him seriously. I interpret this to mean that under current conditions in the Middle East, with Syria being the Syria that it is right now, with its foreign policy being the way it is right now, that relations with Iran being what they are right now, there is no reason for Israel to seriously consider withdrawing from the Golan. However, all of the above can change.
Before Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the talk in Israel was not to give back the Sinai desert and three years before that, the Arab League enunciated Khartoum’s three nos. So things can change, and you know what, let me submit to you not a science fiction type of scenario: the Americans engage Assad so much so that at some point Hillary Clinton goes to Damascus. Assad comes to the UN for the General Assembly of, say, 2010 and he has a cordial 15-minute meeting with President Obama, unplanned. They bump into each other in the corridors of the UN and then Assad communicates to the Americans that he wants to go to Jerusalem the way Sadat did and he wants to speak to the Knesset to address the issue of peace with Israel. Public opinion in Israel would change dramatically. Everyone is going to be overwhelmed by these developments and the entire language is going change from ‘we will not withdraw from the Golan’ to the benefits of peace with Syria. In one move, it could happen. It happened before. So what I’m saying is that when Netanyahu says today, ‘I will not give away the Golan Heights,’ what he means is that he will not under the current circumstances and conditions.
I think the crucial element in this is not the Israeli military establishment, which is in favor of peace with Syria, but the United States, which will see the strategic benefits of an Israeli-Syrian deal that further isolates Iran and further diminishes the power of extremists by creating another buffer peace in addition to the peace Israel already has with Egypt and with Jordan. Syria’s relations with Turkey are improving and the United States is going to withdraw from Iraq. You are almost talking, from an American point of view, in terms of the 1950’s concept of regional alliances—the so-called northern tier.
The Israeli security establishment’s position on that, however, is important and is going to be strengthened by virtue of its compatibility with the American view.
And the regional circle?
The regional approach is something that is going to be much more appealing because of the Iranian threat. The process itself has the potential of a moderating effect. Everyone is around the table. It is not a substitute for bilateral negotiations and I don’t think a 57-nation roundtable is going to solve the problems that the Palestinians feel they encounter every day. I don’t think for one second Netanyahu has any illusions about that. But the regional approach is much more consistent with American interests and I think that both on the eve of his meeting with Obama, but also we can talk of the aftermath of his meeting, Netanyahu, or Israel for that matter, is going to have to make some adjustments, that would be compatible with how the United States is going to perceive the region. Israel should never relent and never compromise on what it deems absolutely vital for its national security, but everything else that is less than vital for national security, modifications and adjustments and reviewing of policies is going to have to be made.
Are you referring to the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report and Israel’s reluctance to accept them?
The report came out in December 2006, and from an Israeli perspective, the report advocated three things—engaging Syria, engaging Iran, diplomatically that is, and actively pursuing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israel assumed strongly that former President Bush rejected the report. What really happened is that Bush refrained from fully endorsing it. But if you take the last year of the Bush presidency, not to mention the first few months of the Obama presidency, there is essentially an endorsement of the recommendation. Iran is being engaged, and I’m sure Netanyahu has heard that from President Obama. Syria is being engaged, and the fact that sanctions have been removed as part of the Syria Accountability Act in Congress doesn’t mean that the United States made a decision not to engage Syria. There have been two American envoys that visited Syria twice since Obama took office, Jeffrey Feltman and Dan Shapiro, and I think that before long you will see special presidential envoy George Mitchell traveling to Syria. And I can only imagine, estimate or assess that the Obama administration is not going to ignore the Palestinian-Israeli track. How forceful their approach will be, how coherent the policy that they formulate, I don’t know, and I think that it is fair to say that Obama is in the process of formulating that approach. He is waiting to see Netanyahu; afterwards he will see Abu Mazen, after that he will see President Mubarak, all in Washington. He has met already with King Abdullah of Jordan and on the 4th of June he is set to go to Cairo and make a major speech on U.S. relations with the Islamic world. So you take all these and you connect the dots between them and you will see that it constitutes an endorsement of the Baker-Hamilton report.
Let me add one more thing, I don’t know of a comprehensive approach that the Obama administration has. I think it is under warranty. I think it is being formulated as we speak. I think we need to wait a few months to allow the president to develop such an approach. I think it is going to be the sum of what he draws from his meetings with regional leaders, what he is being advised by Richard Holbrook, George Mitchell and Dennis Ross, his envoys and Hillary Clinton as secretary, and then all of this subjects to how he sees and defines American interests.
Who advises Netanyahu on the Middle East and on the U.S. approach to the region? If you were briefing him ahead of his D.C. visit, what would you advise him?
I think he has a skilled and decent staff of advisors: Uzi Arad, Yitzhak Molcho, Ron Dermer, but he also consults broader circles on an informal basis. In addition, of course, he has Barak as defense minister and Lieberman as foreign minister with whom he consults, and the foreign ministry and military intelligence and the Mossad. So he gets a broad enough picture and there are no secrets here, there is no golden advice which he hasn’t received.
We are speaking prior to the visit so my advice won’t have any use. But if I were advising him, I would say ‘the quality of the first meeting can potentially set the tone of your relations with the president. Obama is a very strong and popular president of the United States of America and he will remain so until the remainder of your term. Do all you can to listen to him, respect him, understand how he sees things from the U.S. perspective and even if you disagree with him, don’t turn this into a personal issue.’
What in your view are the points on which the Obama and Netanyahu agree? What might be a source of disagreement?
Netanyahu knows America well enough to understand that however long his term in office is going to be, Obama will be president and Democrats will control both houses of Congress, because we are looking at November 2012 before some of the components may change, and in Israeli politics, looking forward from May 2009 to November 2012 is slightly longer than eternity. This is very reassuring from Netanyahu’s point of view, because he knows what he is dealing with, there are no surprises, there is no reason to assume that things are going to change in a year and a half so we have to buy time, we have to drag our feet. It won’t happen, there is no need for it to happen.
Both Obama and Netanyahu agree that Iran acquiring nuclear capability is a major regional threat that will almost inevitably destabilize the region. They agree that Islamic fundamentalism and extremism expressed through terrorism is something that needs to be dealt with comprehensively because it poses a threat not only to Israelis, but also to Americans and to moderate regimes in the region. They agree, I think, that the peace process, the way it was managed until now, albeit paved with good intentions, has yielded very little results and produced a lot of misery. And they agree that something needs to be done. They also agree to a large extent that Israel is an American ally in this region, that the United States needs Israel’s assistance and more than that, Israel needs U.S. assistance.
What they do not agree on is, I think, the priorities and timetables, meaning that the Americans believe that a major effort needs to be made with the Palestinians; Obama is no different than any president since 1967 when under the Johnson administration the United States defined settlements as an obstacle for moving forward. The Americans think that the Israel should be more understanding of the broader American interest in the region. This is just a summation of the agreements and disagreements.
So you don’t anticipate a showdown as some have been writing about between Obama and Netanyahu in their meeting?
No, at least not now. Both sides need to succeed in this meeting. Obama needs to succeed and a lot of people want him to succeed. The last thing he needs is to win a silly PR competition with Israel. Netanyahu understands fully, and this is a lesson from his last term as prime minister, that if he is perceived as failing to deal with the United States or unskilled to engage the U.S. president, then the political price is going to be heavy. Don’t forget that Netanyahu won in 1996 when the electoral system was a direct election system, he beat Shimon Peres and could claim that as narrow as the gap was, he got the public’s mandate. This time around, in 2009, he won 27 mandates out of 120. Not only is it not a majority, but it is not the largest party because Kadima got one more mandate, 28.
He knows that Israelis intuitively understand that Obama is not only a very serious president but he also is the absolute only game in town. You can’t play around. Last time there was Clinton, who was popular. Yes, he won a second election, but Republicans controlled the house and the evangelicals were stronger politically than they are today, and neo-conservatives mounted a very intellectually forceful opposition from outside the administration on foreign policy. So Netanyahu could, at the time, play Washington in the way in which he wanted to play it, in which he could maneuver, in which he could leverage. This time, there is a different America: a huge, once-in-a-century economic crisis that drains energy and sucks all attention and a very popular president. He understand that he will have to get along—not at the expense of what he deems as vital Israeli interest—but he will have to get along.
The media hype generated around the meeting has three reasons. First, yes, there are differences about timetables and priorities, Netanyahu hasn’t said the words two-state solution and Lieberman made some statements. People interpret these differences as having real substance. Number two, the interpretation of Obama as a new, very active president who seeks to change and act in almost geometrical opposition to what has been done before while Netanyahu still engages in ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90’s talk about who controls what hill, according to the press, leads people to think that there is an almost inevitable and unavoidable collision. Third, there is a contrast in styles. Obama is seen as a very active, almost frenzied, president. Just look at his domestic policies and what he was done with the domestic policies, and if you transpose that into foreign policy then we are talking about a hyperactive president—which I’m not sure will happen but this is how people see it. And on the other hand, Netanyahu is viewed by the media as being a super conservative, Republican-oriented, right-wing Israeli politician.
The truth is, both are much more pragmatic than meets the eye. Obama is not as liberal ‘let’s rock the boat and bring down the house’ as some people think and Netanyahu is not a rabid right-wing lunatic as some people try to describe him. Both are much closer to the center than they are to the extremes. So it’s a question of adjustment in policies, but all of this is going to be based in the end, I think, not only on interests but also on a working relationship, call it chemistry. Obama is going to look at Netanyahu and think, can I envision having a beer and watching a football game with him and Netanyahu is going to think, do I have anything in common with this gentlemen. And if they both say yes, even if it is a partial yes, then whatever differences they have, can be sorted out.
You already mentioned settlements being a controversial issue between Israel and the United States for years. Can Netanyahu address Israeli obligations on settlements given the composition of his coalition?
Yes, much more than he thinks. Look, there are three issues regarding the settlements. First, illegal outposts, which are illegal according to Israeli law, not the U.S. constitution, and so Netanyahu will dismantle them and he can do that with this coalition. Will he? I think he will. Does he want to? I don’t know. Second, there is the building of new settlements. I think Netanyahu realizes that no new settlements will be built outside what are called the three major settlement blocs, which by and large, are to be incorporated or annexed to Israel under a peace treaty looking at the Geneva Initiative, Camp David, the Clinton Parameters. Third, continued construction outside the largest settlements block as part of what we call natural growth. Israel’s position is – what can you do about it? These are close communities—culturally, ideologically, religiously—and being around the family is important for them. Children grow up, get married and have children. More children need another kindergarten, another clinic, another access road, another fence, more security forces and before you know it this natural growth turns into what the United States calls settlements expansion. The settlements expand horizontally and not vertically, because conceivably you can say, if you need to build in the settlements build up, but they build horizontally because it is a part of their agenda. This, according to the Americans, Palestinians and many Israelis, this disrupts the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian territories which makes even the remote possibility of a Palestinian state less viable. This is going to be an area of disagreement. The United States will demand a freeze, Israel will insist on natural growth, and this is also a problem Netanyahu will have with his coalition, within his own party, the Likud Party, for that matter.
Is there any way Netanyahu can keep his government together if he stops settlement expansion?
I think he can. Look, Netanyahu is not a left-wing politician. He is not Yossi Beilin. He was not elected as a leftist. You have to respect his ideology. He is not a peacenik in the Oslo sense, in the Israeli left-wing tradition. And he was not elected only to get elected and now move to the left like Sharon and Olmert did.
I think he will have the support of 60-70 percent of the population but this won’t necessarily keep his coalition together. I think that the coalition won’t definitely disintegrate if he moves in that direction, although it might. But—and I’ll speculate—Kadima, a party of 28 mandates, currently sits in the opposition. If Netanyahu moves in this direction, which is not a long way for him to move because in the end he is a pragmatist, and cracks in the coalition start to emerge, he can change the composition of the coalition and bring in Kadima. Obviously this is a political scenario that is complex but is not out of the question.
Israeli papers reported on Thursday that President Obama sent Israel a message not to attack Iran to which Israel responded saying the United States would be notified on its Iran plans. In your assessment, does the President have a reason to fear a unilateral Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear facilities?
No reason to fear. I don’t think Israel will surprise the United States, second guess the United States or do anything that the United States asked not to be done. But I do think that at some point in the very near future, Israel will make it clear to the United States that engaging Iran is not an open-ended deadline-less effort. I don’t think Israel should dictate a deadline but make its view clear, and if the threat becomes even more imminent, Israel will weigh its options.
From your experience as Israel’s consul general in the United States, how would you explain current Israeli policy to the U.S. president and what kind of U.S. engagement would you advocate?
Israel’s relations with the United States are a pillar of Israel’s national security. They should not be tampered with, they should not be ‘fixed’ because they are not broken and they should be nurtured and lubricated on a daily basis. I think there is a growing fatigue with the Middle East in U.S. public opinion, and a lack of understanding of the complexities in which Israel finds itself. If I were to appeal to American public opinion and to American decision-making circles, I would first and foremost highlight the alliance between the two countries and urge the United States to be a facilitator and a mediator in the peace process. I don’t think that the policy of the previous administration, according to which Israel can do whatever it wants, is beneficial to Israel in the long run. I happen to have a kind of a heretic view—because I think many people disagree with me—on what’s good for Israel from a U.S. perspective and my conclusion is that if it’s good for the United States, it is almost inevitably good for Israel. That established, any talk of U.S. ‘pressure’ on Israel is usually counterproductive and not really going to produce the desired results.
You served as chief of staff under two very different foreign ministers —Shlomo Ben Ami and David Levy—and as foreign policy advisor to both Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres. What piece of advice can you offer Foreign Minister Lieberman in light of how he is perceived in the international community?
I think I would explain to Lieberman that Israel is not a superpower and that being on the front page of The New York Times has its benefits but also its downsides. We need to assume that after 60 years of hearing the same thing, there is certain fatigue around the world. Also, try to understands that this is the 21st century and there is more globalism than sovereignty rather than the other way around. More importantly, Lieberman’s legitimacy and acceptability begins and ends in Washington, not in Tel Aviv, not in Berlin or Tokyo, so he should pay attention to that, and, if I may say, curb his enthusiasm.
I have to say, though, that he probably sees the greater Middle East more in line with the U.S. administration than many credit him for. His rhetoric might be controversial but his substance is not as marginal or off the wall as many think.
Ed: After this interview was conducted on the morning of May 18, 2009, we had an opportunity to ask the following question later in the evening, after President Obama’s visit with Prime Minister Netanyahu.
How do you assess the meeting between Obama and Netanyahu? Did it live up to your expectations or not and why?
The meeting, I believe, was exactly what was anticipated and predicted: A shared concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and differences of timetables and approaches on the Palestinian issue. Yet these differences can and presumably will be bridged once a process is launched.
