The “ordeal” of the coming elections, which will be held on June 7, is not what the majority of the Lebanese are worried about. … The current majority does not find it in its interest to hinder or distort the electoral process, as long as it believes that it will ensure preserving its position as the majority. As for the current minority, it makes no secret of the fact that, whatever the results of the elections, these will not change anything in the current balance of power. …
Furthermore, it is no longer a secret that the camp that currently considers itself to be in the opposition—despite participating in the government —is preparing its “weapons” for the next confrontation, if needed. … March 8 camp has prepared the necessary political tools to face post-elections choices, while the ranks of the majority are divided on the stances that they will adopt in the coming phase. Will all of its constituents boycott the government the current opposition might form if it obtains a majority of parliamentary seats, or will part of this majority be willing to walk out on [its] commitment … thus joining the government and giving the March 8 camp the opportunity to launch such a government under the slogan of “consensus”?
Although the internal dimension of this awaited confrontation over the designation of the future government is important, it would be unrealistic to ignore its regional dimension, and particularly Syria’s stance on this Lebanese dispute. … Here too the March 8 camp considers that the election of President Michel Suleiman as a result of the Doha agreement has consecrated his presumed role as a consensual president. … In other words, President Suleiman will be blamed for signing the decree of any government that would not be designated as one of “national unity”, as this would be considered contrary to his “function” as a consensual president, even if such a decree is perfectly sound constitutionally. Access the full article>>
