January 13, 2009

In January 2006, Hamas won a legislative majority, giving it control of the Palestinian cabinet, while Mahmoud Abbas remained the chief executive, controlling overall security. In June 2007, Hamas challenged Abbas’ security forces, overthrowing the Palestinian Authority government (PA) in Gaza, which led to division with the West Bank. Following a year-long blockade of Gaza and ongoing rocket attacks into Israel, Israel and Hamas agreed to an Egyptian-brokered six-month ceasefire in June 2008. By agreeing to the deal, Israel hoped to end the rocket attacks from Gaza, freeze Hamas’ military buildup in Gaza and begin a process that could lead to the release of captured Israeli solider Gilad Shalit. Hamas hoped to end Israeli air strikes and incursions into Gaza and ease the closure of the territory. On December 27, following intensified rocket fire after the ceasefire expired, Israel launched an extensive military operation in Gaza.

June
• The ceasefire began on June 19. At the time, PA officials expressed concern that an agreement with Hamas would undermine the PA.
• On June 29, Hamas arrested a spokesman of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade after the group claimed responsibility for launching two rockets into Israel.

July
• On July 2, Israeli authorities said they had closed the Gaza border six times in response to rocket fire since the truce began.
• In late July, Abbas called for renewed talks with Hamas with the help of Egyptian mediation.
• Israeli and UN figures reported between 10 to 20 rockets fired into Israel from Gaza.

August
• In early August, following a bombing in Gaza, 11 people died in a Hamas crackdown on a clan supportive of Fatah. In response, Israel, in consultations with the PA, allowed 88 Fatah supporters to seek asylum in Jericho.
• In late August Egypt held meetings with representatives from Islamic Jihad as part of a series of bilateral meetings with Palestinian factions.
• Between 10 to 30 rockets were fired into Israel in August.

September
• On September 17, Israeli negotiator Ofer Dekel met with Egyptian officials to discuss the release of Shalit in exchange for Hamas prisoners in Israel.
• Between 5 to 10 rockets were fired into Israel in September.
• In meetings with Egyptian officials in September, PLO/Fatah representatives accepted Egyptian proposals to end inter-Palestinian rifts.

October
• On October 6, Hamas officials said they would not recognize Abbas’ presidency after January 8, 2009.
• On October 8, Hamas representatives met with Egyptian officials in preparation for a future joint meeting of various Palestinian factions.
• The Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) reported two rocket and mortar attacks during October.

November
• Egypt announced that reconciliation talks between different factions had been postponed due to Hamas’ decision not to take part. A Hamas official cited Fatah’s refusal to free Hamas prisoners in the West Bank as the group’s reason for not participating. Hamas had also previously taken issue with Cairo’s unwillingness to hold talks regarding the opening of the Rafah border crossing. Hamas later cited additional reasons for not joining the talks, leading to the impression it feared being pressured into an agreement.
• On November 4, in the course of Israel’s first incursion into Gaza since the ceasefire–a mission intended to destroy a tunnel built to capture Israeli soldiers–six gunmen were killed and militants fired 35 rockets. In the following days, Palestinians fired dozens of rockets and mortars at Israel and Israel closed commercial crossings into Gaza, allowing in limited amounts of fuel.
• On November 12, Israel killed four Hamas members that the military said were attempting to put an explosive device near the border fence. Hamas also launched rockets into Israel and the Israeli military carried out two air strikes in Gaza.

December
• On December 14, during the celebration of Hamas’ 21st anniversary, Hamas leaders in Gaza left open the possibility of extending the truce while the exiled political leadership in Damascus, Syria said it would end December 19. A spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that Israel was willing to continue the ceasefire if Hamas stopped militants from firing rockets into Israel. Major General Amos Gilad, a high-ranking Israeli defense official, traveled to Egypt to discuss the truce.
• By mid-December, Israeli military cited 250 rockets and mortars had been fired at Israel since November 4 and Israeli operations had killed at least 10 more Palestinians.
• On December 18, Hamas declared an end to the ceasefire.
• By the end of the ceasefire, the daily average number of trucks allowed into Gaza had increased from 70 to approximately 90. Before the Hamas takeover of Gaza and the closing of the crossings, 500 to 600 truckloads entered Gaza daily. The Israeli government also reported 362 rocket and mortar shells fired at Israel during the ceasefire.



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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

Setting the Record Straight

Eye Still on the Ball

“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010
  • Middle East Analysis

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