President Suleiman (AP)
"Ultimately, Lebanon’s political leaders will need to bridge their deep differences through compromises that put the national interest ahead of confessional rivalries."More than one month after the May 21st Doha agreement, Lebanon remains poised on the verge of civil war. It does so not only because Lebanon’s rival factions have made little progress on implementing the agreement, but also because not enough is being done to bridge the country’s factional divides.
Negotiations on the formation of a unity government remain stalled. Meanwhile, sectarian fighting—most recently in the northern city of Tripoli—continues to plague the country. Barring serious mediation efforts to defuse tensions between Prime Minister Fuad Siniora’s March 14 coalition and the Hezbollah-led opposition (also known as the March 8 coalition), the tenuous accord between the deeply polarized factions is likely to unravel.
The Qatar-brokered truce—negotiated following the most serious outbreak of sectarian violence since Lebanon’s 15-year civil war ended in 1990—helped to break an 18-month political impasse by paving the way for the election of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander General Michel Suleiman as president. Aside from Suleiman’s election, the agreement calls for a new electoral law in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections and the formation of a national unity government, with 11 cabinet seats (known as the “blocking third” veto) apportioned to the Hezbollah-led opposition.
During the past few weeks, intense bickering between March 14 and March 8 regarding the distribution of cabinet portfolios has brought progress on implementing Doha to a dangerous standstill. The Doha agreement sets out a clear formula mandating the number of cabinet seats allotted to each side—16 for the March 14 majority, 11 for the Hezbollah-led opposition and 3 for President Suleiman—but the feuding factions cannot agree on the distribution of the four “sovereign” ministries: Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance. Debate currently appears centered on the defense ministry portfolio with the Hezbollah-led opposition insisting on a greater say on security-related issues. Recent reporting, however, suggests a compromise may be near.
Yet an agreement on a unity government will not spell the end to Lebanon’s problems. Bitter political rivalries coupled with ongoing sectarian fighting suggest deeper discord among Lebanon’s factions that portends more violence in the coming weeks and months. Since Doha, fighting between Sunni and Shiite factions has taken place nearly daily, with episodic, heavier fighting—including the use of rocket-propelled grenades and mortars—occurring in places such as Tripoli and the eastern Bekaa valley. The army moved tentatively into Tripoli last week to help quell clashes, but sporadic violence continues. Equally concerning, intra-Christian fighting has been reported in areas north of Beirut.
Continued unrest, despite Doha, underscores the willingness of polarized political camps to use violence to achieve political gains. Some fighting has also been attributed to those seeking revenge in longstanding confessional rivalries that date back to the civil war. Although the Doha agreement succeeded in pulling Lebanon’s fighting factions back from the brink of civil war, the rivals’ deep-seated mistrust rooted in a confessional system that emphasizes sectarian differences will likely result in more violence unless the parties engage in serious negotiations aimed at resolving their differences.
Indeed, if the past few weeks are any indication, renewed fighting can be expected throughout the tumultuous period leading up to next May’s parliamentary elections. In the absence of a broader understanding among competing factions on how to resolve their outstanding differences, the fractious rivals may resort to force each time they seek a political advantage in Lebanon’s precarious balance of power. Under this scenario, Lebanon will witness a series of recurring crises, with the attendant danger of the situation spiraling into widespread violence.
In a meeting last week of Lebanon’s principal religious leaders, President Suleiman, calling for national dialogue, warned that Lebanon’s political leaders had brought the country “to the brink of suicide.” Building on Doha, it will be essential for Lebanon’s political factions to engage in serious negotiation devoted to insuring the peaceful implementation of the agreement.
Aside from forming a cabinet, Lebanon’s chief political players will need to strengthen key national security institutions, namely the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). A crucial step toward doing so will be to work out compromises for key government positions such as army commander and head of the Internal Security Forces. Leaders of these two critical national security institutions should be chosen with the aim of rebuilding public confidence in their capacity to protect Lebanese civilians and their ability to implement much-needed security sector reforms.
Serious dialogue among key political factions will also need to facilitate parliamentary debate on the draft electoral law, ideally implementing critical reforms such as the establishment of an independent electoral commission.
Ultimately, Lebanon’s political leaders will need to bridge their deep differences through compromises that put the national interest ahead of confessional rivalries.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace which does not advocate specific policy positions.
