June 10, 2008

On December 18, 2007, the United Nations Security Council extended the mandate authorizing the presence of U.S.-led forces in Iraq through December 31, 2008. The Iraqi government said that this would be its last request for an extension of the UN mandate. The United States and Iraq have since begun to negotiate terms for the future U.S. role in Iraq. The two countries’ envisioned future relationship was first outlined in a 2007 Declaration of Principles, which provided a general political, economic and security framework. The U.S. and Iraqi governments are negotiating a status of forces agreement (SOFA) determining the military structure of U.S. forces in Iraq, including the legal rights and obligations of U.S. personnel. The governments are also negotiating a broader strategic framework agreement covering aspects of the former Declaration of Principles, including the U.S. role in protecting Iraqi sovereignty from external and internal threats and U.S. support for political reconciliation in Iraq. While the governments hope to reach an agreement on the two understandings by July 31, recent disagreements and Iraqi public opposition have led to reports that the Iraqi government may seek an additional extension of the UN mandate.

Iraqi Concerns

Iraqi officials have many concerns about the current negotiations, including the long-term presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, the directive of U.S. military operations and the immunity of U.S. troops and security contractors. There are also reports, discredited by U.S. officials, that Iraqi officials wish to delay negotiations until after the November 2008 U.S. elections. A letter signed by Iraqi parliamentarians from parties that make up a majority of the parliament was released on June 4. It stated that under Article 58 of the Iraqi Constitution any Iraqi-U.S. agreement must be ratified by Iraq’s parliament, the Council of Representatives (COR), and must include mechanisms that will lead to a full U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.

The COR is fragmented in its support of the negotiations. Sadrists, led by the Shia cleric Moktada al-Sadr, strongly oppose any long-term military alliance between Iraq and the United States. Other Iraqi politicians share concerns over the talks, including Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of a top Shia political bloc, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, who sees various aspects of the proposals as violating Iraqi sovereignty. At the same time, Kurdish groups and some Sunni officials support a U.S. presence in Iraq, which they see as protection from the Shia majority backed by Iran.

Regional Perspectives
The Iranian government opposes Iraqi-U.S. negotiations. It fears that negotiations will lead to long-term stationing of U.S. forces in neighboring Iraq. From June 7-8, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian officials in Tehran. In addition to presenting evidence of Iranian intervention in Iraq, Maliki hoped to use the visit to assuage Iranian fears over Iraqi-U.S. security arrangements. Maliki stated that U.S. bases in Iraq would not be used to attack Iran. The Bush Administration is also working to persuade neighboring Sunni Arab states to increase their diplomatic and economic support for the Iraqi government. On June 5, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahayan visited Iraq, the first such visit by a Gulf Arab foreign minister since 2003. The following day the UAE announced plans to name an ambassador to Iraq in the near future and reopen its embassy in Baghdad within days. On June 8, Bahrain announced its plan to set up a new embassy and appoint an ambassador to Iraq. Jordan also promised to name a new ambassador to Iraq.

Criticism in the United States

While administration officials have said that current proposals do not set future troop levels or establish permanent U.S. bases in Iraq, opponents contend that the plans bind the United States to a long-term military presence in Iraq. Opponents also argue that the Bush Administration seeks a SOFA with Iraq that is different from existing SOFAs with more than 80 countries. The proposed Iraq SOFA differs because it permits U.S. military forces to detain Iraqis and unilaterally carry out military operations, while also providing immunity for U.S. security contractors. Opponents claim that these features constitute the agreement as a defense treaty, which requires Senate approval. Administration officials, however, state that the proposals are “nonbinding,” and therefore do not need congressional ratification. While the Bush Administration has indicated that the strategic framework agreement will broadly adhere to the former Declaration of Principles agreement, there is debate over whether the agreement will require the United States to protect Iraqi sovereignty indefinitely.

On June 4, four ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent a bipartisan letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Rice highlighting the potential need for legislative approval of the proposed agreements, noting the administration’s failure to consult with Congress during negotiations and the lack of a response to questions sent to the administration by the Senate committee nearly two months ago. On June 5, the administration issued a response avoiding the controversial questions and repeating former statements that the arrangements would not include specific troop numbers or establish permanent military bases in Iraq.



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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

Setting the Record Straight

Eye Still on the Ball

“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010
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