May 2, 2008

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Bashar Assad (AP)

Timeline
1987: Founding of Hamas: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz Rantisi and others create the organization as an offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the first intifada, or uprising. Hamas has a strong base of support in the Gaza Strip, and has some presence in the West Bank as well.

1988: Publishing of the Hamas Covenant: Among other things, the covenant calls for the obliteration of Israel and Jihad as the only answer to the “Palestinian question” and challenges the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of Palestinian people.

1989: Imprisonment of Yassin: Hamas militants kill Israelis in dozens of shootings. Israel responds by outlawing Hamas and sentencing Yassin to life in prison for ordering the deaths of two captured Israeli agents and authorizing the murder of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel.

1991: Formation of Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades: Hamas establishes the brigade as its military wing to execute attacks against Israel.

1993: Oslo Accords: Israel and the PLO recognize each other’s existence in the Declaration of Principles; Hamas refuses to recognize Israel.

1994-1996: Continued Violence and Palestinian Elections: Hamas introduces suicide bombings as a tactic in the ongoing violence. Israeli military strikes kill Hamas’ chief bombmaker Yehiyeh Ayyash in January 1996 and Hamas responds with increased suicide bombings. Hamas boycotts the first Palestinian elections in 1996 because they were organized as a result of the Oslo accords, which Hamas refused to support. Hamas regarded the PA as illegitimate. After a string of suicide bombs in March 1996, the PA raids Hamas institutions and arrests more than 600 members, while Israel begins to destroy the homes of suicide bomber’s families.

1997: Assassination Attempt and Prisoner Exchanges: An assassination attempt on Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal fails in Jordan, and two Israeli agents allegedly linked to the attempt are captured. Israel releases Yassin and 20 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the two agents.

1999: Jordan and Hamas: In August, Jordanian authorities ban Hamas from the country, closing its political offices in Amman and arresting its leaders. In a controversial move, Jordan sends four Hamas leaders, including Meshaal, to Qatar.

2000-2004: Second Intifada: The Second Intifada begins, sparked by a number of events including the failure of the Camp David negotiations. During this period Hamas increases its attacks against Israel, including a suicide bomb in 2002 in a hotel in Netanya that kills 29. Israel responds with military strikes killing key Hamas leaders including Ismail Abu Shanab in 2003, the leader of Hamas in Gaza Abdel Aziz Rantisi in April 2004 and Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004. In local elections in parts of the West Bank in December 2004, Hamas wins 75 seats compared to Fatah’s 135. Voters focus on candidates’ stances on local issues and not larger political ideologies, and candidates do not run under their party affiliations.

2005: Palestinian Elections: Hamas boycotts the January 2005 PA presidential elections but wins 77 of 118 seats in ten local council elections in Gaza. In February, PA President Mahmoud Abbas convinces Hamas to agree to an informal ceasefire with Israel that will last until the end of 2005. In September, Hamas appears to lose its political momentum in West Bank local elections as Fatah takes 54 percent of the vote over Hamas’ 26 percent.

2006: Elections and the Aftermath:
Hamas wins 76 of 132 seats in the Palestinian parliamentary elections to Fatah’s 43 on January 26, putting it in a position to shape and form a new government under the recently adopted mixed electoral system. Shortly after elections, the Quartet (European Union, Russia, United Nations and United States) indicates that assistance to the PA will only continue if Hamas renounces violence, recognizes Israel and accepts previous Israeli- Palestinian agreements. Hamas refuses to abide by these demands. Nearly a month after the elections Hamas selects Ismail Haniyeh as its prime minister. At the same time Israel begins to withhold nearly $55 million in monthly tax and customs receipts to the PA.
The United States and EU halt aid payments to the Hamas-led government: instead they choose to funnel money through the UN and other independent organizations to the Palestinian people. A government is formed in early April, but conflicts remain between Abbas and Haniyeh over control of various ministries, security agencies and concerns over finances after international aid cuts.

2007: Unity Government and Internal Fighting:
In February, Fatah and Hamas form a unity government after negotiations brokered by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in Mecca. The Mecca Accord aims to stop periodic violence that killed more than 90 people in internal fighting, and seeks to allow for international aid to resume. Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas remains prime minister while Mahmoud Abbas remains president. Hamas controls nine ministries and Fatah six. The unity government, however, does not meet the international community’s three demands— recognizing the right for Israel to exist, forswearing violence and accepting previous Israeli- Palestinian agreements. United States and EU officials continue to avoid interacting with members of Hamas, and do not offer direct aid to the government. Israel continues its ban on meeting with the government, including withholding tax customs revenues. In June after armed clashes in Gaza and the West Bank that leave at least 90 dead, Hamas ousts security forces loyal to Fatah in the Gaza Strip in a violent takeover. Abbas, in turn, dissolves the unity government and appoints finance minister Salam Fayyad as prime minister. The United States and EU subsequently increase support for Abbas’s government in the West Bank and isolate Hamas.

Current Leadership

Khaled Meshaal—Unofficial leader of Hamas since 2004. Meshaal is currently based in Damascus, Syria, where he serves as Hamas’ top diplomat, gathering political and financial support for the movement.

Ismail Haniya—Current Hamas leader in Gaza and former prime minister of the Palestinian unity government. A younger member of the leadership, Haniya is seen as differing in tactics from other Hamas leaders. From the mid- 1990s through the Hamas takeover in Gaza, Haniya served as the liaison between Hamas and Fatah in Gaza.

Mahmoud al-ZaharForeign minister in the Hamas government and one of the founders of the movement. He also served as the personal doctor to Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Al-Zahar has been a primary participant in recent negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza.

Musa Abu-MarzuqDeputy political leader in Damascus. Marzuq has played a role in financing Hamas’ operations, and was convicted in absentia in 2004 by a U.S. court for financing and coordinating Hamas activities.

Aziz DweikSpeaker of the Palestinian parliament. Dweik lives in the West Bank and is seen as a more pragmatic Hamas leader.

Sheikh Muhammed Abu Tir— Senior Leader and second on Hamas’ national candidates list. Tir was a former member of Fatah and has spent 25 years in Israeli prison. He also has been outspoken about Hamas’ legislative intentions, stating Sharia will be a source of law but will not be imposed.

Mohammed Deif—Believed to be the former Gaza commander of Hamas’ military wing, Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades. Deif has been responsible for planning suicide bombings and other attacks against Israel and has frequently been targeted by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities. In July, 2006 Israel dropped a bomb on the house in which he was meeting other Hamas leaders, reportedly causing spinal injuries.

Ahmed al-JaabariGaza commander of Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades.

Said SiamInterior Minister of the Hamas government. Siam is considered to have planned Hamas’ takeover of Gaza and has participated in the recent discussions brokered by Egypt.



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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

Setting the Record Straight

Eye Still on the Ball

“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010
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