Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Bashar Assad (AP)
From Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace by Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky.
Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace is the product of a United States Institute of Peace study group that included William B. Quandt (University of Virginia), Steven L. Spiegel (UCLA) and Shibley Telhami (University of Maryland and the Brookings Institution). Its conclusions draw on more than 100 interviews and consultations with diplomats, political leaders and civil society figures involved in Arab-Israeli peacemaking in the past two decades from the United States, Europe and the Middle East.
1. Arab-Israeli peacemaking is in our national interest: September 11, Iraq and increasing instability in the Middle East have made U.S. leadership in the peace process more, not less, important. The president needs to indicate that the peace process is a priority and ensure that the administration acts accordingly.
2. U.S. policy must be seen as the president’s policy. Consultations with the parties must take place and policy revisions based on those consultations are inevitable, but U.S. policy must never be defined anywhere but in Washington.
3. The United States must not only exploit openings, but also actively encourage, seek out and create opportunities for peacemaking.
4. The peace process has moved beyond incrementalism and must aim for endgame solutions. This not only requires U.S. leadership to help the parties make the necessary trade-offs on core issues, but also a commitment to an expanded diplomatic approach that involves key international and regional actors.
5. Commitments made by the parties and agreements entered into must be respected and implemented. The United States must ensure compliance through monitoring, setting standards of accountability, reporting violations fairly to the parties and exacting consequences when commitments are broken or agreements not implemented.
6. The direct intervention of the president is vital, but presidential assets are finite and should be used selectively and carefully. Too direct a role runs the risk of devaluing the power of the office. Too modest a role runs the other risk of failing to capitalize on diplomatic openings.
7. Build a diverse and experienced negotiating team steeped in regional and functional expertise; encourage open debate and collaboration within the government. A dysfunctional policy process should not be tolerated.
8. Build broad and bipartisan domestic support and use political capital before it is too late in a presidential term. Keep Congress well informed. Cultivate close relations on Capitol Hill and with advocacy communities without being held captive to the agendas of domestic groups.
9. A successful envoy needs the strong and unambiguous support of the Whites House, credibility with all parties and a broad mandate. Envoys should not substitute for meaningful diplomacy. Better a policy without an envoy than an envoy without a policy.
10. Use the diplomatic toolbox judiciously and pay close attention to developments on the ground. Tools such as economic assistance and summitry should be used with strategic objectives in mind, not merely to buy time.
