Real Summit Disputes

Hazem Saghieh (Dar Al-Hayat)
March 31, 2008

[E]very Arab summit since the 1946 Anshas one and then the 1964 Cairo one has been tied to the Paletinian-Israeli issue, as if the Arabs and their summits—supposedly the culmination of their political lives—are unequivocally reduced to this issue. Yet, the question is slightly more complicated and twisted. This link between the summits and the Israeli issue happens to be the primary element responsible for voiding all summits of any meaning and turning them into purposeless ceremonial rituals. This is attributed to the fact that as a result of this link, the supposed joint Arab action has been based on the very issue on which joint action has no influence whatsoever. …

On the other hand, shifting the focus of the summits to live and effective issues where intervention and influence are possible represents an opportunity to revive these summits, resurrect them from their state of death, and pull them out of the loud ideological screaming where accountability is impossible, and turn them into real political tools for real states and societies. Based on our numerous experiences, our absolute unity over Palestine and against Israel literally means doing nothing. In contrast, disagreement over Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, or Morocco means setting foot into the realm of politics—by definition is a realm of disunity—in pursuit of influence and efficacy.

Needless to mention, the Syrian regime’s enthusiasm over linking the Palestinian-Syrian issue to the summits goes without saying. This has nothing to do with the ideologically stated "nationalism" of the regime or to any exceptional love for the Palestinian people or unique sympathy for its suffering. Rather, it is driven in this direction by its hostility toward politics at home where it has been exercising military domination since 1963, and by its animosity to the regional equations and balances which it attempted to escape via an alliance with Iran that bypasses the Arab world. Once all these contradictions are intensified in Lebanon, seeking refuge in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict became a requirement for the survival of the regime. Access the full article>>



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08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

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“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010

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