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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

09/04/08
From Zero-Sum to Win-Win  —Mara Rudman, adviser, Middle East Progress; senior fellow, Center for American Progress. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
09/04/08
How Progress Is Possible  —
08/07/08
How to Deal with Jerusalem  —Lt. Col. (Res.) Ron Shatzberg, Project Director, Economic Cooperation Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Two-State Solution Still Best Option

“In practical terms, we can reach two conclusions: First, a final-status agreement, although its details are known, cannot be secured in the foreseeable future. Second, the time has come to think about other solutions. One of them is a return not to the 1967 borders, but rather, to the reality that prevailed in 1967, when Jordan controlled the West Bank.”
—Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland, “The Jordanian Option,” YNet, September 3, 2008 versus
  • "On both sides of the green line and, indeed, wherever people think about solutions to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, a lot of old/new thinking is taking place. … Most of these ideas are patently unrealistic. Discussion of them often reflects despair, not pragmatic strategic thinking. … Precisely because there is no such alternative, other options more readily suggest themselves, ranging from temporary conflict management to three states or entities. Nor does failure today mean that tomorrow we cannot try again to arrive at a two-state solution, which remains the best option for all."
    —Yossi Alpher, coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications & former director, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, "One State Definitely Not an Option," bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008

    • Middle East Analysis

    • How Progress Is Possible —Hiba Husseini, chair, Legal Committee to Final Status Negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis; former vice chairperson of the Palestine Securities Exchange (1998-May 2005). Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
    • Perils of an Israeli Transition —The New York Times, Editorial
    • The Arabs Will Look Differently Upon America —Ron Pundak, director general of the Peres Center for Peace and former architects and negotiators of the Oslo Agreement (bitterlemons.org)

    Lebanon Political Crisis Timeline Since November 2007

    February 4, 2008

    Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Syrian President Bashar Assad (AP)

    For background on Lebanon’s political crisis before November 2007, click here.

    November 2007

    Presidential elections are delayed from November 12, as Lebanon’s rival coalitions, the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition and the pro-Syrian opposition, are unable to agree upon a suitable Maronite Christian candidate. Despite mediation from UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon as well as Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa and the French and Italian foreign ministers the two sides cannot agree on a candidate before President Emile Lahoud steps down after completing his term on November 23. On November 29 the rival coalitions agree on General Michel Suleiman, the Army’s chief of staff, as a presidential candidate. Since Gen. Suleiman is a member of the armed forces, Lebanon’s constitution must be amended to remove the two-year waiting period that restricts former senior civil servants from running for office. The Parliament is scheduled to meet on December 7 to vote on Gen. Suleiman.

    December 2007

    Rival coalitions, while ostensibly united on Gen. Suleiman, are unable to elect him because the sides cannot agree on the process for amending the constitution nor on the cabinet composition. Decisions on major national issues require two-thirds support of the 30-member cabinet. The Arab League proposed that the March 14 coalition be assigned 14 members, the opposition ten, and Gen. Suleiman choose the remaining. The opposition has called for 11 members, allowing it to block cabinet decisions. The election is postponed multiple times throughout the month, despite outside intervention from French and Arab League diplomats. The situation worsens when General Francois Hajj, appointed to succeed Gen. Suleiman as head of the Army, is assassinated on December 12.

    January 2008

    Elections are postponed throughout the month, but Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa continues to mediate between the two sides. He presents a three-point Arab initiative that calls for Gen. Suleiman to be elected president, the formation of a national unity government and the creation of a new electoral law. The March 14 coalition has accepted the proposal but the opposition now rejects Gen. Suleiman as a candidate, citing lack of faith that he would provide them with a veto as needed. Gen. Suleiman has called Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is reported to have shifted Syria’s support toward former foreign minister Faris Bouweiz. The opposition also begins to challenge Moussa and the Arab League’s independence from Egypt and the United States. In late January, Arab League foreign ministers meet in Cairo and decide to send Moussa back to Lebanon. His next meeting will focus on dividing cabinet seats between the two coalitions. The next parliamentary session to elect the president is scheduled for February 11.