January 28, 2008

Election Basics

February 18: delayed from January 8, 2008 after the assassination of former Prime Minister and leader of the Pakistan People’s Party Benazir Bhutto.

Parliamentary: 272 Seats in the National Assembly and 577 Seats in the four provincial assemblies (Balochistan, North West Frontier Province, Sindh, Punjab).

This election will not determine the presidency: President Musharraf was elected to another five-year term as president on October 6, 2007. The President of Pakistan is indirectly elected by the National Assembly, Senate, and the four provincial assemblies.

Lack of Security

Conflict between government forces and Taliban and Islamist groups. Security in Pakistan is tenuous since the recent increase in violence by the Taliban and Islamist militants, largely in response President Musharraf’s decision to send troops into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The FATA is an area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that is governed primarily by tribal leaders with little federal oversight. Over time, Islamist groups have found sanctuary in the area. While the Pakistani Army has had some success against militants, violent insurgency and acts of terrorism remain ongoing.

Increased political violence. Political candidates and parties have faced targeted violence, most prominently the assassination of former Prime Minister and Pakistan People’s Party leader Benazir Bhutto. This assassination is not the only instance of pre-election violence. Four political party workers of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League were assassinated and one former minister and current candidate narrowly escaped a suicide bomb in December.

Restrictions on Freedom of Speech and the Press

Media restrictions imposed during emergency rule still in effect. With the imposition of the state of emergency, which began on November 3, 2007 and lasted six weeks, press freedoms decreased significantly. Though the government recently eased some of these restrictions, a ban on the press criticizing the government remains in place.

Questions about electoral coverage by media. These continuing restrictions draw into question the ability of the media to cover the election properly. Independent television stations have faced particular restrictions while the official Pakistan Television network has maintained a strong pro-government stance. Speech restrictions apply to opposition political parties as well, limiting their ability to articulate their campaign messages for fear of arrest.

Restrictions on Political Organization and Assembly

Political leaders under house arrest. Many party activists and leaders are still under house arrest, including PPP leader and Supreme Court Bar Association president Chaudhry Aitzaz Ahsan. The government has selectively used Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits gatherings of more than four people without police authorization, to restrict local political activity and arrest party workers.

Political leaders barred from running for office. Nawaz Sharif, leader of one of Pakistan’s largest parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, is still barred from actually running for a seat in parliament, limiting his ability to lead his party.

Law not applied evenly in the country. The Political Parties Act, which governs the registration and organization of political parties, has not been extended to the FATA which prevents mainstream secular parties from mobilizing in these areas.

Voter Fraud

Voter intimidation and fraud. Independent groups like the Pakistani Free and Fair Election Network and U.S. National Democratic Institute have documented political parties attempting to illegally influence voters. Incidents of intimidation, focused particularly on those who are dependent on a landowner for their livelihood, have been noted across Pakistan. Bribes or promises of rewards after the election, such as development projects, are also regularly used by political parties.

No Independent Oversight Bodies

Judicial independence undermined. Shortly after imposing the state of emergency President Musharraf dismissed Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and other justices opposed to his decision. The court was expected to rule on the constitutionality of President Musharraf’s re-election while he was still an army officer. The justices appointed in their place were picked by Musharraf and have had to sign a loyalty oath to Musharraf. The Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of Musharraf’s re-election. Musharraf’s manipulation of the Supreme Court is part of a wider trend that has included the dismissal of over 40 senior justices, severely undermining the impartiality of the judicial system. Any challenges to election results will ultimately face a panel of judges whose legitimacy and independence are in doubt.

Election commission not seen as neutral. The official Election Comission (EC) is not viewed by the opposition as a neutral oversight body. Communication between the EC and opposition parties and transparency in the EC decision-making process is limited and problematic. The EC has shown little ability to actually enforce its mandate, with open violations of election law alleged against multiple parties, including the president. Assessments by outside election monitors have called into question the accuracy of the EC’s voter rolls, whose initial draft was 20 million names short of lists from the 2002 elections; more names have since been added, but some 10 million of them cannot be verified as accurate.

Caretaker government viewed as partisan. The current interim government is also viewed as partisan; caretaker cabinets at the federal and provincial levels are dominated by members of Musharraf’s PML-Q party, many of whom are running in the current elections. The powerful local government nazims, a position analogous to a mayor, are also predominantly aligned with the PML-Q, and opposition parties allege that many have provided government resources (vehicles, meeting spaces, even local development funds) to the ruling party.



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