October 1, 2007

UN Sanctions
Existing Sanctions:
Resolution 1696 - Adopted on July 31, 2006; demanded the cessation of Iranian “research and development” nuclear activities within one month.
Resolution 1737 - Adopted on December 23, 2006; banned the supply of nuclear-related technology by UN member states to Iran and required member states to freeze the assets of individuals and companies with ties to Iran’s nuclear program.
Resolution 1747 - Adopted on March 24, 2007; imposed a ban on Iranian arms sales and stated need for international financial institutions to end provision of funds to Iran.

Future Sanctions: The UN decided on September 28 to delay a third round of sanctions on Iran until after an IAEA report on the status of the Iranian nuclear program expected November 30. The U.S. seeks new sanctions to include punitive measures on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s al-Quds Force, prevent Iran from importing military equipment, strengthen penalties on banks and companies connected to Iran’s acquisition of military material, and tighten travel restrictions on Iranian officials.

U.S. Sanctions
Existing Sanctions:
U.S. economic sanctions against Iran have existed for nearly three decades. The sanctions were imposed initially by Executive Order during the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979 and were strengthened by the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), signed into law by President Clinton in 1995. This act banned trade and investment by U.S. companies with Iran. This legislation was renewed in 2001 and modified in 2006 to the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) omitting Libya. More recently, the U.S. stepped up pressure on foreign banks and companies conducting business with Iran.

Future Sanctions: The House passed the Iran Counterproliferation Act on September 25, which sanctions foreign companies with U.S. subsidiaries that invest in Iranian oil and gas sectors. In addition, the bill prohibits civilian nuclear cooperation with countries that support Iran’s nuclear program, calls for the State Department to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) a “foreign terrorist organization,” and takes away executive branch power to waive sanctions against firms that invest in the Iranian energy sector. The Senate approved the Kyl-Lieberman measure on September 26 which labeled the IRG as “a foreign terrorist organization,” which would allow for more severe sanctions. The administration is debating whether to label the entire Iranian Revolutionary Guard or more narrowly IRG’s al-Quds Force as a terrorist organization. This decision affects the depth and scope of possible future sanctions on the organization.

EU Sanctions
Existing Sanctions:
Iran’s economy is largely dependant on the European market; the EU accounts for some 40 percent of Iran’s imports. The EU approved a resolution on February 12, 2007 that imposed sanctions on individuals and companies linked to Iran’s nuclear program. A second round of sanctions was implemented on April 23, 2007, banning Iranian arms exports and freezing the assets of 28 additional individuals and organizations. The EU continues to follow a twin-track approach of diplomacy and sanctions.

Future Sanctions:
Given the delay on additional UN sanctions, France has proposed new sanctions to be introduced at the October 15 EU conference. This proposal would increase EU sanctions on companies and banks that invest in Iran.

Russia
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia played a key role in delaying the implementation of a third round of Iranian sanctions until after the release of the IAEA report. Russian hesitation to implement powerful sanctions on Iran arises from the countries’ military, economic, and political ties. Russia is Iran’s chief arms supplier with sales reaching $1.7 billion between 2002 and 2005. In addition, Russia is currently building a nuclear power plant in Iran, and President Putin is scheduled to visit Tehran on October 15.

China
China, also a member of the UN Security Council, played a supporting role to Russia in delaying a new round of UN sanctions on Iran. China has strong economic ties to Iran as the country serves as the third largest source of China’s oil imports, providing 12 percent of Chinese oil imports in the first ten months of 2006.



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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

08/20/10
Center for American Progress Welcomes Resumption of Direct Talks  —
08/10/10
A View from the Ground  —Darbaz Kosrat Rasul, chair, Rebaz Foundation. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
08/03/10
U.S.-Turkish Relations  —Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., recently returned deputy ambassador in Afghanistan; former ambassador to Egypt (2005-2008); and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires in U.S. embassy in Turkey (1995-1999). Congressional Testimony.

Setting the Record Straight

Eye Still on the Ball

“Adverse developments in Iraq will be (and will look to be) increasingly a function of the Obama Team taking their eye off of the ball and rushing to declare mission accomplished. Yes, in such a scenario the Iraqis should bear most of the blame, but the part that is due to U.S. action or inaction will be Obama's responsibility. And it will matter. Iraq is at the center of a region that every president since Jimmy Carter has identified as vital to our national security. Iraq is next door to, and the playground for mischief from, the most thorny national security challenge the United States faces: a nuclear-weapons-seeking Iranian regime. These inconvenient facts mean that if the Iraqi situation demands more focused and costly U.S. attention, it will likely get it. At that point, what sort of domestic coalition will be available for President Obama's Iraq policy?”
—Peter Feaver, director, Triangle Institute for Security Studies; former director for defense policy and arms control, National Security Council, “Obama’s Iraq Speech: Another Missed Opportunity,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2010versus
  • “Iraq is a strategically important place in the Middle East, just by its geographic location, by its population, by the influence it's had in the Middle East for a long time. So neighboring countries from around the Middle East have an interest inside of Iraq.

    “But I will tell you that I think Iraqis themselves are nationalistic in nature, and that's why it's important. A strong Iraq will defend itself against interference from outside countries, and I think as we build a strong Iraq and as we continue to build a strong security mechanism and as we continue to help them economically and diplomatically, that will make it less likely of others from the outside being able to interfere.

    “Now, for the vacuum as we see today, again, I remind everyone is that we still have a significant presence here, and we are not going to—we will not allow undue maligned influence on the Iraqi government as they attempt to form their government. What we're trying to do is provide them the space and time for them to do that, and we will continue to do that post 1 September. We'll still have a significant civilian presence, and again, we'll still have 50,000 troops on the ground here to ensure that this government can be formed by the Iraqis. And that all the other nations respect their sovereignty as they go about forming their government.”
    —General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, interview, “This Week” with Christiane Amanpour, August 8, 2010
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