Centrifuge: The most cost effective way of enriching uranium isotopes, a key step in the production of nuclear fuel. The Iranian Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz is designed to produce low-enriched uranium for energy production, but could be modified to produce highly enriched uranium necessary for a nuclear weapon. Such a modification, however, would be apparent to IAEA inspectors.
Just under 2,000: Number of centrifuges operating at the Natanz facility as of August 19th, 2007.
54,000: Total number of centrifuges that the Natanz facility could hold.
37.3 kg: Amount of highly enriched uranium 2,000 P1 centrifuges could produce in one year (based on Carnegie Endowment formula).
28 kg: Amount of highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon.
5-10 years: IAEA estimated time required for Iran to develop enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.
Current Iran-IAEA cooperation: On June 22, 2007, Iran and the IAEA began developing a working plan to address outstanding issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Talks were held in Tehran on July 12th, and led to an IAEA visit to the Iranian heavy water reactor in Arak on July 30th. The working plan was released August 27th, 2007, and included Iran’s agreement to allow one year-multiple entry visas to IAEA inspectors and staff. The working paper also set the next discussion of the Natanz inspection mechanisms (known as the “safeguards approach”) for September. Iran remains under UN sanctions for refusing to halt its enrichment program.

