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In-Depth Coverage

Original Commentaries

07/24/08
Strategy and Leadership Needed  —Lt. Gen. (Ret.) David W. Barno, U.S. Army; commander, Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (2003-2005); director, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, Natl Defense University. Interview with Middle East Bulletin.
07/22/08
What the U.S. Should Do  —Andrew Exum, former Army captain, led U.S. Army Rangers in Iraq and Afghanistan; Ph.D student, War Studies, King's College London. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.
07/08/08
Planning the Transition  —Ghaith al-Omari, director of advocacy, American Task Force on Palestine; former foreign policy adviser to Palestinian President Abbas. Original Commentary for Middle East Bulletin.

Setting the Record Straight

Neglecting Afghanistan

“[W]e're fighting two wars at once, three wars at once. We're fighting the global war on terror, we're fighting a war in Iraq, and we're fighting a war in Afghanistan. There are multiple demands on our forces. That's the reality of life at this point. The focus of our efforts clearly has been in Iraq, the battleground which Osama bin Laden identified as the central front in their war against us, the place in which they sought to set up a foothold for their caliphate that would reach into Europe.”
—Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell, DoD News Briefing, July 23, 2008  versus
  • “The most dangerous area of the world … representing the most significant U.S. national security threat … is not Iraq but the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. … [W]e still lack relevant, long-term strategies to achieve sustainable security and stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan.”
    —Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), speech, Brookings Institution, June 26, 2008
  • Middle East Analysis

    May 30, 2007

    With the new United Nations Security Council deadline looming in late May, neither side appears willing to relent. While some outside experts have advocated unconditional nuclear talks with Iran, the P-5 see little value in negotiating the nuclear issue while Iran continues to develop its enrichment capacity. Under these circumstances, Iran would have every incentive to drag out the talks while working to achieve its nuclear objectives.

    For its part, Iran fears that if it does agree to halt its activities, the P-5 would have their own reason to drag out the talks, keeping Iran’s enrichment programme on ice indefinitely while threatening to re-impose sanctions if Iran were to re-start it. …

    For now, Washington is prepared to let diplomacy ‘play out’ because Iran is not making rapid technical progress towards acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability and because Washington believes that its diplomatic strategy is having some effect. Ultimately, however, if Iran begins to reach critical technical thresholds, and diplomatic means fail to persuade Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment programme, then consideration of military options will come into play, despite all the risks and drawbacks. Access the full report>>