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Wednesday, August 08, 2007
Today's News
- Abbas and Mubarak Meet in Alexandria
- by Associated Press
Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas said Wednesday that Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip was destructive to the quest for a Palestinian state and reiterated his rejection of any talks with the militant group.
Abbas made the comments after talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, part of a flurry of meetings ahead of a U.S.-sponsored peace conference set for this fall.
- Stranded Palestinians Continue to Return to Gaza
- by Abdel-Rahman Hussein (Daily News Egypt)
Palestinians stranded in Egypt after the closure of the Rafah crossing could all be back by the end of the week if the rate of return continues as it is.
A further 950 Palestinians made their way to Al-Oja crossing Sunday to bring the number of returned Palestinians up to 3,350 since the crossing was opened on July 29.
- Attempts to Mediate Between Fatah and Hamas
- by Khaled Abu Toameh (The Jerusalem Post)
Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh said Tuesday he was prepared to step down to pave the way for the resumption of the Hamas-Fatah talks.
"There are attempts to open channels of communication between the two sides," he said.
According to one [Fatah] official, the efforts were still at an early stage, and the talks between the two sides were being held in the West Bank, Beirut, Cairo and Damascus, as well as a number of Gulf capitals.
- Egyptian Islamists Tried Behind Closed Doors
- by Emad el-Sayed (AFP)
The trial of 40 members of Egyptian opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood on charges of money-laundering and financing a banned organization resumed at a military tribunal Sunday amid calls to allow observers into the court.
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Setting the Record Straight
"For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East — and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people."
– Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, American University in Cairo, June 20, 2005
VS.
"I feel disappointed and betrayed by George Bush… He said that he is promoting democracy, but he has been manipulated by President Hosni Mubarak, who managed to frighten him with the threat of the Islamists."
– Saad Eddin Ibrahim, former Egyptian political prisoner, June 10, 2007
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Vital and Complicated U.S.-Egypt Relations
TODAY'S FEATURE
 Egyptian President Mubarak
"The revival of the peace process is likely to help moderate public attitudes [and] contribute to the stabilization of the entire Middle East."
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by Gamal A. G. Soltan, American University in Cairo & the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Bitterlemons International Egypt … is perplexed by the recent developments in Gaza. Testing the new waters, Egypt is keeping its cards close to the chest. An isolated Gaza is a liability Egypt wants to avoid. Attempts to reverse the recent territorial/ideological divide in Palestine are likely to dominate Egypt’s approach to the conflict…
In the security field, enhancing border control with Gaza is at the top of Egypt’s agenda. The consolidation of the PA’s grip over the West Bank is a top priority on the political level. In all cases, close consultation and coordination between the concerned parties, both within and without the region, is no longer a matter of choice. Access the full article>>
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Middle East Analysis
by Michele Dunne, Amr Hamzawy, and Nathan J. Brown, Carnegie Endowment
After the Bush administration made a striking departure from decades of U.S. policy to move democracy promotion to the center of its Middle East policy agenda, it dropped the issue just as suddenly in early 2006. Islamist gains in elections in Palestine, Egypt, and elsewhere created doubts within the administration about the wisdom of pressing forward assertively on electoral democracy. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq, particularly after the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing, and the increasing influence of Iran led the administration to devote more efforts to traditional (versus transformational) diplomacy. …
The idea that the United States must choose between pursuing its strategic political interests and domestic reform in Arab states—and revolutionary Islamist regimes—sets up false choices. The record shows, for example, that the Egyptian government cooperated closely with the United States on Arab–Israeli peace and on Iraq at the very time (2004–2005) the United States was pressing for political reform in Egypt with some seriousness. …
The United States should take advantage of the unique opportunity offered by the current phase of leadership succession in Egypt and encourage a gradual, responsible political opening that gives secular forces a chance to mobilize support and Islamists a stake in a system of democratic institutions. Only an approach involving sustained public and private diplomacy, in addition to assistance programs, will work. To be effective, the United States should ground its engagement in the demands of Egyptian civil society and opposition groups, who are now focusing on electoral systems, term limits, political expression by the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition forces, and human rights protections. Access the full article>>
Multiple Interests, Few Options
by Daniel C. Kurtzer, former ambassador to Egypt and Israel, Bitterlemons International
In the long history of Egyptian-Palestinian relations and in particular the relationship between Egypt and Gaza, there has been nothing to rival the current crisis in Gaza for intensity and for the implications it holds for future stability in the area. While it is too early to tell whether a fundamentally different relationship will develop between Egypt and Palestinians over Gaza, it is certain that Egyptian policy choices in the period ahead will be fraught with contradictory impulses. In the end, Egyptian decision-makers may not be able to decide what to do.
At least four vital national security interests come into play within Egyptian decision-making related to Gaza. For a political system in Egypt beset by its own internal and external challenges, the crisis in Gaza could not have come at a worse time. For example, there is no vice president and thus no constitutionally-sanctioned successor in line; the political system is sclerotic and subject to increasing pressures from within; and Saudi diplomacy has been more agile and deft than Egyptian diplomacy resulting in Saudi Arabia all but displacing Egypt as the locus of moderate Arab decision-making. Access the full article>>
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Heard on the Street
A Difficult Debate in Congress
On June 21, 2007, the House debated an amendment to the foreign operations bill conditioning aid to Egypt:
House Foreign Affairs Committee Member Jeff Fortenberry (R - NE): Mr. Chairman, it is critical to remember that our friend and ally Egypt led the Arab world in establishing a model for peaceful cooperation in the Middle East. The Camp David Accords ushered in an unprecedented era of cooperation between Egypt and the United States, as well as between Egypt and Israel. …
Egypt has been the cultural and historical center of the Arab world and is poised to play a significant role in fostering peace and maintaining a very delicate balance of stability in the Middle East. Even now, as my colleague mentioned, Egyptian President Mubarak is preparing for an emergency summit with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert, King Abdullah of Jordan, and Palestinian President Abbas to address the potentially explosive situation in Gaza.
Mr. Chairman, I fully understand the desire of my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee to see progress on human rights and civil reform in Egypt . I deeply share this concern as well and eagerly look for the right mechanism to achieve this goal. But I oppose the methodology of penalizing our diplomatic and military cooperation efforts.
U.S.-Middle East policy is complex and a delicate undertaking, at best. And despite the good intentions here, I fear that section 699 [which would condition part of U.S. assistance to Egypt on certification that Egypt adheres to basic human rights standards] could backfire and harm one of our best and most vital strategic relationships in the region.
Chairman of the Appropriations Committee David R. Obey (D-WI): We have a dilemma. Egypt is an important and welcome ally. I have always considered them to be a friend. They have played a very constructive role in the Middle East. But in recent years, I am sad to say, Egypt has displayed an increasingly brutal repression of freedom that is contrary to everything that America is supposed to stand for. …
We have to speak out… I do not naively believe that we can force democracy down the throats of a region that has had little experience with it. We have seen in the case of Hamas how democratic forms can be abused and subverted by undemocratic means. But, nonetheless, I do believe that we have an obligation to expect that countries with whom we are so closely associated will perform within certain norms of decency when it comes to the question of human rights.
To indicate our concern, while still expressing our respect for a treasured friend, we have fenced $200 million in military aid until the administration can honestly certify that Egypt has greatly improved its human rights conduct and has done more to effectively prevent the illicit supply of arms from being smuggled into Gaza.
In my view, this is a balanced approach. It does not cut off aid. It leaves options open. …
It is a balanced approach. It is a nuanced approach. It is aimed at military aid, because only the military in the Egyptian government, in my view, has the influence to make this come to a responsible and friendly conclusion.
Background Basics
Egypt’s Recent Efforts as Regional Mediator and Host
July 2007: With the help of Egyptian mediation, Israel and Hamas renew negotiations for captured Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.
June 2007: Saudi Arabia and Egypt announce they are willing to resume mediation of inter-Palestinian dialogue following Hamas takeover of Gaza strip.
July 2006: Egypt becomes key negotiator for release of Gilad Shalit.
February 2006: Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman urges newly elected Hamas government to renounce violence and recognize Israel.
February 2005: At regional summit, co-hosted by Egypt and Jordan in Sharm el-Sheikh, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Chairman Abbas declare an official end to the Al Aqsa intifada.
August 2005: Palestinian factions meet with Omar Suleiman in Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal. Faction leaders pledge their support for a ceasefire with Israel.
July 2004: Israeli delegation led by the Israeli Defense ministry political security chief, Amos Gilad, travels to Cairo for talks regarding Egypt’s security role in the Israeli disengagement from Gaza.
December 2003: Egypt mediates cease-fire talks between Palestinian factions, but is unsuccessful at reaching a settlement.
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Middle East Progress appreciates the support and cooperation of Americans for Peace Now, Geneva Initiative, Israel Policy Forum, and New Israel Fund.
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